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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 2009, a group of researchers from University of California, Los 
Angeles released the fi ndings of a study of low-wage workers in New York, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles, aimed at assessing the prevalence of workplace 
violations in the nation’s three largest cities.1 The result was eye-opening 
for lawmakers: federal and state employment laws are not providing 
adequate protections to the most critical, and indeed the most vulnerable, 
members of the United States (“U.S.”) workforce—immigrant workers. 
Among the report’s fi ndings, the fact that two-thirds of the workers surveyed 
suffered pay violations, losing roughly $2,600 in annual wages, which is 
about fi fteen percent of their yearly salaries, is especially alarming.2 This 
report, along with others, indicates the need for immigration reform has 
reached critical levels.
Regrettably, the political discourse over immigration reform is entangled 
in America’s culture wars.3 Anti-immigrant activists maintain that 
immigrants come to the United States to take advantage of social welfare 
programs, health care services, and birthright citizenship. However, this 
anti-immigrant rhetoric does not adequately explain why people actually 
pack up and leave their home countries to come to the United States. In 
reality, immigrants come to America for one overarching reason: work.4 
Commentators, politicians, judges, members of citizen militias, and 
others who fear that immigration is threatening our nation’s cultural 
and economic integrity believe that undocumented immigrants must be 
deported, arrested, or otherwise punished.5 Notably, the Naturalization Act 
1.  See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: 
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 16 (2009), available at 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1 (studying 
“workplace violation prevalence” among non-managerial and non-professional, “front-
line” employees).
2.  Id. at 50.
3. See Eve Conant, Razing Arizona, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 2010, at 34, 34–35, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/07/razing-arizona.html (assessing 
that, similar to the South African culture wars against apartheid, Latino organizations 
have rallied to punish the state of Arizona by forming a coalition centered around 
cultural identity).
4. See The Hub Nation: Immigration Places America at the Centre of a Web of Global 
Networks. So Why Not Make It Easier?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 2010, at 32 [hereinafter 
The Hub Nation] (characterizing immigrants as an asset to America because of their hard-
working attitude and entrepreneurial spirit).
5. See, e.g., Joseph Lelyveld, The Border Dividing Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 42 (explaining how Republicans tried to save their majority in 
Congress by using the issues of immigration and border security as the main focus of 
the 2006 election). Curiously, some of these critics have actually relied on 
undocumented workers themselves to their own personal benefi t. See, e.g., Michael 
Calderone, Report: Lou Dobbs Employed Illegal Immigrants, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 7, 
2010, 9:04 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_upshot/20101007cm_yblog_upshot/
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of 1790, which restricted citizenship to white persons serves to 
adequately illustrates the role that fear has historically played in the 
immigration debate. Yet, despite this long-held fear that the the United 
States is being overrun by immigrants, which historically manifested the in 
discrimination of southern European, Chinese, and other immigrant groups—
the U.S. is a nation of immigrants.6  
Immigration is a social and political issue that generates strong 
emotional feelings. On one side of the debate, we hear calls for sealing 
the borders and deporting undocumented immigrants. On the 
other side of the debate, we hear a call for the full inclusion of 
undocumented immigrants into broader society. No matter which 
passions are  invoked when debating the issues, immigration 
reform is vital because without large-scale immigration the United States 
cannot fi eld a competitive workforce.7 This Article argues that, in the 
absence of a competitive workforce, the current standard of living in the 
United States will erode, and the nation’s long term economic growth prospects 
will diminish.8 
As a matter of economic policy, there is no other option but to undertake the 
task of reforming our immigration laws. Central to this undertaking is an 
analysis of the operative nexus connecting the American immigrant 
demographic to the needs of the economy and to federal and state wage and 
hour laws.
II.  THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
Following the Enron and WorldCom scandals of the 1990’s and the 
more recent mortgage crisis, it is not surprising that the primary concern 
of the average American in today’s society is the restoration of the health 
and well-being of the U.S. economy. The effects of the Great Recession 
have been so devastating that leading economists, the U.S. government, and 
much of the public rightly feared that we just stood at the precipice
report-lou-dobbs-employed-undocumented-immigrants (reporting that Lou Dobbs, a 
celebrated anti-immigrant talk show host, relied on undocumented laborers for the upkeep 
of his multimillion-dollar estate and for tending to his private stable of horses).
6. See A Better Way: Utah May Offer a Better Model Than Arizona for Dealing 
with Illegal Immigrants, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2010, at 25, 26 (observing that while the 
people of Utah have a strong anti-immigrant sentiment, they still rally around an 
identity originating from the nineteenth century, when the success of the state was 
highly dependent on the labor of Irish and Chinese immigrants). 
7. See infra Part II (comparing Brazil, India, China, Japan and Germany’s economies 
and populations to that of the United States).
8. See infra Part II (proposing that because of the decline in the rate of native-born 
U.S. citizens, the U.S. will struggle to keep up with emerging economies).
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of an economic depression.9
Upon entering offi ce, President Obama assembled an all-star lineup of 
economists to tackle the fl oundering economy.10 These economists looked 
to the unprecedented interventionist policies of the U.S. government during 
the Great Depression.11 After all, it was the implosion of the American 
economy in the 1930’s that gave license to the Roosevelt Administration to 
beat back the predatory and rapacious form of capitalism that had come to 
dominate the market.12 The Roosevelt Administration, and many members of 
Congress understood that the country had veered away from a free market 
balance in which capital and labor were rationally and prudently deployed 
in the best interest of the nation.13
Both the Great Depression and the Great Recession were preceded by 
an accumulation of wealth in the hands of ever fewer individuals.14 On 
both occasions, the drive for immediate, short-term profi ts created an 
overheated fi nancial services sector whose meltdown resulted in large-scale 
destruction of American economic productivity.15 A fundamental law 
of economics is that profi ts cannot increase indefi nitely.16 Specifi cally, 
an economy focused on short-term profi ts generated by the fi nancial 
9. See, e.g., The Great Stabilization: The Recession Was Less Calamitous Than 
Many Feared. Its Aftermath Will Be More Dangerous Than Many Expect,  ECONOMIST, 
Dec. 19, 2009, at 15 (stipulating that without the drastic economic intervention of the 
government, the recession would have turned into a depression).
10.  See Off to Work They Go: Barack Obama Has Stacked His Cabinet with Clever 
Economists, but Can They Work Together? And What Will They Do?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 
29, 2008, at 31 (crediting Obama’s economic team members—Larry Summers, Peter 
Orszag, Christina Romer, and Paul Volcker—as some of the best economists, with 
extensive and impressive economic experience).
11.  See How New a Deal?: Comparisons Between Barack Obama and FDR Are 
Misguided, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2008, at 46 (indicating that Obama’s closest advisors 
consider the government intervention led by Roosevelt during the Great Depression an 
important area to study possible remedies to the recent recession).
12.  See Michael Hirsh & Daniel Gross, The Wisdom of Crowds: When Populist Rage 
Leads to Smart Policy, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 2010, at 26, 28–29 (explaining that during 
the Great Depression, an enraged general public focused on capitalist institutions—
such as Wall Street and banks—and Roosevelt was able to heavily regulate those 
institutions because intervention was required to quell the public outrage). 
13.  See Irving Howe, When America Entered the 20th Century, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 
28, 1986, at 3, 46 (emphasizing that the strong rhetoric Roosevelt used to attack the 
high concentration of wealth and power also allowed him to persuade Congress to 
shift from a capitalist focus to a humanitarian one).
14. See ROBERT B. REICH, AFTERSHOCK: THE NEXT ECONOMY AND AMERICA’S 
FUTURE 22–27 (2010) (noting that “[t]he share of total income going to the richest [one] 
percent of Americans peaked in both 1928 and in 2007, at over [twenty-three percent]. The 
same pattern held for the richest one-tenth of one percent . . . . And . . . for the richest [ten] 
percent . . . .”).
15.  See id. at 25–26 (identifying in both eras a working class engaged in 
performing services that, once credit ran out, reduced spending—ultimately forcing 
business to reduce spending through mass layoffs).
16.  See id. at 23 (“[I]t is an iron law of economics, as well as physics, that 
expanding bubbles eventually burst.”).
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services sector—at the expense of a production-based economy—is 
predisposed to predatory investment schemes that destabilize the workforce. 
 In both economic downturns, the full weight of the economic destruction
came crashing down upon the American middle class.17 The recent fi nancial 
downturn has left the U.S. economy struggling with high unemployment, 
rising poverty, and lost opportunity for individual advancement.18 
Meanwhile, at the same time, the productive capacity of  emerging economies,
like Brazil, India, and China, is expanding.19 These emerging market countries
have young, large populations;20 China and India, for example, have 
populations of about 1.2 billion, and Brazil is home to nearly 200 million 
people.21 Meanwhile, the populations of Japan and Germany, 
the developed world’s fi rst and second largest economies 
after to the United States, are aging and shrinking.22 
 Despite the declining birth rates of native-born U.S. citizens, the 
population of the United States continues to grow because of 
17. See John Wheeler, The Great Recession Has Hit the Middle Class the Hardest, 
BIZNETCENTRAL (Dec. 28, 2010), http://biznetcentral.com/2010/12/28/the-great-
recession-has-hit-the-middle-class-the-hardest (explaining that the middle class has 
been hit the hardest by the current recession, in large part as a result of drastic declines 
in home equity); cf. Reich, supra note at 14, at 23 (observing that a broad swath of 
Americans suffered during the Great Depression).
18.  See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 194 (2011), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf (reporting a rise in unemployment
from 5.8% in 2008 to 9.6% in 2010); Erik Eckholm, Recession Raises 
Poverty Rate to 15-Year High, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/us/17poverty.html (reporting the percentage of 
Americans living in poverty in 2009 at 14.3 percent—the highest since 1994).
19.  Cf. Nipping at Their Heels: Firms from the Developing World are Rapidly 
Catching Up with Their Old-World Competitors, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2011, at 80, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/17957117?story_id=17957117 (tracking
the resilience of businesses in Brazil, Russia, India, and China following the fi nancial crisis 
as compared with the more sluggish multinationals from developed nations ).
20. See, e.g., Jeff Schlegel, Rebuilding with BRICS: The Big Four of 
Emerging Markets are Back in Favor, FIN. ADVISOR MAG., July 2009, available at 
http://www.fa-mag.com/component/content/article/4269.html?issue=110&magazineID=1
&Itemid=73 (attributing much of India and China’s growth to their young population and 
growing middle classes). 
21. Shamim Adam et al., Evergreen Rises on Lure of $100 Billion 
China-India Trade: Freight Markets, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 07, 2011, 11:00 AM) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-07/fedex-maersk-add-shipping-routes-
for-china-india-prize-freight-markets.html; Brazil, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2011).
22. See WARREN SANDERSON, CTR. FOR INTERGENERATIONAL STUDIES, LOW 
FERTILITY AND POPULATION AGING IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES 
5 (May 2, 2008), available at http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/Japanese/pdf/shoushika/
SandersonWorkshop.pdf.
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immigration.23 For the U.S. to remain economically preeminent, its 
population must remain one of the largest in the world.24 Equally important
is a balanced demographic ratio between young and old.  Population growth
is crucial to America’s long-term economic security.25
In 1930, the U.S. population was 122,775,046,26 with about forty 
percent of the population under twenty years of age,27 and immigrants 
compring just over eleven percent of the total population.28 Today, the U.S. 
population stands at 308,700,00029 with less than twenty-eight percent 
under the age of twenty.30 Immigrants, however, still comprise merely 
twelve percent of the U.S. population.31 Population growth is projected to 
23.  See Sharon Jayson, CDC: Birthrates Decline Overall, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 
2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/yourlife/parenting-family/babies/2010-
12-22-birthdata22_ST_N.htm (reporting that birthrate levels are at record lows in the 
United States); Mark W. Nowak, Immigration and U.S. Population 
Growth: An Environmental Perspective, NEGATIVE POPULATION GROWTH, 
http://www.npg.org/specialreports/imm&uspopgrowth.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011) 
(“[Sixty percent] of the population increase in the United States between 1994 and 
2050 will be attributable to immigration and the descendants of immigrants.”).
24. See Population: Growth Is Good, ECONOMIST: FREE EXCH. (Dec. 23, 2010, 
2:11 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/12/population (arguing 
that slow population growth may lead to greater government debt). 
25. See Adam Ozimek, A Strange Model of the Economy, MODELED BEHAVIOR 
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://modeledbehavior.com/2010/12/22/a-strange-model-of-the-
economy/ (observing that an aging population requires governmental support and that 
it becomes a greater burden without a signifi cant working population to generate that 
fi nancial support).
26. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930, at 9 
tbl. 2 (1933). 
27. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1931, at 5 (1931) (recording that in 1930 about nine percent of the population was 
younger than fi ve years of age, twenty percent was between fi ve and fourteen years of 
age, and more than nine percent was between the ages of fi fteen and nineteen).
28. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2000, § 1, at 8 (2001) [hereinafter PROFILE OF FOREIGN-BORN 
POPULATION] (recounting immigration data from the 1930 census, in regards to 
immigration, for purposes of comparison to immigration data from the 2000 census). 
29.  Haya El Nasser, et al., 2010 Census: Slowest Growth Since Great Depression, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2011, available at http://content.usatoday.net/dist/custom/gci/
InsidePage.aspx?cId=tallahassee&sParam=41887628.story.
30.  United States—Age and Sex, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-qr_
name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_S0101&-ds_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_&-_lang=en&-
redoLog=false&-state=st&-CONTEXT=st (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Age 
and Sex Statistics].
31. Jeanne Batalova & Aaron Terrazas, Frequently Requested Information on 
Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, (Dec. 
2010), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=818 (reporting 
immigrants to comprise 12.5 percent of total U.S. population). 
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continue, reaching 439 million by 205032 with eighty-two percent of this 
growth coming from immigration.33 While the percentage of foreign-born
residents of the United States is no greater today than it was nearly eighty 
years ago,34 the national percentage of younger individuals has declined 
signifi cantly.35 This portends substantial economic challenges for the 
economy as the country grows ever older. 
Currently, roughly thirty-three percent of immigration into the United States 
comes from Asia and Europe, with less than fi fty-seven percent arriving from 
Mexico and Latin America.36 Nearly sixty-six percent of immigrants in the 
United States are either naturalized citizens or legal, permanent residents, while 
undocumented immigrants account for thirty percent.37 The employment 
rate for male, undocumented workers is ninety-six percent—substantially 
higher than that of their legal, immigrant counterparts.38 Not surprisingly, 
undocumented workers earn considerably less than U.S. citizens.39  
It is against the backdrop of the Great Recession, with competitive pressures 
from emerging markets, and an anti-immigrant climate, that the rights of 
the American laborer must be defended. In hindsight, it is clear that the 
challenges presented by the Great Depression necessitated the enactment
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) as a means to protect the health 
32. See Press Release, Robert Bernstein & Tom Edwards, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury (Aug. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.uscentralonline.net/uploadedfiles/An%20Older%20and%20More%20
Diverse%20Nation%20by%20Midcentury-US%20Census%20Bureau%20article%20v2.
pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (predicting that the United States will be both older and 
more ethnically diverse by 2050).
33.  Adriana Garcia, Whites to Become Minority in U.S. by 2050, REUTERS, Feb. 12, 
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/12/us-usa-population-
immigration-idUSN1110177520080212. Forecasts also indicate that by 2050, non-
Hispanic whites will no longer constitute a majority of the U.S. population. Id.
34.  See PROFILE OF FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, supra note 28, at 8 (providing 
that according to the 2000 U.S. Census, the percentage of foreign-born individuals 
living in the U.S. was the highest since 1930).
35. Compare Age and Sex Statistics, supra note 30, with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1931, supra note 27, at 5 (providing 
that in 2009, only twenty-seven percent of the population was under twenty years old, 
as compared to thirty-eight percent in 1930).  
36.  ROBERT SHAPIRO & JIWON VELLUCCI, NEW POLICY INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF 
IMMIGRATION REFORM ON THE WAGES OF AMERICAN WORKERS 1 (2010), available at 
http://ndn.org/paper/2010/impact-immigration-and-immigration-reform-wages-american-
workers.
37.  Id. (providing that while just one-third of all workers earns less than twice the 
minimum wage, two-thirds of undocumented workers earn that amount).
38.  See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, ET. AL., URBAN INST., UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: 
FACTS AND FIGURES 1 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=1000587 
(noting that on average, the higher participation in the work force of immigrant 
workers is due to the younger average age of undocumented men and a reduced 
likelihood of undocumented workers opting out of work force participation due to 
disability, retirement, or schooling). 
39.  Id.
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and welfare of the U.S. workforce.40 Likewise, the pressures created by the 
current economic crisis necessitate legislation to protect the U.S. immigrant 
workforce.
III.  THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
 A. The FLSA and Undocumented Immigrants
The FLSA is the preeminent civil rights legislation protecting workers’ 
pay. The objective of the FLSA is the elimination of “labor conditions 
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard[s] of living 
necessary for health, effi ciency, and general well-being of workers . . . . ”41 
So, what does the FLSA have to do with immigration reform? In short, the 
answer is quite a lot.
It is often said that immigrants perform jobs that Americans will not. 
Without questioning the validity of this assertion, the United States has 
not shut its doors to immigration because native-born Americans refuse to 
perform certain jobs. The door to immigration has been open 
since Colonial America because the U.S. economy relies on the 
manpower of immigrant laborers to remain competitive.
While immigrants fi ll all types of jobs in the United States, 
undocumented immigrants typically perform intensive manual labor in 
industries like construction, agriculture, and food service.42 Without the 
manpower resources of the undocumented immigrants who reside in the 
United States, many if not all, American business enterprises would suffer 
substantial and adverse economic consequences.
While most employers comply with the FLSA, many take advantage of 
the undocumented status of immigrant laborers. One Government 
Accounting Offi ce study found that non-profi t and government agencies 
across the country reported that “day laborers complained at least once a 
week about nonpayment of wages.”43 The failure to compensate 
undocumented immigrants in accordance with the federal and state wage
40.  See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201–219 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010) (providing that private sector employers shall provide employees, among other 
protections, a baseline minimum wage and overtime).
41. See id. at § 202(a) (providing that the absence of minimum standards for 
workers obstructs the national economy and “constitutes an unfair method of 
competition in commerce”).
42. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A PORTRAIT 
OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES fi g. 5  (2009), available at 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1190/portrait-unauthorized-immigrants-states.
43.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-925, WORKER 
PROTECTION: LABOR’S EFFORTS TO ENFORCE PROTECTIONS FOR DAY LABORERS COULD 
BENEFIT FROM BETTER DATA AND GUIDANCE 14–15  (2002) (reporting that over half of 
day laborers do not receive the wages that are due to them under state and federal law).
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and hour laws is widespread and frequent, extending well beyond day 
laborers.44
Nowadays, just as during the Great Depression, workers are forced to suffer
the twin evils of overwork and underpay. It was amidst the unprecedented 
economic challenges of the Great Depression that Congress enacted the 
FLSA “to protect ‘the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifi ce a full 
measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profi t of others.’”45 
In enacting the FLSA, Congress intended to eliminate substandard 
working conditions by establishing a minimum wage and requiring 
employers to pay an overtime premium of one and one half times an 
employee’s regular hourly rate for work exceeding forty hours per week.46 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt heralded the FLSA as “the most far-
reaching, far-sighted program for the benefi t of workers ever adopted here 
or in any other country.”47
By design, the FLSA’s purpose is “remedial and humanitarian.”48 To 
effectuate its goals, the FLSA requires courts to interpret its application 
broadly.49 For instance, the FLSA “defi nes the verb ‘employ’ expansively 
to mean to ‘suffer or permit to work.’”50 This defi nition of employ is “the 
broadest defi nition that has ever been included in any legislation.”51 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has directed courts to expansively construe 
the term “employee;” which, under the FLSA, is defi ned as “any individual 
44. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: 
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 5 (2009) (fi nding 
that foreign-born workers are victims of the highest incidence of FLSA violations
compared to even native-born minority groups within the United States).
45. Benshoff v. City of Va. Beach, 180 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Tenn. 
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)).
46.  See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (declaring that the policy considerations contained in the 
FLSA including the maintenance of worker well-being required Congressional 
regulation of industry); § 206 (requiring employers to pay minimum wages to 
employees covered under the FLSA); § 207(a)(1) (stipulating overtime compensation if
a worker’s workweek is longer than forty hours). 
47. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Party Primaries (Jun. 24, 1938), 
reprinted in 1938 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: 
THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR LIBERALISM 391, 392 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 
1941).
48.  Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 
(1944), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 
84 (1947) (codifi ed as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2006)).
49. Id.
50. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(g)).
51. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945) (observing the 
broad reach of the term “employee” that Congress intended under FLSA is based, in 
part, on Senator Black’s statements on the Senate fl oor during the congressional debate
of the FLSA (citing 81 CONG. REC. 7657 (1937) (statement of Sen. Hugo Black))).
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employed by an employer.”52 
There is no enabling language contained in the FLSA that extends its 
provisions to undocumented immigrants.53 However, FLSA coverage
has been extended to undocumented immigrants by the courts as consistent 
with congressional intent and U.S. immigration policy.54 If the protections
of the FLSA were not afforded to undocumented immigrants, a perverse 
economic incentive for employers to seek out and hire undocumented 
immigrants at rates lower than the minimum wage would emerge. Such a 
policy would stimulate an infl ow of undocumented immigrants and put 
downward pressure on the wages earned by all Americans. The end 
result would be the denigration of the health and welfare of the entire 
American workforce.  Thus, enforcing the wage and hour laws on behalf of 
undocumented immigrants—a substantial portion of the American 
workforce—is sound economic policy.
It is no accident that courts have interpreted the FLSA’s defi nition of 
employee to extend  “to citizens and aliens alike [irrespective of] whether 
such aliens are documented or undocumented . . . .”55. Some courts have
gone so far as to hold employers liable for retaliation if they report an 
undocumented laborer to immigration authorities for asserting their rights 
under the FLSA.56
Despite the right of undocumented immigrants to avail themselves of the 
FLSA, studies show that undocumented immigrants are reluctant to report a 
variety of labor and employment law violations because they feel insecure 
about their immigration status.57 As one court explained: 
52.  29 U.S.C.§ 203(e)(1). See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 
(1947) (confi rming that the FLSA’s defi nition of “employ” is broad and reiterating that 
this breadth is conferred to the determination of who is an “employee” for purposes of 
the Act).
53.  See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 202–218(c) (providing no jurisdictional bar (or 
grant) based on an employee’s immigration status).
54. See, e.g., Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding 
that extension of FLSA coverage to undocumented workers actually furthers the goals 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 because without FLSA coverage 
for undocumented immigrants, employers would be incentivized to hire undocumented 
workers in an effort to skirt federal wage and hour regulations).  
55. In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987). See Patel v. Quality
Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (“FLSA’s coverage of undocumented aliens
is fully consistent with the [Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986] and the
 policies behind it.”).
56.  See, e.g., Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 
1053, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (denying the defendant employer’s motion to dismiss an 
undocumented immigrant’s claim, alleging retaliation for fi ling a claimed violation of 
the FLSA against her employer).
57.  See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 667, 676–79 (2003) (reporting the statistics of a survey that found that about 
thirty percent of workers did not inform Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration about their employer’s violations because they feared deportation).
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Many of these workers are willing to work for substandard wages in our 
economy’s most undesirable jobs. While documented workers face the 
possibility of retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their labor and 
civil rights, undocumented workers confront the harsher reality that, in 
addition to possible discharge, their employer will likely report them to 
the [immigration enforcement authorities] and they will be subjected to 
deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution . . . . As a result, most
undocumented workers are reluctant to report abusive or 
discriminatory employment practices.58
Knowing that undocumented immigrants are vulnerable, unscrupulous 
employers willfully ignore immigration status during hiring and save 
money assembling a workforce that is unlikely to report violations of 
employee rights.59 While these employers choose to circumvent 
the immigration laws at the time of hiring, they callously threaten their 
undocumented workers with the same laws if they complain.60 
These unscrupulous employers are not only “gaming the system,” but 
they are also undermining U.S. labor and immigration policy objectives. To 
balance the leverage that employers have over undocumented immigrants, 
it is essential that FLSA enforcement take priority over immigration 
enforcement. By excluding a worker’s immigration status from the FLSA 
enforcement calculus, undocumented workers are less likely to forgo 
reporting wage and hour law violations or shy away from joining FLSA 
litigation.61
Experience shows that when an employer fails to properly pay wages to 
one employee, the employer is likely to operate under a common scheme, 
practice, or policy of paying all similarly situated employees less than their 
due wages. At the heart of the FLSA’s remedial attributes is the permissive 
joinder device of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which prescribes the issuance of 
notice to a collective class of similarly situated employees for the joint 
58.  Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal
citations omitted) (“The aliens themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they 
cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation.” 
(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975))). 
59.  See id. at 1072.
60.  See Montoya v. S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 
(D. Md. 2008) (couching the need for preventing employers from collaterally 
defending alleged FLSA violations on the grounds of the plaintiffs’ immigration status
as being necessary to “the effectiveness of the FLSA”); see also Rivera, 364 F.3d at 
1065 (speculating that allowing an employer to inquire into a worker’s immigration 
status would allow it to threaten the worker that raises a legal claim against the 
employer with deportation). 
61.  See Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192–93 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that injury that potentially would befall an FLSA claimant-
worker far outweighs any need for its disclosure during the litigation of alleged FLSA 
violations). 
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prosecution of statutory wage violations.62 The mandate given to a plaintiff 
to bring suit on his own behalf or on behalf of similarly situated employees
is perhaps the greatest remedial aspect of the FLSA, aimed at preserving the 
health and welfare of laborers industry-wide for the benefi t of the American 
public.63
Marroquin v. Canales,64 brought by CASA de Maryland65 on behalf of a 
group of undocumented day laborers, illustrates the interplay between the 
needs of the economy, the treatment of undocumented day laborers, and 
the remedial attributes of the FLSA. In Marroquin, the defendant employer 
hired about 150 Latino immigrant men of limited education, income, and 
resources as day laborers to perform debris removal work in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina.66 The day laborers were hired in Maryland and 
transported by vans to Mississippi, where they were promised lodging and 
ten dollars per hour for their work.67 The day laborers began work 
immediately upon their arrival at dawn and were housed in tents, trailers, and 
apartments.68 Between twelve and sixteen people were lodged in each trailer 
with four to six people sleeping in each room.69 In the lawsuit, the laborers 
claimed that defendants failed to pay them federal minimum wage and overtime 
wages.  They sought collective action certifi cation of the lawsuit pursuant
to § 216(b) on their own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated 
employees.70 In certifying the collective action and authorizing notice to 
similarly situated plaintiffs, the court held that the “notifi cation effort is 
warranted in light of the testimony produced, the importance of adequate 
notifi cation in an ‘opt-in’ regime such as this, the nature of this population
and the defendants’ apparent failure to maintain adequate records.”71 
62.  See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 167, n.1, 170 
(1989) (demonstrating that any employee may bring an action on behalf of similarly 
situated groups of employees as long as she has their written consent implying that they 
have received accurate and timely notice of the proceedings under § 216(b)).
63.  See Id. (stating that the FLSA aims to facilitate notice 
and remedy to all those affected by the claim and to expedite the 
judicial process).   
64.  505 F. Supp. 2d 283 (D. Md. 2007).
65.  CASA de Maryland, Inc. is the largest immigrants’ rights organization in the 
state of Maryland. The organization runs fi ve worker centers throughout the state and 
offers a number of services to the community including education, vocational training, 
fi nancial literacy, social services, health access and promotion, and legal services. 
History, CASA DE MARYLAND, http://www.casademaryland.org/about-mainmenu-26/
history-mainmenu-63 (last visited June 21, 2011). 
66.  Marroquin, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88.
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. at 288 & n.3.
69.  Id. at 288, n.3.
70.   Second Amended Complaint at 3, Marroquin v. Canales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 283
 (D. Md. 2007) (No. CCB-05-3393), 2005 WL 4678916 at *1.
71.  Marroquin v. Canales, 236 F.R.D. 257, 262 (D. Md. 2006).
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In 2005, a New York Times article drew attention to the rampant wage
and hour law violations affecting the 2.3 million people who work in the 
janitorial services industry.72 The root causes of these statutory violations
were attributed to the fact that “cleaning contractors frequently hire 
immigrants, often without proper papers and at low wages, trying to 
squeeze out profi ts as they submit rock-bottom bids to win business. The 
immigrant workers dare not complain about safety or minimum-wage 
violations for fear of being fi red—and possibly deported.”73  At that time, it 
was estimated that ninety percent of the janitors in Los Angeles alone were 
immigrants and, of these, half were undocumented.74
The widespread employment of undocumented immigrants in the 
janitorial services industry at substandard wages resulted in liability for 
these statutory violations to several well-known companies.  For instance, 
in 2005, Wal-Mart agreed to an $11 million settlement with the Department 
of Justice after twelve Wal-Mart contractors pleaded guilty to employing 
350 undocumented workers as janitors in stores across twenty-one states.75 
Similarly, a Target contractor entered into a $1.9 million settlement after 
the Department of Labor discovered that 775 immigrant janitors in several 
states had been refused overtime pay.76 In addition, the largest supermarket 
chains in California settled with 2,000 janitors—many of whom where 
undocumented—for $22.4 million over allegations that many of the 
affected workers received substantially less than minimum wage while 
working seven nights a week.77
These examples illustrate the realities of many undocumented laborers 
who work in the shadows of our society, performing the sort of back-
breaking physical work that makes the lives of most Americans more 
comfortable and far more affordable. When walking into our homes, our 
supermarkets, or our big-box retailers, it is not at the forefront of our minds 
that the foundations have been laid, the fl oors have been cleaned, and the 
food has been processed and packaged by immigrant laborers.
In the examples cited above, employers assembled workforces that 
relied extensively on undocumented immigrants. These undocumented 
immigrants uncharacteristically asserted their rights under the FLSA. Yet, 
for every FLSA wage claim brought, dozens more go unasserted.
72.  See Steven Greenhouse, Among Janitors, Labor Violations Go with the Job,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005 at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/13/
national/13janitor.html?pagewanted=all. 
73.  Id.
74.  Id. 
75.  Id.
76.  Id.
77.  Id. (reporting that the janitors were receiving an hourly rate of just $3.50).
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The importance of the FLSA as a tool in promoting the health and 
welfare of the U.S. economy cannot be overstated. If the courts and the 
Department of Labor vigorously enforce the wage and hour laws on behalf
of undocumented immigrants, the ability of unscrupulous employers to 
exploit U.S. immigration policy and undermine the health of the U.S. 
workforce will be dramatically curtailed. Violations of wage and hour laws
result in huge costs to public coffers since the full amount of taxes due 
are not paid to state and federal authorities.
To combat the rampant fl outing of the FLSA, plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
empowered to act as “private attorneys general” in the enforcement of 
wage and hour laws and earn their fees under the FLSA’s fee shifting 
provisions.78 By empowering the individual laborer to assert claims on 
behalf of similarly situated employees and by awarding attorneys fees, the 
FLSA’s permissive joinder provisions operate like similar provisions of 
Title VII.79 By acknowledging the undeniable reality that immigration 
is essential to the growth and prosperity of the U.S. economy and by
recognizing that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants are 
gainfully employed, we can accept that zealous enforcement of the 
FLSA in favor of undocumented immigrants is essential to the health and well-
being of the of the U.S. economy.
 B.  The Role of Legal Service Organizations.
The most important public service provided by legal service 
organizations like CASA de Maryland is community education.80 
Considering the limited resources available to organizations that focus their 
efforts on legal advocacy for immigrant workers, the task of defending
78.  See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“Any employer who violates the provisions of 
[the FLSA] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their 
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, 
and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages . . . [including] a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and the costs of the action.”); cf. Rivera v. 
NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a similar provision 
contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows alleged discriminatees to 
act as “private attorneys general” in effectuating the purpose of Title VII).
79.  See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“An action . . . may be maintained against any 
employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves
and other employees similarly situated.”); cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) (“[T]he private right of action remains an essential means of 
obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII . . . . In such cases, the private litigant not
only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against 
discriminatory employment practices.” (alterations in original)).
80.  CASA de Maryland’s legal staff provides “Know Your Rights” presentations 
to groups of day laborers, domestic workers, and tenants’ associations on a range 
of topics including wage and hour law, workers’ compensation, employment 
discrimination, and general housing issues. Know Your Rights, CASA DE MD., 
http://www.casademaryland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=743&
Itemid=126 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
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the rights of those who have been wronged by their employers cannot be 
accomplished if the worker community is not empowered to advocate on 
its own behalf. Therefore, enabling workers to recognize when their rights 
are being infringed upon and to take the necessary steps to preserve their 
ability to seek legal remedies is a critical component of a grassroots 
immigrant’s rights mission.  
Far too often, aggrieved workers come to CASA with stories of 
employers who acknowledge their unlawful acts with impunity because of 
the workers’ inability to pay for legal representation or current unlawful 
immigration status. 81 Despite the fact that the right to recover wages does 
not depend on immigration status or legal representation, the threat of 
reporting a particular worker or group of workers to law enforcement 
authorities is commonplace and plays a signifi cant role in deterring low-
wage workers from reporting workplace abuse.82  
At times, the physical and psychological abuse suffered by low-wage 
workers extends far beyond the failure to pay appropriate wages. In one 
instance, a female grocery store clerk who initially complained of wage and 
hour violations later revealed that her employer had also sexually assaulted 
her. The employer forced her to engage in sexual acts and threatened to have 
her deported and separated from her young daughter if she refused. Due to 
a lack of physical force in the assault, her complaint with the police was not 
investigated and her only recourse was to seek a peace order, temporarily 
restricting her assailant’s ability to contact her. This story illustrates the 
harsh realities of living in a state of perpetual fear and unchecked 
vulnerability. Viewed through this lens, it is easy to understand how so 
many unscrupulous employers formulate “wage chiseling” business 
models.83
IV.  CASE STUDY: MARYLAND WAGE AND HOUR LAWS
 Maryland boasts two of the strongest employment laws in the 
country: the Maryland Wage and Hour Law84 and the Maryland Wage
 
81.  See CASA OF MARYLAND, WAGE THEFT: HOW MARYLAND FAILS TO PROTECT 
THE RIGHTS OF LOW WAGE WORKERS 5–7 (2007) [hereinafter WAGE THEFT], available 
at http://www.casademaryland.org/storage/documents/wagetheft.pdf (documenting six 
pervasive practices by employers that deny immigrant workers their employment and 
labor rights).
82.  Cf. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064-65 (noting the reluctance of undocumented 
workers to report employers, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and substandard 
working conditions).
83.  See WAGE THEFT, supra note 81, at 4 (“Thus while it is incredibly diffi cult to 
get by, let alone support a family on the minimum wage, any wage violations that 
chisel away at already-low take-home pay make survival even harder.”).
84.  MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL., §§ 3-401–3-431 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 
2010).
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Payment and Collection Act.85 Perhaps the most impressive statutory 
protection provided by these laws is the provision that allows for an award 
of treble damages in cases where a defendant is found to be delinquent on 
wage payments to employees.86 Maryland’s Governor, Martin O’Malley,
recently signed into law a bill clarifying the state’s defi nition of “wage” 
as including overtime pay.87 In doing so, he expanded the reach of the 
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Act by allowing employees to sue 
for unpaid overtime wages and permitting judges to award treble damages 
in the absence of a genuine dispute over the payment of wages.88
Theoretically, the treble damages provision, which is more severe than 
the standard double damages provision found in the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act, provides a convincing deterrent to unscrupulous employers 
that seek to exploit low-income workers and rob them of their hard-earned 
wages. Unfortunately, in this case, theory and practice fail to align. Lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and extremely limited access to resources make 
participation in the legal process and self-advocacy virtual impossible
for the low-wage worker community.  
These barriers are exacerbated when immigrant workers lack suffi cient 
English language skills. In addition, the fact that most of these individuals 
are unaware of their rights—or of the avenues of relief that may be 
available to them should those rights be violated—results in millions of 
workers left exposed and unprotected. Aggressive, predatory employers 
take advantage of these enforcement shortcomings and turn wage theft and 
exploitation into a common business practice. Low-income workers often 
“attest to the devastating effects of wage theft” on their efforts to overcome 
their marginalized status in society.89 These workers struggle “to cover 
basic expenses for rent, food, and medical costs, and [are frequently unable
to remit wages] overseas to families who depend on that income for 
survival.”90 Yet, wage theft largely remains a consequence-free practice for 
employers.  
Assuming that an aggrieved employee is aware of her rights to a 
minimum wage and overtime and has been refused payment by her 
employer, what can she do? Many low-wage immigrant workers feel as if
there is not much available to them in terms of legal redress. Although 
a worker may have the right to take a claim for unpaid wages to court, the
85.  LAB. & EMPL., §§ 3-501–3-509. 
86.  LAB. & EMPL., § 3-507.2(b).
87.  2010 Md. Laws 1158–60.
88.  LAB. & EMPL., § 3-507.2(b) (providing employees the ability to recover three 
times their actual damages for willful employer violations of Maryland Wage and Hour 
laws).
89.  WAGE THEFT, supra note 81, at 1.  
90.  Id.
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reality is that there is a high likelihood that the employer is judgment proof 
or will not respond to a court summons. This may be because the employer 
is truly destitute or, more likely, has put its assets in someone else’s name, 
making collection on a judgment almost impossible.  
For these immigrant workers, taking time off to prepare testimony
and later attend a court hearing can be a costly proposition as well as 
discouraging if the employer, cognizant of the legal pitfalls, does not show up 
to court. The chance in these cases is slim of either collecting back wages or 
fi nding available resources to aid the immigrant worker’s collection efforts. 
From the perspective of the unscrupulous employer, there are no incentives to 
appear before a judge and explain why wages were withheld in the fi rst place.
The resources available at the state level are equally ineffi cient. The 
Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (“DLLR”) is 
the state agency tasked with investigating and resolving unpaid wages and 
other employment disputes in conjunction with the Attorney General’s 
Offi ce. 91 In order to fi le a claim for wages, an employee must fi ll out a 
form, available online in English and Spanish, and submit that form and 
any supporting documentation to the state agency by mail. 92 Complaints 
may also be made over the phone, but Spanish-speaking complainants are 
often discouraged by long, automated messages in English that they cannot 
understand.93 Additionally, due to lack of funding from the State, the size 
of DLLR’s investigatory staff is well below what is necessary to address 
the overwhelming number of complaints received each year.94 This staffi ng 
shortage is further complicated by the very limited number of Spanish-
speaking investigators in an area where many of the victims of the most 
egregious “wage chiseling” practices are only able to communicate in 
Spanish.95  
91.  See MD. DEP’T OF LAB. LICENSING & REGULATION, THE MARYLAND GUIDE 
TO WAGE PAYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 5 (2010) [hereinafter MD. WAGE 
PAYMENT & EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS], available at http://www.dllr.state.md.us/
labor/wagepay/mdguidewagepay.doc (describing the Employment Standard Service’s 
investigation process and the possibility of criminal charges brought on behalf of the 
employee by the Attorney General). 
92.  MD. DEP’T OF LAB. LICENSING & REGULATION, WAGE CLAIM FORM, available 
at https://www.dllr.state.md.us/forms/essclaimform.doc (last visited Feb. 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter WAGE CLAIM FORM].
93.   MD. WAGE PAYMENT & EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS, supra note 91, at 5. 
94.   WAGE THEFT, supra note 81, at 10 (discussing staffi ng cuts, from a high of 
twenty investigators to six or fewer in recent years, making it impossible to suffi ciently 
investigate the claims received).
95.  See id. at 15 (asserting the need for the Employment Standards Division to 
provide information on rights in various languages to accommodate the large population of 
non-English speakers in the Maryland workforce). 
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Once all of these hurdles are overcome by a worker seeking to collect 
unpaid wages, the process of investigating a particular claim can take as 
long as, or even longer than, fi ling a claim in district court. At times, 
claimants have waited a year or longer to receive a response from state 
investigators.96 Even then, many of the same collection problems persist. 
 When DLLR is unable to resolve a claimant’s case during the 
investigative process, the case will be referred to an Assistant Attorney 
General (“AAG”) for review.97 If the AAG concludes that the case has 
merit and is ripe for litigation, an offi cial claim will be fi led in court.98 At 
this point, months after the initiation of a claim by a worker dependent on
his earnings for basic survival, the case heads to court. However, if the 
employer fails to appear and a default judgment is entered against him, the 
worker is back to square one with his available resources fading fast.
V.  CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM
The 110th and 111th Congress failed to pass substantial immigration 
reform legislation. While the House passed the Development, Relief and 
Education for Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act during the lame duck session 
in the 111th Congress, the Senate failed to pass it.99 The DREAM Act, 
if enacted, would provide a pathway to citizenship for “a small child 
smuggled in [his] mother’s arms . . . [to] the United States” who graduates 
high school with no serious criminal record and either completes two years
of college or serves in the military.100 It is hard to imagine that Congress
could undertake any movement toward immigration reform if it could not 
pass the DREAM Act.  
96.  See id. at 8–10 (attributing shortcomings in investigations to decreases in funding 
for wage enforcement agencies, leading to a failure to address large amounts of worker 
claims).
97. See MD. WAGE PAYMENT & EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS, supra note 91, at 5 
(stating that if the Employment Standards Service of the Maryland Division of Labor 
and Industry fails to resolve the dispute after an investigation is conducted and efforts
to settle the case are attempted, the agency may then pursue a court remedy); see also 
MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 3-507(a) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010) (providing 
that the Commissioner of Labor and Industry may, after fi nding a violation, refer the
case to the Attorney General to bring an action on behalf of the aggrieved employee).
98.  See WAGE CLAIM FORM, supra note 92 (detailing the process followed to 
establish an unpaid wages claim against an employer by an employee).
99.  See Michael Winerip, Dream Act Advocate Turns Failure into Hope, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/
education/21winerip.html (characterizing how a young activist witnessed the success of 
the bill in the House of Representatives and its demise in the Senate after it failed to 
receive the sixty votes needed in December 2010).
100.  Roger Simon, Congress Displeases on DREAM, POLITICO, Dec. 21, 2010, 
available at http://politico.com/news/stories/1210/46633.html (characterizing the 
intended benefi ciary of the DREAM Act).
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The longer Congress remains deadlocked over immigration reform, 
organizing efforts at the grassroots level to continue the fi ght for social 
and political equality to empower a community of workers conditioned 
to tolerate abuse and expect injustice becomes increasingly critical. Changing 
that mindset of tolerance and inspiring trust and confi dence in a system 
that has consciously turned its back on millions of people in need of help 
will not be accomplished overnight, nor will it be accomplished by a single 
individual or organization. Immigrants’ rights groups and other grassroots
organizations cannot shoulder this responsibility on their own, and it would
be unwise to make such an attempt.  
Legal protections for immigrant workers will continue to fall short so 
long as the immigrant workers themselves do not join the national 
discourse on immigration reform. Hopefully, immigrant workers 
would then capture the attention and garner the support of 
community leaders, judges, and Congress.
Yet, more than compassion, hope, and optimism drive the need for
immigration reform. Prejudice offers indefensible reasons for opposing 
immigration reform, and the facts compel the need for reform. The facts are 
that immigrants are far more likely to contribute to society than to burden
its coffers. and studies show immigrants are thirty-percent more likely to 
start new businesses than native-born Americans.101 Studies also show that 
immigrants have a net positive effect on the federal budget.102 Bringing 
undocumented workers out from the shadows and the cash economy will 
increase the state and federal tax base and the public coffers.
Moreover, in the realm of global commerce and innovation, immigration 
benefi ts the United States by providing “legions of unoffi cial ambassadors, 
deal-brokers, recruiters and boosters. Immigrants not only bring the best 
ideas from around the world to American shores, but they are also a conduit 
for spreading American ideas and ideals back to their homelands, thus 
increasing their adoptive country’s soft power.”103 Without question, 
immigration reform is a matter of economic necessity, and, to the extent 
that both business interests and immigrant workers demand relief from 
outdated immigration laws, Congress will be forced to address this intractable
101.  See, e.g., SHAPIRO & VELLUCCI, supra note 36, at 1 (expanding upon the
benefi ts of immigrants pointing to the success of even uneducated immigrants as 
entrepreneurs). 
102. See, e.g., id. at 3 (distinguishing between the short and long term effects of 
immigration on government budgets indicating that, while immigration produces a 
small net cost in the short term, it provides a net profi t over the course of an 
immigrant’s lifetime).  
103.  The Hub Nation, supra note 4, at 32.
278            THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM       [Vol. 1:3
problem.104 Nonetheless, with the current political climate and the recent
refusal by Congress to support passage of the DREAM Act, the much 
needed overhaul of our immigration laws remains an uphill battle. In the 
meantime, it is incumbent upon federal and state authorities to support the
low-wage worker community—and the public coffers—by expanding their 
prosecution of “wage chiseling” employers. 
104.  See Green-Card Blues: A Backlash Against Foreign Workers Dims Business 
Hopes for Immigration Reform, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2010, at 33 (speculating that 
President Obama might fi nd bipartisan support for one of his legislative proposals in 
immigration reform because both Republicans and Democrats have an interest, albeit 
different ones . . . in reform).
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I.  INTRODUCTION
 It is fi ve thirty in the morning in a parking lot in Immokalee, Florida, 
where hundreds of laborers wait for a bus to take them to the tomato fi elds. 
Sadly, these workers may have to leave without being paid for their time if it 
rains while they are in the fi eld.1 
 Even though Florida has a $62 billion agricultural industry, migrant 
workers, like the ones in the tomato fi elds of Immokalee, earn about forty-
fi ve cents for every thirty-two pound bucket of tomatoes they pick.2 Laborers, 
including agricultural workers in Florida, earn an average of $200.00 per 
week, comprising a segment of an unregulated system established to keep the 
cost of food down, while keeping Americans’ plates full. 
 The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”)3 
is the federal law designed to shield migrant farm workers from exploitative 
working conditions,  and to protect vulnerable migrant and seasonal 
1. Bernie Sanders, The Harvest of Shame, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2008, 11:01 
AM), http://www.huffi ngtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/the-harvest-of-shame_b_96759.
html.
2. See Christine Evans et al., Modern Day Slavery, PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 7, 2003),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/moderndayslavery/content/moderndayslavery/reports/
day1_main1207.html.
3. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1872 (2006), succeeded the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 
1963 (“FLCRA”), Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920 (repealed 1983), which was designed 
to regulate independent contractors who supplied laborers for farms across the nation. The 
AWPA’s scope is broader than that of the FLCRA. See Sherylle Gordon, Note, Michigan 
Housing Laws Should Apply To Migrant Farm Workers, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1849, 1857 
(1995) (arguing that farm labor contractor status is no longer the sole qualifi cation to trigger 
liability under the AWPA). Gordon asserts that, “instead, the AWPA requires the following 
categories of persons to adhere to certain worker protection requirements: (1) farm labor 
contractors, (2) agricultural associations, (3) agricultural employers, and (4) any persons 
who own or control farm worker housing.”  Id.
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agricultural workers from abuse.4 In Florida, migrant workers’ rights have 
not been adequately protected because Florida courts—specifi cally in the 
Eleventh Circuit—have not effectively enforced the AWPA.5  
 This Article addresses the misinterpretation of the AWPA and the failure 
to enforce basic worker protections. Part II lays out common defenses used 
by fruit and vegetable growers to avoid liability under the AWPA, based on 
whether a migrant worker is an “employee” of the grower under the statutory 
defi nition.6 Part III touches on the AWPA’s joint employment doctrine, which 
provides that workers may be considered employees of both a grower and 
a crewleader—the intermediary—who recruits, transports, and supervises 
migrant and seasonal workers.7 Part IV focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit 
has misinterpreted the AWPA by incorrectly applying the joint employment 
test and holding that a migrant worker is solely an employee of the 
crewleader and not of the grower—as exemplifi ed by the decision of Aimable 
v. Long & Scott Farms.8 This section will also address the consequences 
of that decision, which has left migrant workers with no recourse because 
crewleaders are often judgment-proof.9 Finally, Part V suggests that the 
Florida legislature should correct this problem by requiring crewleaders to 
have a surety bond to ensure that migrant workers are compensated when 
crewleaders violate the AWPA.10
  
4. See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act § 1801 (stating 
that the purpose of the AWPA is to regulate activities detrimental to migrant and seasonal 
agricultural workers).
5. See, e.g., Renteria-Marin v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc., 537 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (fi nding that the plain language construction of the terms “controls a facility” 
does not include supervising crew leaders because the statute, by referring to the person 
owning or controlling the facility, targeted the persons who “effectuat[ed] the maintenance 
of, inter alia, plumbing, electricity, sanitation, fi re safety equipment and cleanliness in 
compliance with applicable federal and state standards.”).
6. See discussion infra Part II.B (stating that because the term employ within the 
AWPA is based on an ambiguous defi nition in the FLSA, the relationship between a grower 
and a migrant worker often requires a detailed analysis of caselaw).
7. See discussion infra Part III (defi ning agricultural association, employees and 
farm labor contractors under the AWPA).
8. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B, Part V (analyzing the courts decision that even 
though the grower had contracted with a farm labor contractor the farm labor contractor 
was the sole employer).
9. See discussion infra Part IV.A (arguing that because the 11th Circuit misapplied 
the AWPA in Aimable, in order to protect immigrant workers, it must require surety bonds 
for crewleaders .
10. See id.
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II. THE LEGISLATURE’S ANSWER TO THE MIGRANT WORKERS’ QUANDARY
 A.     Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
In 1982, testimony before the House Committee on Education and Labor 
described patterns of abuse and exploitation of farmworkers, and led to the 
enactment of the AWPA.11 The AWPA was passed in 1983, and repealed the 
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963 (“FLCRA”).12 The FLCRA 
provided limited protection to agricultural workers from the “low wages, long 
hours and poor working conditions” that have long plagued the industry.13 
The FLCRA imposed certain requirements, particularly on crewleaders rather 
than on the growers that own or operate the farm.14 For example, this Act 
required crewleaders to register with the Department of Labor (“DOL”) by 
providing information regarding their methods of operation as contractors.15 
Additionally, crewleaders had to provide proof of public liability insurance, or 
proof of fi nancial responsibility, for all vehicles used in the business.16  
Similarly, the AWPA provides for wage, employment, and safety protections 
for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers.17 Like the FLCRA, the AWPA 
defi nes the DOL registration requirements for farm labor contractors and also 
requires farm labor contractors and their employees to obtain a certifi cate of 
registration from the DOL before starting any farm labor contracting activities.18
 The AWPA, however, was adopted for the broad purpose of protecting 
migrant and agricultural workers, and it regulates many more aspects of
11. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 4547, at 4548 
(“Evidence received by the Committee confi rms that many migrant and seasonal agricultural 
workers remain today, as in the past, the most abused of all workers in the United States . . 
. . Congress found that the [FLCRA] was largely ignored and not adequately enforced . . . 
testimony before Congress has shown that the Act of 1963 has failed to achieve its original 
objectives.”).
12. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1872 (2006); Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (“FLCRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 2041, 
repealed by Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470, 
§ 523, 96 Stat. 2600 (1983).
13. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 1; accord 7 U.S.C. § 2041. The Committee on 
Education and Labor concluded, “as a result of direct evidence, that the Farm Labor 
Contractor Registration Act, as amended, has failed to reverse the historical pattern of 
abuse and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers and that a completely new 
approach must be advanced.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 3.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 2 (fi nding that ten years after its passage, evidence 
shows that the same abuses the FLCRA addressed continued unabated).
15. 78 Stat. at 921.
16. Id.
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1822, 1841 (2006). Under the AWPA, a migrant 
agricultural worker is “an individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a 
seasonal or other temporary nature, and who is required to be absent overnight from his 
permanent place of residence.” § 1802(8)(A). A seasonal agricultural worker is a person 
who is “employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature and 
is not required to be absent overnight from his permanent place of residence.” § 1802(10)
(A).
18. § 1811.
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the employment relationship, by establishing employment standards related 
to wages, transportation, disclosures, and record keeping.19 Furthermore, it 
provides that if housing is furnished, it must meet specifi c safety and health 
standards.20 Workers must be provided with written statements of earnings 
and deductions.21 If transportation is provided, vehicles used must be safe and 
properly insured.22 And most importantly, the AWPA provides enforcement 
provisions, including a provision granting aggrieved migrant workers a private 
right of action to sue for violations.23  
B.       Growers’ Defenses to Avoid Liability under AWPA
A grower is responsible to a migrant worker under the AWPA only if 
the grower employs the migrant worker under the statutory defi nition of 
“employ.”24 Because the defi nition of “employ” is based on an unclear 
defi nition from the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), determining whether 
a grower employs a migrant worker requires a detailed analysis of case law.25 
In enacting the AWPA, Congress acknowledged that agricultural-type labor 
often creates distinctive employment relationships.26 The most common of 
these types of relationships is a triangle between the grower, the crewleader, 
and the worker.27 Congress predicted that growers would deny responsibility 
for AWPA violations by categorizing crewleaders as independent contractors, 
not as employees of the agricultural employer or association, and categorizing 
farmworkers as employees solely of the crewleaders.28 Indeed, growers have
19. §§ 1811, 1821, 1822, 1831, 1832, 1841.
20. § 1823.
21. § 1821.
22. § 1841.
23. See § 1854.
24. § 1802(2), (5).
25. § 1802(5); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2010) (defi ning employ as “to suffer or permit to work”).
26. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4553 
(giving examples of many types of possible employment relationships between employees, 
employers, and contractors).
27. Id. at 6, 7 (explaining that this issue often arises where an “employer/association 
asserts that the worker in question was not an employee but an independent contractor or 
in the alternative that such worker was solely an employee of an independent contractor/
crewleader”).
28. Id.
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often been successful in using those two defenses to escape liability under 
AWPA.29   
When a court holds that a crewleader or worker is an independent contractor, 
the crewleader is directly liable to the migrant worker, but the grower is not.30 
In other words, the crewleader can be found to be the sole employer of the 
farmworker.31 Yet, crewleaders typically do not have the fi nancial resources 
to pay farmworkers’ judgments in a lawsuit, frequently making it impossible 
for the farmworker to recover damages against the crewleader.32 This lack of 
legal recourse places an economic burden on migrant farmworkers, “who are 
underpaid in the fi rst instance and who cannot realistically recover unpaid 
wages from a crewleader who is undercapitalized and nowhere to be found.”33 
29. See, e.g., Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 F.3d 434, 445 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(fi nding that absent a clear showing of both the regulatory and non-regulatory factors that 
the migrant workers were economically dependent on the grower, the crewleader remains 
the sole employer of migrant workers), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 351 (1994); Howard v. 
Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the crewleader was the sole 
employer of migrant corn pickers because he hired them, arranged for their housing and 
transportation, bargained for corn price with grower, and set their wages); Donovan v. 
Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that migrant pickle harvesters were 
not employees but independent contractors because of their ability to perform a similar task 
throughout Michigan); Charles v. Burton, 857 F. Supp. 1574, 1581–82 (M.D. Ga. 1994) 
(invoking the AWPA’s legislative history to show there will always be situations where a 
farmer is not held to be a joint employer of a crewleader’s employees, especially where the 
farmer exercised only cursory supervision, did not determine the wages, did not have the 
authority to hire or fi re, and could not modify the individual conditions of employment, and 
was not responsible for the preparation of the payroll).
30. A crewleader is also known as farm labor contractor (“FLC”). See AWPA, 29 
U.S.C. § 1802(7) (defi ning the term “farm labor contractor” as “any person, other than 
an agricultural employer, an agricultural association, or an employee of an agricultural 
employer or agricultural association, who, for any money or other valuable consideration 
paid or promised to be paid, performs any farm labor contracting activity”); see also 
Bertrand v. Jorden, 672 F. Supp. 1417, 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (establishing that the 
defendant employer “ha[d] worked as a farm labor contractor, or ‘crewleader.’”).
31. See, e.g., Aimable, 20 F.3d at 445 (conducting a multi-factor regulatory and non-
regulatory analysis and concluding that the crewleader was the sole employer because the 
employee was found to be economically dependent on the crewleader).
32.  Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal 
Svcs.  (Sept 19, 2008) (on fi le with author). See Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 930 
(11th Cir. 1996) (attributing agricultural workers’ inability to reverse patterns of abuse to 
crewleaders’ tendency to be insolvent and transient).  
33. Jeanne M. Glader, Note, A Harvest of Shame: The Imposition of Independent 
Contractor Status on Migrant Farmworkers and its Ramifi cations for Migrant Children, 
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1455, 1472 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Maldonado v. 
Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483, 489 (D.N.J. 1986)).
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III.     THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
There are three principal classes of regulated persons under the AWPA: 
agricultural associations, agricultural employers, and farm labor contractors.34
Growers have limited obligations under AWPA, and are liable under the 
Act only if their relationship to the agricultural workers meets the statutory 
defi nition of “employ.”35 If the grower is not found to be a joint employer of 
the migrant or the seasonal worker, she avoids liability under the AWPA.36
Under the AWPA, the term “agricultural employer” means “any person 
who owns or operates a farm, ranch, processing establishment, cannery, 
gin, packing shed or nursery, or who produces or conditions seed, and who 
either recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or 
seasonal agricultural worker.”37 The term “employ” under the AWPA has the 
same meaning as under the FLSA:  “to suffer or permit to work.”38  Congress’s 
deliberate adoption of the broad defi nition of employ from the FLSA was the 
“central foundation” of the AWPA and “the best means by which to insure that 
the purposes of [the AWPA] would be fulfi lled.”39 
Despite claims by growers that crewleaders are the farmworkers’ sole 
employer, and thus are solely responsible for compliance with the AWPA, 
courts sometimes look beyond this label and hold growers and crewleaders 
liable as joint employers of farmworkers.40 The term joint employment means
34. “The term ‘agricultural association’ means any nonprofi t or cooperative 
association of farmers, growers, or ranchers, incorporated or qualifi ed under applicable 
State law, which recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or 
seasonal agricultural worker.” AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1802(1). 
35. § 1802(2). Growers only have to take reasonable steps to determine that the farm 
labor contractor possesses a certifi cate of registration. See § 1842. See also Antenor, 88 
F.3d at 929 (“The grower’s liability under the FLSA and the AWPA depends on whether 
they ‘employed’ the farmworkers furnished by [the independent labor contractor].”).
36. § 1802(2). See 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (2011) (incorporating into the AWPA 
the defi nition of joint employment relationship contained in the FLSA); see also Antenor, 
88 F.3d at 929-30 (discussing the liability of a grower if involved in joint employment 
relationship).
37. § 1802(2) (emphasis added).
38. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010);AWPA, 19 U.S.C. § 1802(5). See S. Rep. No. 89-1487 (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002 (1982) (discussing how the 1966 amendment would extend minimum 
wage protection to 390,000 agricultural workers). Congress passed the FLSA in 1938 to 
correct and eliminate those “conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum 
standard of living necessary for health, effi ciency, and general well-being of workers.” 
The FLSA establishes minimum wage; regulations concerning maximum hours; record-
keeping and reporting requirements; child labor provisions; and a system of civil and 
criminal penalties for violations of the FLSA. Although the original version of the FLSA 
excluded agricultural workers from its minimum wage protection, Congress amended the 
FLSA in 1966 to extend minimum wage protection to some agricultural workers. Id.  See 
generally, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
39. H. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7.
40. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 
1979) (holding that the farmer and independent contractor jointly employed the worker in 
light of the level of control the farmer exercised over the workers).
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“a condition in which a single individual stands in the relation of an employee 
to two or more persons at the same time.”41 A fi nding of joint employment 
requires a case-by-case fact-based analysis.42 “If the facts establish that two 
or more alleged employers are completely disassociated with respect to the 
employment of a particular employee, a joint employment situation does not 
exist.”43
Whether an employment relationship exists between the agricultural 
employer or association and the agricultural worker, depends on whether 
the worker is economically dependent upon the agricultural employer or 
association. 44 This economic dependency test used by courts to determine 
whether a migrant or seasonal farmworker is jointly employed does not appear 
in the AWPA.45 In the legislative history of the AWPA, Congress expressly 
stated that, for joint employment purposes, the factors used in case law 
interpreting FLSA violation claims should be the controlling approach used 
by courts interpreting AWPA violations.46 Congress specifi cally endorsed 
several factors used by courts construing FLSA claims in determining joint 
employment. These elements include but are not limited to:
(1) Whether the work was a “specialty job on the production line,”47 
(2) Whether responsibility under the contracts between a labor 
contractor and an employer pass from one labor contractor to another 
without “material changes,”48 
41. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (2002).
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. § 500.20(h)(5)(iii).
45. Rather, the economic dependency doctrine is a judicially constructed device 
developed by several courts in fi nding whether a worker is jointly employed by an 
entity under FLSA claims. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 
729 (1947) (fi nding that the workers were employees of the slaughterhouse since they 
were economically dependent upon the factory because the workers used the factory’s 
premises and equipment, because the workers had no independent business organization, 
and because the workers’ contracts were not individually tailored and never materially 
altered); Real, 603 F.2d at 756 (concluding that the strawberry farmer’s supervision, 
control over fertilization of plants, and provision of strawberry plants rendered the 
workers economically dependent upon the farmer and therefore fi nding an employer-
employee relationship between the farmer and workers); Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 
F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988) (asserting that the 
migrant workers were economically dependent on the farmer’s land, agricultural expertise, 
equipment and marketing and accordingly were employees for the purposes of the AWPA); 
Beliz v. McLeod, 765 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1985) (determining that an employer-employee 
relationship existed between the crewmembers and the agricultural producer because the 
agricultural producer controlled and supervised how the work was to be performed and set 
the piecework rates); Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 850 (1983). 
46. H. R. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7.  
47. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730; Hodgson v. Griffi n & Brand of 
McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730. 
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(3) Whether the “premises and equipment” of the employer are used 
for the work,49 
(4) Whether the employees had a “business organization that could or 
did shift as a unit from one worksite to another,”50 
(5) Whether the work was “piecework” and not work that required 
“initiative, judgment or foresight,”51 
(6) Whether the employer exercised control over the employees’ 
work.52
In analyzing the existence of a joint employment relationship, the Supreme 
Court in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb utilized the economic reality test 
in the context of a FLSA claim.53 In Rutherford, the DOL sought to enjoin a 
slaughterhouse and meat packing company from violating FLSA wage and 
hour provisions.54 The Court looked at the economic reality of the relationship 
between meat deboners, the slaughterhouse operator, and slaughterhouse 
owner.55 The Court sought to determine whether workers who deboned meat 
in the slaughterhouse were independent contractors or employees of either 
Rutherford Food Corporation (the slaughterhouse operator) or Kaiser Packing 
Company (the slaughterhouse owner).56 The Court proceeded to look at the 
broader circumstances of the deboners as they related to all the activities in the 
slaughterhouse, and concluded that the workers were employees of the owner, 
49. Id.; accord Griffi n & Brand, 471 F.2d at 237; Real, 603 F.2d at 754 (considering 
the alleged employees’ “investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his 
employment of helpers”).
50. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.  
51. See id. (noting that providing a fi nancial incentive to encourage greater output 
from the workers by lining payment to output does not result in any independent initiative 
on the part of the workers, but is more similar to piecework thereby resulting in the worker 
remaining economically dependent upon the deboning factory); see also Real, 603 F.2d at 
754 (considering “whether the service rendered requires a special skill”); Griffi n & Brand, 
471 F.2d at 236 (defi ning piece rate as the amount paid per basket picked  and stating that 
the piece rate varies with the size of the particular vegetable or fruit being harvested).
52. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730; see also Griffi n & Brand, 471 F.2d at 
237 (indicating that the farmer exercised control over the crew leaders and harvest workers 
when the farmer assigned what row or patches to harvest each day and the rate at which 
crew leaders should pay the harvest workers, including whether an hourly or piece rate is 
appropriate).
53. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 727 (fi nding that because the FLSA sought to 
improve labor conditions for workers, the standard it uses to defi ne an “employee” should 
also be used in AWPA cases).
54. See id. at 723 (examining whether there was a violation of the FLSA because the 
factory failed to keep proper records and pay appropriate overtime).
55. See id. at 726 (following the Circuit Court of Appeals’ departure from the common 
law test of determining the defi nition of an “employee” and looking at the “underlying 
economic realities”).
56. Id. at 724, 727. Rutherford owned 51% of Kaiser stock. Because Kaiser was 
operating at a loss, Rutherford advanced money for Kaiser’s operation. In 1943, Rutherford 
leased the Kaiser slaughterhouse and took over its operations. This arrangement lasted 
until 1944. Id. 
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Kaiser, as they were performing a specialty job on the production line.57 The 
Court considered Kaiser’s ownership of the plant and most of the equipment as 
well as Kasier management’s close supervision of the workers’s performance.58 
The job was essentially piecework because the deboners’ compensation did 
not actually depend on their own initiative, judgment, or foresight, as it would 
for a typical independent contractor.59 Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
employer could not label the deboners independent contractors in order to 
escape compliance with the FLSA.60
AWPA’s legislative history indicates that the absence of any one or more 
of the six factors listed above does not preclude a fi nding that an agricultural 
association or agricultural employer is a joint employer along with a farm labor 
contractor.61 Additionally, Congress recognized that the agricultural economy 
contains varied employment relationships.62 These relationships often involve 
a combination of employers, contractors and employees. In the enactment of 
the AWPA, Congress wanted to make clear that, under the construction of the 
joint employer concept, it envisioned situations in which a single employee 
may have the required employment relationship with not just one employer, 
but simultaneously with an employer and an independent contractor, or with 
several employers, with or without the inclusion of an independent contractor.63 
The focus of each inquiry, therefore, must be each employment relationship as 
it exists between the parties.64  
Whether a worker is an employee does not depend on technical or 
“isolated factors but rather on the circumstances of the whole activity.”65 It 
depends not on the form of the relationship but on the economic reality, and 
whether the employee is dependent upon that person for his livelihood.66 
57. See id. at 730 (determining that assessment of the relationship between the 
deboners and the slaughterhouse does not hinge on isolated factors, but rather on the 
entirety of the circumstances).
58. See id. (considering the ownership of the premises and the equipment factory 
a when fi nding an employer-employee relationship and proving that the de-boners were 
dependent on the managers and were therefore employees). 
59. See id. (holding that linking pay to worker output can constitute piecework which 
does entail initiative or judgment by the worker).
60. See id. (reasoning that the deboners could not constitute independent contractors 
since they did not work as a unit, they did piecework, and they relied on the slaughterhouse 
management equipment).
61. H. R. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 8.
65. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.
66. Id. (looking at the entire work relationship including the extent of employee 
organization, payment structure, and managerial oversight).
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     IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE AWPA
A.       How the Eleventh Circuit has Interpreted the AWPA
The joint employment doctrine is a judicial mechanism used by courts to 
determine whether a farm labor contractor and agricultural association or 
employer jointly employ a migrant or agricultural worker for purposes of 
AWPA violations.67 In assessing the existence this relationship, the Eleventh 
Circuit has used the economic reality test promulgated in Title 29 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) and interpreted by several judicial decisions.68 
AWPA violations have also been found using the factors outlined in decisions 
construing FLSA violation claims in determining the existence of joint 
employment.69 
Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms is the seminal case in the Eleventh Circuit 
interpreting the joint employment doctrine under the AWPA.70 In Aimable, 
a grower had contracted with a farm labor contractor that would provide 
laborers to harvest its crops.  The Eleventh Circuit had to decide whether the 
grower was the joint employer of those laborers for purposes of the FLSA 
and AWPA.71 The plaintiffs, 206 migrant and seasonal farm workers, were
67. Id.   
68. 29 C.F.R. 500.20(h)(5)(iii). See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (assessing whether a joint employment relationship exists by examining the 
“economic reality”—looking at the nature and degree of control of the workers, the degree 
of supervision, the power to determine methods of payment of the workers, the right to 
fi re or modify employment conditions and the preparation of payroll and the payment 
of wages);  Howard v. Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1988) (fi nding joint employment 
because the farmer arranged the housing, transportation, the piecework rate, tax and 
maintained work records); Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1536-38 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (looking at the control of supervisors, profi t and loss, capital investment and 
degree of skill required to perform the work to assess the economic reality); Beliz v. W.H. 
McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (fi nding that control 
of the farmer over the workers is key in assessing the economic reality and the “critically 
signifi cant” factors are how specialized the nature of the work and whether the individual is 
“in business for himself”); Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 185–93 (5th Cir. 1983); Real v. 
Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing employees 
from independent contractors by examining the employer’s control of the workers, the 
worker’s opportunity for profi t or loss, the worker’s investment in the equipment or 
materials, whether the service requires a special skill, the degree of permanence of the 
working relationship, and whether the service rendered is an integral part of the employer’s 
business). 
69. See, e.g., Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
the concept of “employ” used in the AWPA includes the joint employment principles 
applicable under the FLSA); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996) (viewing 
the AWPA defi nition of “employ” as the same as the FLSA defi nition); Aimable v. Long & 
Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 438 (11th Cir. 1994) (referring to the FLSA principles to defi ne 
concept of “joint employment” in the context of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection); accord Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21636 (N.D. Ga., March 18, 2008) (construing that both the AWPA and the FLSA defi ne 
“employer” as any entity that “suffers or permits” an individual to work).
70. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (examining the district court’s summary judgment 
that the farm was not the laborers’ joint employer).
71. Id.  
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alleged to have been employed by John Miller, Jr., the farm labor contractor, 
to harvest crops grown by Long & Scott Farms—the owner and operator 
(grower) of a vegetable farm in Florida.72 One of the grower owners, Frank 
Scott, managed the day-to-day activities of the farm.73 Miller, the farm labor 
contractor, had been recruiting and supplying Scott with migrant workers for
his farm for twenty-fi ve years.74 Throughout their relationship, Scott never 
used any contractor other than Miller.75 Scott would pay Miller a fl at rate 
for each quantity of produce picked and Miller compensated the workers on 
a piece-rate basis.76 The farmworkers sued both the grower and farm labor 
contractor to recover unpaid wages—alleging that the defendants were liable 
as joint employers for violations of the FLSA and the AWPA for not paying 
them minimum wage and keeping proper records of their pay.77 
At the trial court, the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida held that the farm labor contractor was the sole employer of the 
farmworkers for purposes of the FLSA and the AWPA.78 On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld these fi ndings.79 The Eleventh Circuit used factors 
formulated by other courts to determine whether a joint employment relation 
exists under the FLSA, including:80
72. Id. at 437. 
73. Frank Scott owned one-half shares in the Long & Scott farm.
74. Id. at 437.
75. Id.
76. Piece rate is a payment system where employees are paid according to how much 
they produce. For example, farmworkers are paid a predetermined amount per bucket of 
vegetables or fruits picked.  
77. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 437
78. Id. at 436.
79. Id.
80. Congress recognized that in each case interpreting joint employment under the 
FLSA, courts give a slightly different description of the fi ve or six factors used in making 
the determination of whether joint employment exist. Additionally, Congress suggested 
that the factors are not exhaustive. Id. at 438. See Hodgson v. Griffi n & Brand of McAllen, 
Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1973) (using a fi ve-part test to examine the employer-
employee relationship under the FLSA); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 
722 (1947); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(adopting FLSA factors to determine whether a joint relationship exists by looking at 
the degree of the employer’s control, the employees’ opportunity for profi t or loss, the 
employees’ investment in equipment, the special skills required, the permanence of 
the working relationship, and whether the service is an integral part of the employer’s 
business).
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 (1) The nature and degree of control of the workers; 
 (2) The degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work;
 (3) The power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment of 
 the workers;
 (4) The right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fi re, or modify the 
 employment conditions of the workers; and  
  (5) Preparation of payroll and the payment of wages.81
In interpreting the fi ve factors, the court concluded that Long & Scott were 
not the joint employers of the farmworkers based on fi ve key fi ndings.82 First, 
the court found that the farm labor contractor, not Long & Scott, controlled the 
number of workers employed to work on the farm; the farm labor contractor 
hired and fi red specifi c individuals, and selected specifi c workers to do specifi c 
jobs.83 Second, supervision by Long & Scott was de minimis, although Long 
& Scott employees came out to the fi eld on a regular basis and occasionally 
gave Miller commands that were, in turn, relayed to the workers.84 Third, Long 
& Scott had no direct or indirect power to set or increase the workers’ wages, 
although plaintiffs argued that Long & Scott controlled the amount Miller 
received and Miller controlled the amount the workers received and therefore, 
Long & Scott controlled the amount the workers ultimately received.85 Fourth, 
Long & Scott never commanded that a particular individual be hired or fi red 
and never decided whether the workers would be paid hourly or piece-rate 
wages.86 Lastly, Miller, not Long & Scott, was responsible for calculating and 
paying each farmworker his wages.87  
81. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 438 (fi nding that none of the fi rst three factors—the three in 
dispute—supported a fi nding of joint employment).
82. See id. at 443-44.  However, the court continued its analysis by addressing six 
additional factors proposed by the plaintiff farmworkers. In its examination, the court 
determined two issues: “whether the factors were relevant to this particular case; and if 
so, whether the factor supported a fi nding of joint employment.” The court held that, in 
this case, only two of the six factors were relevant. Thus, the court created its own unique 
six-factor test for joint employment as follows: (1) Investment in equipment and facilities; 
(2) The opportunity for profi t and loss; (3) Permanency and exclusivity of employment; 
(4) The degree of skill required to perform the job; (5) Ownership of property or facilities 
where work occurred; and (6) Performance of a specialty job within the production line 
integral to the business. Id.
83. Id. at 441 (making such a determination even though the court also recognized 
that Long & Scott made all planting decisions, including which crops to plant, how much 
to plant, and how to grow the crop (e.g., decisions regarding tilling, fertilization, and 
irrigation)). 
84. Cf. Hodgson, 471 F.2d at 238 (holding that supervision is present whether orders 
are communicated directly to the laborer or indirectly through the contractor). 
85. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 442 (explaining the indirect control Long & Scott 
possessed over the appellants).
86. See id. (illustrating how the fourth regulatory factor favors a fi nding that no joint 
employment existed).
87. See id. at 442-43 (showing how the fi fth regulatory factor does not support a 
fi nding of joint employment).
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The court concluded by stating that the farmworkers were economically 
dependent upon Miller, not upon Long & Scott.88 Moreover, taking the fi ve
factors in isolation, “the result is inescapable: Miller alone was appellants’ 
employer; no joint employment existed.”89
  B.      Why the AWPA does not Protect Migrants in Florida
The legislative history of the AWPA demonstrates that Congress intended 
to have growers ensure compliance with the AWPA.90 During the debate, Rep. 
Miller noted that:  “Agricultural employers . . . will for the fi rst time be sure 
of their duties to migrant workers. Agricultural employees will, in turn, know 
who is responsible for their protections, by fi xing responsibility on those who 
ultimately benefi t from their labors—the agricultural employer.”91 Section 
1842 of the AWPA provides that “[n]o person shall utilize the services of 
any farm labor contractor . . . unless the person fi rst takes reasonable steps to 
determine that the farm labor contractor possesses a certifi cate of registration 
which is valid and which authorizes the activity for which the contractor is 
utilized.”92 
Additionally, the legislative history of the AWPA states that Congress’s 
purpose in enacting the AWPA was to reverse the historical pattern of abuse 
and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers.93 According to Gregory 
Schell, a leading AWPA attorney who has represented many migrant workers in 
AWPA violation cases, “the courts simply are not enforcing AWPA against the 
growers.”94 He went on to say that “when Congress enacted AWPA, it meant 
to regulate the crewleaders.”95 But, he further stated, “The law is doing what it 
is supposed to do, protecting migrant workers from crewleaders’ violations.”96 
The crewleaders, however, do not usually have very much money.97 Even 
when a migrant worker wins a lawsuit against a crewleader under the AWPA,
88. See id. at 445 (holding that when the court examines all of the non-regulatory 
factors in light of the fi ve regulatory factors, each of which demonstrates that the 
farmworkers were economically dependent upon Miller).
89. See id. at 443 (establishing that Aimable is still the law in the Eleventh Circuit); 
accord Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636, at *29 (fi nding 
no joint employment where the wholly-owned subsidiary hired and fi red workers and the 
parent company purchased and sold the produce). 
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (2006) (“The term ‘agricultural employer’ means any 
person who owns or operates a farm . . . and who either recruits, solicits, hires, employs, 
furnishes, or transports any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker.”).         
91. 128 CONG. REC. 26,008 (1982) (statement of Rep. Miller).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1842 (2006).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, at 
4549.
94. Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal 
Servs. (Sept. 19, 2008) (on fi le with author). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
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the migrant usually cannot collect the damages.98 Thus, “when a person is 
riding on the back of a crewleader’s truck that is not insured, the person is just 
out of luck if he is injured [because] he has to pay his own hospital bills.”99 
Furthermore, Schell also stated that the crewleaders deduct social security
insurance from the workers’ paychecks, but the Internal Revenue Service will 
never see a dime, as many of the workers do not have valid social security 
numbers with which to collect social security payments.100 The same is true for 
alleged worker’s compensation payments collected by the growers.101  
In another Eleventh Circuit AWPA decision, Charles v. Burton,102 the 
court had to decide whether the growers were liable for actual damages to 
the farmworkers for the growers’ failure to verify the farm labor contractor’s 
registration and insurance.103 In Burton, the farm labor contractor’s uninsured 
truck overturned on the highway while driving the workers to the growers’ 
farm, killing and seriously injuring several farmworkers aboard the truck.104 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the growers’ 
failure to check the farm labor contractor’s certifi cate of registration precluded 
the workers from having access to insurance coverage.105 In reversing, the 
court reasoned that if the growers had utilized a farm labor contractor with a 
valid certifi cate of registration, there would have been insurance coverage for 
the workers’ physical injuries.106 Thus, the court concluded that the growers 
violated the AWPA and therefore were liable for the workers’ lost wages and 
medical care.107
The district court’s ruling in Burton shows some courts’ refusal to hold 
growers liable under the AWPA, even where the grower blatantly violated the 
act by not checking the farm labor contractor’s certifi cate of registration.108 
The decision had to be reversed on appeal in order to hold the grower liable. 
During a phone interview, Gregory Schell explained why such decisions are 
so common:  
98. Id. 
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 1999) (failing 
to check worker’s certifi cate of registration).
102. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1322.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1842 (2006) (requiring farm labor contractor to possess the certifi cate 
of registration); § 1841(b) (requiring vehicles used for transporting migrants to carry 
insurance or a liability bond). 
104. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1326. 
105. Id. at 1335 (explaining that the trial court found that checking the farm labor 
contractor’s license was too far removed from the type of harm the workers suffered). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1336. 
108. Id.
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 [N]obody cares about these people. The fact is the majority of 
 these workers are undocumented which saves the company 
 that hires them a  lot of money because the labor is cheap.
 The government does not care about them either, because
 they are minorities. They don’t pay taxes; they don’t pay
 campaign contributions, and therefore [they], are not [a] priority
 on anyone’s list. [This is why] so many bills intended to protect 
 them fail—the migrants are powerless.109
     V.  FLORIDA SHOULD REQUIRE CONTRACTORS TO HAVE SURETY BONDS
In enacting AWPA, Congress adopted the joint employment doctrine to aid 
courts in enforcing AWPA violations.110 At the same time, when a worker is 
found not to be an employee of the agricultural association or the employer, 
the farmworker is often left without recourse for his injuries.111 Still, enacting 
stricter penalties will likely not remedy the problem of judgment-proof farm 
labor contractors. Congress has already attempted this by repealing the AWPA’s 
predecessor, the FLCRA, and adopting standards that are more stringent for 
growers and farm labor contractors.112   
The author of a Note entitled, Picking Produce and Employees: Recent 
Developments in Farmworker Injustice, suggests that Congress should amend 
the AWPA and create a per se rule that migrant farmworkers are employees of 
agricultural businesses.113 The article reasoned that adopting a per se rule would 
make it impossible for large growers to avoid liability under the AWPA.114 The 
author further noted, “this per se rule should begin in the courts as a signal to 
growers that judges will no longer be fooled by the veil of a mere contractual 
agreement with a crewleader.”115 However, as with the joint employment 
doctrine, a per se rule would still be subject to judicial construction. Notably, 
inconsistent judicial construction is one of the weaknesses of the AWPA, as 
109. Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal 
Servs. (Sept. 19, 2008) (on fi le with author).
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 8 (1982).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2008). Overwhelmingly, migrant 
and seasonal farmworkers do not have social security numbers and are not employees 
of the grower. Therefore, they cannot collect worker’s compensation and unemployment 
benefi ts when they are out of work. Many migrant farmworkers come to the United States 
under the H-2A program, authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 
which permits U.S. employers to bring temporary foreign workers into the United States to 
perform seasonal agricultural work. Id.
112. H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 13. Farm labor contractors, agricultural employers, 
and agricultural associations that recruit workers must provide the workers with a written 
disclosure statement informing them of the wage rates, the period of employment, where 
the employment will take place, and what it will involve, as well as whether housing, 
transportation or other benefi ts are provided. 
113. Jeanne E. Varner, Note, Picking Produce and Employees: Recent Developments 
in Farmworker Injustice, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 433, 469-71 (1996).
114. Id. at 435.
115. Id. at 470. 
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courts do not apply the factors of the joint employment doctrine uniformly, and 
each court may develop its own factors where applicable.116 Thus, the per se 
rule is a dilemma with no end.  
  A.     California and Oregon: Additional Protection for Migrant Workers
In order to remedy the problems created by the joint employment loophole, 
Florida should require that crewleaders obtain a surety bond upon registering 
as a farm labor contractor.117 Such regulation already exists in at least two 
states—California and Oregon—both of which require that farm labor 
contractors be bonded before employing migrant workers. 118 
Both California and Oregon statutes provide agricultural workers added 
protections in addition to the ones already offered by AWPA.119 Whenever 
federal statutes confer certain rights and benefi ts to individuals, states can 
always provide even greater benefi ts to their citizens.120 Typically, where a 
person brings a cause of action under the federal statute, that person may sue 
under the state statute as well.121 This is because state statutes often replicate 
federal statutes pertaining to particular rights.122 In addition to the protections 
offered by the AWPA, California and Oregon agricultural workers enjoy added 
benefi ts.
116. See, e.g., Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 436 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(affi rming that the grower had no control over workers where the farmer gave the farm 
labor contractor general instructions as to which crops to harvest at a particular time); see 
also Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling the the grower 
had control where growers determined the particular fi elds that they wanted the workers to 
cultivate, determined when workers would begin picking each fi eld, and supplied workers 
with boxes); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 937-38 (11th Cir. 1996) (fi nding the the 
growers did have control over workers where growers told FLC how many farmworkers to 
bring each day, the growers’ foremen determined the precise moment when picking would 
commence each day, and the growers were free to directly delay or stop the workers from 
continuing their work). 
117. A surety bond is an insurance policy that pays injured parties for losses suffered 
from the bondholder’s failure to perform under a contract. 30 FLA. JUR. 2D Insurance § 27 
(2011). 
118. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1684(a)(3)  (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 
658.415(3) (2009).
119. 29 U.S.C.A § (1)(H) (1983).  For example, AWPA does require that farm labor 
contractors carry an insurance policy or liability bond. However, the grower has to verify 
coverage. Insurance is not a requisite to be a licensed farm labor contractor.
120. Cf. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (discussing the capacity for state constitutions to 
help protect individual liberties in a manner separate from the role of federal law and the 
United States Constitution).
121. Cf. id. at 503 (stating that the “very premise of the cases that foreclose federal 
remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach.”).  
122. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (“We pause . . . to 
reaffi rm the independent nature of the California Constitution and our responsibility to 
separately defi ne and protect the rights of California citizens despite confl icting decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court . . . .”)  
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The California Labor Code provides that a person shall not act as a farm 
labor contractor until the California Labor Commissioner licenses that 
person.123 The California Labor Commission must investigate an individual’s 
character, competency, and responsibility before it issues or renews his license 
as a farm labor contractor.124 The statute also requires that a person deposit with
the Labor Commissioner a surety bond in an amount based on the size of the
person’s annual payroll for all employees.125 For payrolls up to $500,000.00, 
a $25,000.00 bond is required.126 In addition, a $50,000.00 bond is required 
for payrolls of $500,000.00 to $2,000,000.00.127 For payrolls greater than 
$2,000,000.00, a $75,000.00 bond is mandated.128 Furthermore, the law 
requires that where a farm labor contractor is subject to a fi nal judgment in 
an amount equal to the bond requirement, he must deposit an additional bond 
within sixty days.129  
Additionally, farm labor contractors in California must take a written 
examination to measure their knowledge of the current laws and administrative 
regulations concerning farm labor contractors.130 A farm labor contractor 
needs a score of at least eighty-fi ve percent on the examination to pass and 
be licensed.131 Moreover, a person may take the examination no more than 
three times in a calendar year.132 The statute also mandates that a person who 
wishes to become a farm labor contractor enroll and participate in at least eight 
hours of relevant educational classes each year, chosen from a list of approved 
classes prepared by the California Labor Commissioner.133 
123. Under the California Labor Code, a farm labor contractor is any person who, 
for a fee, employs workers to render personal services in connection with the production 
of any farm products to, for, or under the direction of a third person, or who recruits, 
solicits, supplies, or hires workers on behalf of an employer engaged in the growing or 
producing of farm products, and who, for a fee, provides in connection therewith one 
or more of the following services: furnishes board, lodging, or transportation for those 
workers; supervises, times, checks, counts, weighs, or otherwise directs or measures their 
work; or disburses wage payments to these persons.  See § 1682 (2011). See § 1684(a)(6) 
(“[a] person has registered as a farm labor contractor pursuant to the federal Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (29 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), when registration is 
required pursuant to federal law.”).
124. § 1684(a)(1)(A).
125. § 1684 (a)(3) (2006).
126. § 1684 (a)(3)(A).
127. § 1684 (a)(3)(B).
128. § 1684 (a)(3)(C). 
129. Id.
130. § 1684 (a)(5). The exam taker is assessed on his knowledge of the current laws 
and regulations regarding wages, hours, and working conditions, penalties, employee 
housing and transportation, collective bargaining, fi eld sanitation, and safe work practices 
related to pesticide use in agricultural employment setting. 
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. § 1684 (b)(2).
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Similarly, under Oregon’s Revised Statute, a person may not act as a farm 
labor contractor unless fi rst licensed by the Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Labor and Industries.134 Oregon requires that farm labor contractors carry 
surety bonds for the protection of its migrant workers.135 In contrast, Oregon 
provides farm labor contractors the option of making a cash deposit if they are 
unable to obtain the surety bond.136 While, the bond in California is based upon 
the amount of one’s payroll, in Oregon it is based on the number of employees 
a farm labor contractor has.137 
Any person may fi le an application for a license to act as a farm labor 
contractor at any offi ce of the Bureau of Labor and Industries.138 However, 
every person who acts as a farm labor contractor must furnish proof of insurance 
for any vehicles that will be utilized to transport agricultural workers.139 In
addition, each farm labor contractor applicant has to provide and maintain 
proof of fi nancial ability to pay the wages of employees and other obligations 
that may arise under this statute.140 Proof of fi nancial ability to obtain and 
carry a corporate surety bond of a company licensed to do such business in 
Oregon is necessary.141 Where a farm labor contractor cannot purchase the 
requisite surety bond, that person may establish a cash deposit or deposit 
the cash equivalent through a savings account at a bank in the name of the 
Commissioner.142  
The Commissioner acts as trustee for the employees of the farm labor 
contractor and others as their interests may appear. The farm labor contractor, 
in turn, has to deliver proof of the account and the ability to withdraw the 
funds for the Commissioner under the terms of a bond approved by the 
Commissioner.143 The amount of the bond a farm labor contractor is required 
to carry depends on the number of workers the contractor employs.144 For 
example, a $10,000 bond is required if the contractor employs up to twenty 
employees, and a $30,000 bond is required if the contractor employs over 
twenty workers.145 The statute further provides that any person who suffers lost 
wages or any other loss because of an agricultural association or the private 
nonprofi t corporation as a farm labor contractor shall have a right of action 
against the surety bond or against the bank deposit.146 In addition, any person 
134. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(1) (2007).
135. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(8) (2007).
136. § 658.415(3) (2007).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. § 658.415(2)(a) (2007).
140. § 658.415(3) (2007).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. 
144. Id.
145. § 658.415(3)(b) (2007).
146. § 658.415(8) (2007).
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who knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed farm labor contractor shall 
be personally, jointly, and severally liable along with the person acting as a 
farm labor contractor.147
In addition, Oregon makes any person jointly and severally liable with a farm 
labor contractor if that person knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed 
farm labor contractor.148 Consequently, this provision seems to indicate that 
even if a court fi nds that an agricultural association or owner is not a joint 
employer of a migrant worker for AWPA violations, the owner or association 
could still be liable under the this statute.149 For instance, in Burton, the growers 
violated AWPA by not verifying that the farm labor contractor had a valid 
certifi cate of registration. So long as the owner or association knowingly uses 
the services of an unlicensed farm, they are liable for the workers’ claims.150 
Under this approach, a court does not even need to defi ne joint employment 
in order to hold a grower liable under Oregon law for AWPA violations. The 
grower would be jointly and severally liable if it fails to verify the farm labor 
contractor’s certifi cate of registration.
Requiring farm labor contractors to take an exam holds the individuals to a 
greater standard, as contractors should know the laws that can potentially affect 
their status as farm labor contractors.151 The exam ensures that before someone 
even applies to be a licensed farm labor contractor, that person already knows 
the standard to which he must conform.152 Requiring farm labor contractors to 
carry surety bonds ensures that workers are compensated for injuries suffered 
from farm labor contractors’ non-compliance with AWPA and the California 
Code.153  
 B.      Florida Should Follow Oregon’s Surety Bond Law
Often, migrant workers cannot collect on civil judgments won under AWPA. 
This is because farm labor contractors usually do not have the fi nancial 
ability to pay the judgments, and the growers who have the economic ability 
to pay are found not to be the employer of the migrant worker. In order to 
further AWPA’s statutory purpose, the Florida legislature should enact a law 
similar to Oregon’s—requiring crewleaders to carry surety bond. The statute 
should require proof of surety bond before a person can become a farm 
labor contractor. And in the event a grower fails to verify that the farm labor 
contractor meets this requirement, the grower would be jointly and severally 
liable to the migrant workers for any injuries sustained. The Oregon law 
147. See § 658.419. 
148. § 658.415(7)(a) (2007).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. § 1684(a)(3)(C) (2006). 
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provides more protection and fl exibility than the California law. For instance, 
in Oregon the farm labor contractor can have a bond or a cash deposit.154 
Furthermore, Oregon makes any person jointly liable under the act for known 
violations.155 Moreover, just like Oregon, Florida should make the amount of 
bond based on the number of personnel a farm labor contractor employs. In 
addition, Florida should establish a commission that would oversee and act as 
trustee for any bonds paid and maintained. By enacting this legislation, Florida 
migrant workers would fi nally have the much-needed protection they lack in 
the event of incidents like the one in Burton.156 For example, under current 
law, if a migrant worker incurs bodily injury or death while being transported 
by a farm labor contractor and the contractor does not have liability insurance, 
the migrant worker does not get compensation for medical expenses or lost
wages.157 Under this new recommended law, whether a farm labor contractor
is underinsured or uninsured, the surety bond would help pay for the medical 
expenses and lost wages of the migrant worker.  
While the AWPA states that a farm labor contractor should not transport 
workers in its vehicle unless insured, contractors often break this rule.158 The 
AWPA does not require that farm labor contractors fi rst obtain insurance 
in order to obtain their farm labor contractor status. The Oregon law deals 
precisely with this issue, requiring a person who wants to apply to be a farm 
labor contractor to fi rst have a surety bond approved by the Commissioner of 
Labor.159  
This mandatory policy would aid migrants like the ones in Burton.160 In 
Burton, since the farm labor contractor’s truck was uninsured and the migrants 
could not get medical care or compensation for lost wages.161 Burton would 
have ended differently had Florida required the crewleader to have a surety 
bond, which would have compensated the migrant workers for the injuries 
sustained in that crash. Additionally, the grower would be jointly and severally 
liable for its failure to validate the farm labor contractor’s valid certifi cate of
154. § 658.415(3) (2007).
155. § 658.415(7)(a) (2007).
156. Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (fi nding that farmworkers 
were unable to obtain medical care and compensation for lost wages because the farm 
labor contractor did not have a valid certifi cate of registration and therefore no insurance 
coverage on the vehicle).
157. See generally Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(discussing the factors used to determine joint employer status, as well as related 
responsibilities).  
158. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1326.
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(3) (2007). 
160. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1322, 1326. 
161. See Burton, 169 F.3d at 1325-26. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a 
number of migrant workers may be eligible for workers compensation, insurance paid for 
by an employer, which provides cash benefi ts and medical care if an employee sustains 
job-related injury or illness. On the other hand, a person has to be an employee in order to 
fi le a worker’s compensation claim, which brings back to the table the joint employment 
doctrine discussion.  
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registration. The uncompensated damages suffered by the migrants were the 
result of the farm labor contractor’s truck’s lack of insurance. 
By mandating that crewleaders carry a surety bond, migrant and agricultural 
workers will be less likely to suffer from the grave economic hardship like 
that suffered by the workers in Burton. The surety bond would provide some 
relief so that the migrant workers can be compensated if they win a claim 
against the farm labor contractor. Moreover, this statute would eliminate the 
need for the joint employment doctrine because migrant workers would have 
some expectation of compensation for injuries suffered. 
VI.      CONCLUSION
 The AWPA provides many necessary protections for migrant workers. 
However, these protections are only available if the farmworkers are found to 
be employees under the statutory defi nition.162 When courts, like the Eleventh 
Circuit in Aimable, misapply the joint employment doctrine and fi nd that 
migrant farmworkers are not employees of the growers on whose land they 
work—it is as if the AWPA does not exist. If courts do not hold growers liable
for AWPA violations, the migrant workers have almost no hope of recovering 
the damages to which they are entitled if their farm labor contractor does not 
have the funds to pay. Courts and Congress must provide an incentive for 
growers to comply with the AWPA by implementing a surety bond requirement 
and fi nding them jointly and severally liable with the farm labor contractor 
where the grower knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed, non-bonded 
farm labor contractor. Growers would therefore not try to dodge the joint 
employment doctrine. Aimable and Burton demonstrate that without this 
type of monetary incentive, unprincipled crewleaders will continue to abuse 
workers and laws while growers look the other way.163
Migrant workers have no political voice and little power to organize for 
their own protection. They are part of an eager yet oppressed work force that 
enables Americans to purchase a half-gallon of fresh orange juice for just $3.39 
and a pound of tomatoes for only $1.29 while they earn as little as $200.00 
a week. As major contributors to Florida’s $62 billion agricultural industry, 
these workers should get more in return.
162. Compare Burton, 169 F.3d at 1336 (fi nding that appellants were employees 
under weighing factors, leading to a determination that employer appellees were liable 
for violating AWPA) with Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (fi nding that the weighing factors to 
determine employee status of farmworkers was insuffi cient to determine their employer).
163. Compare Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (determining joint employment doctrine did 
not apply because appellants could not establish suffi cient economic dependency on 
appellees), with Burton, 169 F.3d at 1336 (contending Burtons’ use of appellants’ services 
established joint employer relationship). 
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 PETER ASAAD: I’d like to welcome everyone to this informative program 
entitled E-Verify and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.1 I’d like also to thank 
our panelists for volunteering their time today and we would like to extend 
our appreciation to American University Washington College of Law, the 
Immigrants’ Rights Coalition, and the LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM 
who put a lot of time and energy into organizing today’s panel. 
Before we get started with our panelists, I will provide a brief history and 
introduction to the topic.
For the fi rst time ever, in 1986, Congress made it illegal for employers to 
knowingly hire, recruit, or continue to employ undocumented workers through 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act, otherwise known as IRCA.2 Since 
1986, controlling illegal immigration by regulating who is entitled to work in 
the United States has been a key component of the U.S. immigration policy. 
For the fi rst time, IRCA required all employers to examine documents to verify 
their employees’ identity and citizenship or immigration status and to attest to 
the verifi cation on the paper-based I-9 form. President Reagan described the 
1. In a 5-3 decision, with the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
the Court held that the Legal Arizona Workers Act—that provides for the suspension and/
or revocation of the business license of Arizona employers who knowingly or intentionally 
employ unauthorized aliens—is not preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and 
Control Act.  Additionally, the Court held that Arizona’s requirement to mandate the usage 
of the E-Verify system preempted federal law.  131 S. Ct. 624 (2011).
2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359.
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I-9 provision3 as the keystone of IRCA in 1986.4
Under the paper-based I-9 scheme, the employee offers identity documents, 
such as a driver’s license, and an employment eligibility document, such as 
a social security card. The employer then looks at these documents, and the 
employer is presumed safe if the documents reasonably appear authentic 
on their face. This is the so-called good faith defense. The employer is then 
in the clear unless there is evidence that the employer knowingly hired the 
unauthorized worker. 
In 1994, a unanimous recommendation was made by the bipartisan U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform to institute an electronic employment 
verifi cation system. Our panelist today, Representative Morrison, was on 
that commission. It wasn’t until 1996 that a more mechanized system of 
employment verifi cation was introduced through the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, otherwise known as IIRIRA.5 But, 
even then, the program was only authorized as a pilot program which, after one 
year, became the Basic Pilot Program. 
In 1997, the Basic Pilot Program allowed employers, on a voluntary basis 
and only in fi ve states, to electronically verify the work eligibility of a new 
hire. Congress extended the program to all fi fty states, but it continued on a 
pilot and voluntary basis. Now, in 2007, the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) changed the name of the Basic Pilot Program to E-Verify, and, the 
same year, the Offi ce of Management and Budget instructed federal agencies 
to utilize the E-Verify system for all new employees. 
E-Verify is an Internet-based system designed as a tool for employers to 
electronically verify employment eligibility. E-Verify is a complement to the 
I-9 paperwork process; it doesn’t replace it. Specifi cally, E-Verify compares 
employee information required by the I-9 form against more than 455 million 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) records, more than 122 million 
Department of State passport records, and more than eighty million [DHS] 
immigration records. So it’s pinging these databases to verify both identity and 
employment eligibility, using the information that was put into the I-9 form 
upon hire. 
3. The I-9 is a paper-based form through which employees record identifi cation 
documents demonstrating employment eligibility.  Employers must examine the 
identifi cation documents and keep records of compliance with the I-9 paper-based, 
employment eligibility verifi cation system.  See Ariz. Contractors. Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano, 
526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. Ariz. 2007).
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. 
Ct. 624 (2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/scotus10-
chamber1208.pdf  (last visited July 28, 2011).
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codifi ed in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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 Expanding yet again, beginning September 8, 2009, federal contractors and 
subcontractors became required to participate in E-Verify pursuant to federal 
regulation. 
Then in January 2008, Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act,6 
requiring all public and private employers to check the employment eligibility 
of new employees through E-Verify. This Arizona law is the subject of current 
litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court in a case entitled Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting.7 
Now, stepping back and looking at IRCA, Congress developed this as a 
comprehensive scheme to prohibit unauthorized employment. Congress was 
focusing on balancing at least three diffi cult problems: fi rst, minimizing burdens 
on the employer; second, minimizing discrimination against people who are 
permitted to be hired—so this isn’t supposed to be a system that discriminates, 
this is supposed to be a mechanism that eliminates discrimination; and third, it 
is supposed to minimize the hiring of people who are not permitted to be hired. 
The resulting IRCA scheme is a careful and delicate balance. It imposes 
both a fi ne for illegal hiring and a fi ne for discrimination. The Legal Arizona 
Workers Act provides that if an employer hires an unauthorized worker, the 
employer loses its license to do business, instead of merely being fi ned. 
As Justice Breyer noted during the U.S. Supreme Court oral argument 
on June 8, 2010, that scheme amplifi es the incentive to terminate those who 
appear unauthorized to work because it’s actually silent as to the disincentive 
to discriminate. He explains, “If you’re a businessman,  every incentive under 
that law is to call close questions against hiring this person.” In contrast, “[u]
nder the Federal law, every incentive is to look at it carefully [so as not to 
discriminate].”8 
The Legal Arizona Workers Act also requires businesses to use E-Verify, 
and, if they fail to do so, they cannot receive any grants, loans, or performance-
based incentives. As one of our panelists, Dr. Marc Rosenblum, explains in his 
recent report on E-Verify,9 fourteen other states also require certain employees 
in the state to be checked using E-Verify, including four states—Alabama, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah—which similar to Arizona, require all 
employers to participate in E-Verify. 
Mandatory use of E-Verify has been a subject of proposed federal legislation 
for years. In 2005, a bill, passed in the House by a vote of 239 to 182, 
6.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212 (2011). 
7.  Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010), cert. granted, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2010)  (No. 09-115).
8.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. 
Ct. 624 (2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/scotus10-
chamber1208.pdf  (last visited July 28, 2011).
9. MARC ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., E-VERIFY: STRENGTHS, 
WEAKNESSES, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2011).
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sought to make employment verifi cation a requirement for all employers.10 
Both major pieces of proposed legislation on comprehensive immigration 
reform in 200611 and 200712 also contained provisions to mandate electronic 
employment verifi cation by employers. In addition to the mandatory use of 
E-Verify, it was also the subject of the [Secure America Through Verifi cation 
and Enforcement Act ] (“SAVE”) Act,13 a bill in the 110th Congress that almost 
garnered the requisite number of signatures for a successful discharge petition 
in the House of Representatives. Finally, in the new Congress, leaders in the
new Republican majority have actively voiced their interest in making E-Verify 
mandatory for all employers. 
It is becoming clear that the expansion or mandatory use of E-Verify is 
potentially on the horizon. Our panelists today will not only help us understand 
the legal battle currently before the Supreme Court in Chamber of Commerce 
v. Whiting, but also help us understand the policy implications of any 
expansion of the use of E-Verify. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting represents 
the possibility that states and even local municipalities may have the ability 
to make E-Verify mandatory for employers in their jurisdiction—creating a 
patchwork of rules nationwide. Some states require E-Verify, whereas other 
states may not. 
Furthermore, statements by Representative Gallegly, Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee’s Immigration Panel, and many other Republicans 
as well as many Democrats and Obama Administration offi cials, represent a 
willingness to make E-Verify mandatory. So we’re looking at both what’s 
happening in the Supreme Court and what could happen in the states as well 
as on the federal level. 
First, there is the issue of effectiveness, which our panelists will speak 
of, in catching unauthorized workers. Independent analyses of the E-Verify 
program by the Government Accountability Offi ce and a Maryland research 
group known as Westat shows that if an unauthorized worker presents genuine 
identity and employment eligibility documents that are borrowed or stolen, 
E-Verify will erroneously confi rm them as an authorized worker. The report 
estimated, in 2009, that fi fty-four percent of unauthorized workers screened 
through E-Verify were erroneously approved as work authorized. That means 
that E-Verify failed to do the job it is intended to do more than half the time. 
10. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control of 2005, H.R. 
4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
11. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
12. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007).
13. Secure America Through Verifi cation and Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 3308, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
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Now the supporters of E-Verify will say, “Well, so it’s not perfect. So what? 
At least it does something. At least it catches some of them.” Well, there’s 
another issue that our panelists will discuss, which is the harm it does to 
lawful workers. The mandatory use of E-Verify does not mean employment 
authorization inquiries are only for foreign workers. When it’s mandatory, it’s 
mandatory for all workers. Obviously you can’t decide who’s the worker that 
you’re going to check. It’s a check on all workers.
Thus, a federally commissioned study of E-Verify14 showed that over 
ninety-six percent of workers queried through E-Verify were approved as 
authorized workers. However, while E-Verify’s accuracy rates have increased, 
the [DHS] and Social Security Administration databases, upon which E-Verify 
relies, contain errors. So how do those errors affect U.S. workers? Well, 
for example, workers who naturalize through marriage or have multiple or 
hyphenated surnames may receive erroneous results from E-Verify. When 
problems are found, employers are required, to notify workers of a tentative 
nonconfi rmation, known as a “TNC,” and give the employee an opportunity to 
contest the initial fi nding.
The Westat report fi nds that 0.8 percent of authorized workers were shown 
to be unauthorized. So authorized workers were shown to be unauthorized. 
Another report by Los Angeles County15 showed that error rate to be as high as 
2.7 percent. But let’s say that if it’s made mandatory, even if the error rate were 
only one percent, that would be one percent of 163 million, if we’re looking at 
163 million workers in the United States. Well, 1.6 million authorized workers 
would be unable to work until they could verify their work authorization status. 
More troubling is the incentive to terminate that Justice Breyer mentioned, 
under the Arizona Legal Workers Act. A survey of immigrant workers in 
Arizona found that 33.5 percent of those found tentatively unconfi rmed 
initially through the system, had been unlawfully fi red. They weren’t given 
the chance to correct their tentative nonconfi rmation; to fi x the database; to 
say, “I’ve changed my name since I was married.” And as a result, if we look 
at whether it’s made mandatory with an error rate of one percent of authorized 
workers shown to be unauthorized and if a third are terminated without being 
notifi ed of the tentative nonconfi rmation to contest and seek corrections to 
those databases, we’re looking at over 536,000 work authorized people per 
year who will lose their jobs. You can extrapolate that there will be that type of 
discrimination that authorized workers will lose their jobs.
14. WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY® PROGRAM EVALUATION (2009), http://
www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-Verify%20 Report%2012-16-09_2.
pdf (last visited August 18, 2011). 
15. COAL. FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF LOS ANGELES, ANALYSIS:  E-VERIFY 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY (2009), http://www.chirla.org/sites/default/fi les/E-Verify.pdf. 
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Third, there’s a fi nancial cost which I will let our guests speak on—for 
example, Bloomberg News Service said that making E-Verify mandatory 
would cost $2.7 billion a year and would also burden businesses.16 There’s the 
issue of prescreening—using E-Verify before someone is even employed—
which raises issues as well, which our guests will speak of. Some businesses 
lack the resources to even use E-Verify.
Then, there’s the elephant in the room. I-9 is a compliance mechanism. 
E-Verify is also a compliance mechanism, but somewhere along the way, it 
became confused with a deportation strategy. Calls for mandatory E-Verify 
tend to portray the program as the solution to our illegal immigration problem 
and a way to generate jobs for unemployed Americans. The elephant in the 
room is that signifi cant portions of the U.S. economy depend on documented, 
immigrant, foreign labor. Not only that, but looking at E-Verify as becoming 
mandatory, individuals are focused on it as the solution to the immigration 
problem without looking at comprehensive immigration reform and 
understanding the needs of our employers. 
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: First of all, thank you all for coming. 
It’s a pleasure to have a chance to talk to people who may get to resolve this 
problem in their professional careers. I’ve been working on it for twenty-fi ve 
years and we’re not there yet, so we probably have plenty to do in this fi eld—if 
you’re interested in it.
I’d like to suggest that it’s very important to put this discussion in a context, 
and the context is, how does the United States operate a successful legal 
immigration regime that has credibility with the American people? I think I’m 
the only person on this panel who has ever actually had to vote on legislation 
generally, and legislation in this area, and so I bring to this discussion the 
perspective of the people who have to be persuaded about what the right thing 
to do is about these diffi cult questions. And I think it’s very important, if you 
believe in immigration as a central part of the American story, that we need to 
fi nd a way to have that be something that has credibility and support among 
Americans. 
And everybody is against illegal immigration. The issue isn’t whether we 
should have a system that is not conforming to law, the challenge is how to 
you actually have a system that operates within legal standards and is not beset 
by the problem we currently have with so many millions of people here on an 
unauthorized basis.
Some people want to use this debate about E-Verify to advance the undoing 
of the mistakes of the past, undoing the fact that there are eleven million people
here illegally and that somehow, there’s some technological fi x that’s going 
to fi x that. I think that’s wrong-headed. What we can do, however, is create a 
16. Jason Arvello, ‘Free’ E-Verify May Cost Small Businesses $2.6 billion: Insight, 
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 28, 2011. 
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legally-conforming future, and that’s really what this discussion ought to be 
about—how we do that. 
Now there really is no new policy being debated here. Congress, in 1986, set 
a policy that still appeals to people on an intellectual level of what you have to 
do if you are interested in preventing people from coming to the United States 
in substantial numbers and remaining illegally, whether they entered legally or 
they entered illegally. That is, most people who come here illegally initially or 
who come legally and overstay either, initially have the intention of coming 
here to work or, in order to stay here without legal status, have to work; so that 
employment is at the center of the sustenance of any substantial population of 
people who are unauthorized. 
That’s what Congress decided in 1986, that if there was going to be a 
legal regime—and at that point, we were debating two million, three million, 
whatever number you wanted to accept—with two or three million people 
present in the United States on an unauthorized basis. Obviously, measured 
that way, the 1986 law was a total failure. But the idea at the center of it 
was that this isn’t a border problem—you can only do a certain amount at the 
border—but this is a workplace problem and, if you’re serious about it, you’ve 
got to deal with the workplace.
I don’t think anything’s changed about that policy decision. What we’re 
debating is how to do something at the workplace, and there are no easy and 
simpleminded solutions because, if there were, even with all our political 
problems as a country, we would have done them. We’ve thrown billions of 
dollars at this problem and I don’t know how many trees have been sacrifi ced 
in pursuit of the debate, but we are not much closer to a solution than we were 
in 1986.
So 1986, to me, is the time when we got the policy right and the twenty-fi ve 
years in between is when we’ve gotten the implementation wrong. So, it’s in 
that perspective that I think you should think about this and not get too hung 
up in all the technical arguments without answering this question: how do 
we solve this problem? Because, if we do not have a way to prevent people 
from being employed if they’re unauthorized, then there will be millions of 
unauthorized people here. It’s a simple economic fact. The border will be 
breached in many ways. Many of the people who are here unauthorized came 
legally and then overstayed. It isn’t a problem that’s going to be solved at the 
border. It’s a problem that is either going to be solved at the workplace or not 
at all. 
And that really is the question that people have to struggle with; how much 
burden and on whom are we willing to accept at the workplace, in order to 
prevent the presence of large numbers of unauthorized workers? It is a very 
simple question to state and a very hard question to resolve. And most of 
what you hear in the discussion of all the technicalities of E-Verify tend, 
sometimes, to obscure that fundamental question, because that’s the choice. 
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The other thing I’d say, putting it in context, is there are a lot of people 
in Congress who will feel themselves politically better off for voting for an 
expansion of E-Verify or a mandatory E-Verify without regard to all of the 
niceties that you’ll hear discussed on this panel about fi xing this or fi xing that. 
The political momentum is in favor of enforcement. Billions on the border, 
much of it wasted; billions for the workplace, much of it wasted. The politics 
are pushing away from a rational solution to this problem, a careful solution 
to this problem. The longer this is a debate and not a kind of problem-solving 
implementation, the more likely that we’ll just get all of the downsides and 
miss the upsides, as we did in 1986. 
So, I have just a few other observations. First, I’d like to talk about the 
workplace initiative as a prevention strategy. I think when it’s talked about 
as enforcement, it gets confused about what is the objective. In my opinion, 
the objective is not to use a worksite program to get rid of the eleven million 
people already here. The question of what to do about the eleven million people 
is really a separate policy judgment. I have my opinions on that, but that’s not 
the purpose of this discussion. 
If you see the worksite prevention being confused with fi xing the problem 
that we created over the last twenty-fi ve years, well you’re never going to get 
any agreement on preventing what might happen in the future. And I actually 
think the American people are very open to some reasonable resolution of the 
mistaken eleven million if they can believe that the future is not the creation 
of a new eleven million. So I think it’s very important to think in prevention 
terms. 
If you think in prevention terms, the last thing you would ever do—which 
is something that the Bush and Obama Administrations did—is to go back 
and check existing employees. Because once you go back there, you’ve really 
changed this from a preventing the incentive to come and get a new job into 
some kind of prior enforcement regime, and that was done in the contractor 
regulation. Despite the litigation, which was unsuccessful, the 1986 law forbids 
the use of the current I-9 E-Verify scheme to get at existing employees, but it’s 
the law now for federal contractors.
So prevention is important. Let’s think about how this becomes a 
disincentive to come in the future. No system screening people at the worksite 
will be perfect, number one. And any system will make it more attractive to be 
employed off the books. So there’s two parts to this problem. The one part is 
the compliant employer. Most employers are compliant. They obey laws that 
they don’t agree with everyday. Most employers just follow the law because 
that’s the way to do business. Obviously, publicly-traded corporations are at 
great risk for violating the law, but most business people obey the law; they 
withhold the taxes, they send the taxes in, etc. They may or may not agree 
with it. So there’s a compliant community. And then there’s a noncompliant 
community. We can argue about how big the two of them are, but I think the 
fi rst is much bigger than the second.
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But there is now and there will be, during any enforcement regime, any 
prevention regime, an off-the-books problem. There’s an off-the-books 
problem right now with American citizens, without regard to people who are 
unauthorized to work. If we’re serious about this problem and some other 
problems, we should have a much increased focus on enforcing labor laws 
and insisting on on-the-books employment throughout our economy. We don’t 
even enforce the wages and hours laws effectively right now. 
So that’s a part of this, and anybody who wants any of this to work needs to 
recognize this. The Joint Tax Committee said it would cost seventeen billion 
dollars over ten years if you made E-Verify mandatory, and the reason for that 
number they said was a number of taxpayers would go off the books. Whether 
that number is right or not, it’s directionally correct; that is, you will get more 
of it. Now fi nally, just a few things about E-Verify itself.
My colleague Paul Donnelly, who’s here, and I have been working on 
this going back to the Jordan Commission. He was also a staff member 
of mine when I was in Congress and [assisted with] the 1990 Act. 
So we’re old and gray and rather cranky about the subject. But we found the 
Westat report in plain sight on the DHS website. Nobody was talking about 
it and everybody was talking about false negatives; that is, people who are 
misidentifi ed as unauthorized, which is a number that has been shrinking. But 
what we found really interesting in the Westat report were false positives. The 
fact that, essentially, over half the time, a person who is not authorized could 
be found to be authorized because of impostor documents. And that’s like 
fl ipping a coin. 
So the whole point of this system is not to catch American citizens. The 
whole point of this is to prevent employment of people who are not authorized. 
So, if half the time that group is misidentifi ed, then this system is failing. And 
it won’t succeed unless, in some fashion, the identity of people is actually 
verifi ed, as opposed to numbers that they give or documents they present. I-9 
is a document system. E-Verify is a number and document system. It is easy to 
get impostor documents and an impostor identity and beat this system. When 
the Swift Meatpacking Company was raided, they had about 6,000 employees; 
1,300 of their employees, all of whom had been run through E-Verify, were 
carted off as unauthorized. This is a serious problem, and hiding from this 
problem won’t get us a solution. 
So the impostor problem is very serious and the problems of what it takes to 
verify identity are full of trade-offs between privacy and prevention. And you 
can get into a long discussion about all of those, but I think, at the end of the 
day, we either are going to solve those problems in some way or we’re going 
to give up on it, and then we’re going to have lots of people here unauthorized, 
plain and simple. Some people think if you have enough legal visas, that you’ll 
solve the problem. But the fact is, illegal employment is always cheaper than 
legal employment, so there’ll still be a lot of incentives in the economic system 
if you don’t have any enforcement on the worksite end. 
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Two fi nal things. One, paper raids—which is the new, humane Obama plan 
instead of real raids—actually is the biggest breeder of going out and getting 
impostor documents you could ever imagine. People are being fi red for having 
inadequate documents. Where do you think they go next? To buy impostor 
documents from the black market that provides them. So, this problem is being 
made worse, not better, by paper raids, although they’re more humane, for 
sure. 
And then, fi nally, with respect to how we’re going to get at this problem, 
I think that the scariest thing we might do is to spend billions more dollars 
expanding E-Verify without solving the identity problem and the other trade-
offs that have to be met. But the Supreme Court is going to decide this question 
as to whether the states can go ahead and the states are going ahead, and they 
will continue to go ahead. Now, Arizona was very smart in what it did in this 
piece of legislation. And no other state has actually done exactly what it did. 
Arizona took the 1986 law, which has a very specifi c exemption to preemption 
having to do with business licenses, and they took that language and made that 
the centerpiece of its requirement that E-Verify and other verifi cation be done. 
Whether the Supreme Court will fi nd that it is enough to overcome other 
arguments about preemption or not, I won’t try to guess. But the reason that 
the law passed muster in the Ninth Circuit was because of that very clever 
drafting. And if that’s upheld, then I predict that many states in the country 
will pursue that, and some people have said, “Well, losing a business license is 
capital punishment, so that clearly can’t be compared to a fi ne.” But Congress 
may have opened the door to that by the language employed in 1986, so that’s 
a very interesting question to watch. But the people who drafted this were not 
stupid. They knew exactly the channel they were trying to drive through. 
PETER ASAAD: Now we turn to Dr. Marc Rosenblum. 
DR. ROSENBLUM: Well, thank you for coming, everybody and including 
me on this prestigious panel. It’s a tough act to follow and an honor to follow 
Congressman Morrison. But I’ll reiterate a couple of points and maybe expand 
on a couple of points. I’ll also tell you that I brought copies of my recent 
E-Verify report and it’s back on the back table, so please pick that up.
Let me fi rst, to reiterate, tell you that this program has been around since 
1997. It’s really only been in use since 2005. In 2005, there were still just 
5,000 employers using the system. But it’s grown exponentially, as in literally 
exponentially; it’s doubled every year since 2005. And currently, there are 
200,000 participating employers, which is about four percent of all employers 
in the country, and about fourteen million verifi cations were run last year, 
which is about a quarter of all hires in a typical year.
So that exponential growth means that most of what we know about 
E-Verify is based on very recent experience, and we don’t still know exactly 
how the system works, partly because most of this growth has occurred during 
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the recent economic downturn. So, we still have a lot to learn as this program 
continues to expand in terms of how it affects labor markets and hiring. And 
certainly, we don’t know how it would work in the context of a different 
immigration system that did a better job with matching supply and demand. 
Although, certainly there’s no perfect way to do that, and you’ll always have 
compliant employers and non-compliant employers. 
But, I agree that it’s very important as we think about how to make E-Verify 
work and how to put it in the context of the broader immigration debate, 
to have in mind these two different populations of employers; the majority 
of employers who intend to comply and then a subset of employers who 
knowingly—or at least suspect that they’re hiring unauthorized workers. And, 
there are employers now who do that in the I-9 context, and there are employers 
in mandatory E-Verify states who knowingly, or more or less knowingly, hire 
unauthorized workers because they feel unable to fi nd U.S. workers or because 
they prefer to hire unauthorized workers since they can pay them less for a 
variety of reasons. 
Designing a system that makes it easy for willingly-compliant employers 
to comply accurately is a different task than designing a system to prevent 
willfully-noncompliant employers from fi nding a way around the system. And 
clever employers, with offi ce workers who are looking for employment, have 
a lot of resources to look for ways around the system. So it’s really different 
tasks going after those two different problems.
 I believe that E-Verify is a very powerful and important tool to build on the 
I-9 process and to address what we know is the big fl aw in the I-9 system, which 
is that the I-9 system is a document-based system and it is very vulnerable to 
document fraud. The employer has the responsibility to look and see if identity 
documents on their face are genuine and prove work eligibility. Anybody can 
go down to the fl ea market and buy a fake ID that looks genuine on its face, 
so E-Verify was designed to prevent a certain type of fake ID by making sure 
that the name and the number on the ID match data in DHS and Social Security 
databases. 
Looking at the data that DHS has made available, E-Verify probably 
prevented about 166,000, unauthorized workers from obtaining employment 
in 2009 by successfully non-confi rming fake IDs. But there are two different 
vulnerabilities. One is that while E-Verify can identify fake IDs that don’t have 
a genuine name and number on them, it’s vulnerable to identity fraud when an 
unauthorized worker uses a borrowed ID or a stolen ID or a fake ID that has a 
real name and number on it that are available on the black market.
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The system has almost no mechanism designed to prevent this. There are a 
couple of tools that USCIS17 has been experimenting with to try to cut down 
on identity fraud, but for the most part, there is no defense against it right now 
in E-Verify. The one defense that exists on a small scale is that for certain 
types of IDs, USCIS has a photo-matching tool, which means that if you use 
a green card or a passport or an employment authorization document as your 
identity document and you’re using E-Verify, then the employer, in addition 
to getting the confi rmation that the name and number are in the database, will 
also get a copy of the picture that’s on the original ID that was issued and the 
employer can then match that picture to the ID that they’re presented with and 
make sure that it’s not a fake ID with a real number on it and somebody else’s 
picture. But only about two percent of hiring uses those documents. Most 
hiring uses driver’s licenses to prove identity. So the identity fraud issue is 
one vulnerability and the off-the-books employment is the other vulnerability. 
With employers who intend to comply, they are vulnerable to being victims 
of the identity fraud problem. And so what that means is that employers who 
use E-Verify and are doing their best have no guarantee that they have a legal 
workforce. And that’s a major disincentive to employers to take on the hassle 
of using E-Verify because, even if you do everything right, you may not have 
a legal workforce. And so employers really don’t get anything out of using 
E-Verify. They don’t get a legal safe harbor and if [Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement]18 does an audit, they may lose their whole workforce. So there’s 
really nothing in it for employers right now.
The off-the-books problem and the identity fraud problem is also an issue 
for willfully-noncompliant employers because employers can conspire with 
workers to use identity fraud in a variety of ways and they can just either 
employ their workers off the books or use E-Verify selectively for some 
workers and not others or just not use E-Verify even though they’re required 
to do so. 
17.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is the government agency 
that oversees lawful immigration to the United States.  See About Us, USCIS, http://www.
uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2
af29c7755cb90 10VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010
VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD. 
18.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is the principal investigative 
arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  See ICE Overview, ICE, http://www.
ice.gov/about/overview/. 
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As it has been pointed out, [the Congressional Budget Offi ce]19 estimates 
that requiring all employers to use E-Verify without creating an opportunity to 
legalize their workforce would result in seventeen billion dollars in lost taxes 
over ten years as a result of existing workers being moved off the books or 
workers who would be hired on the books being hired off the books instead. 
There are limits to E-Verify’s ability to do its job. The other point that Peter 
referred to is that the system also sometimes non-confi rms legal workers, and 
we estimate that happens about one percent of the time; being 0.8 and 2.0 
percent of the time—depending on what survey you look at. If all employers 
were required to screen all new hires, that would be about between 600,000 
and 1.2 million workers a year, legal workers who would be wrongly non-
confi rmed. And between 60,000 and 280,000 workers would lose their jobs or 
lose some period of employment or somehow face adverse consequences from 
their employer during that period. 
But the other issue with those false non-confi rmations is that it creates a 
lot of uncertainty for employers during the hiring process. In that one to two 
percent of the time, employers by law have to treat all non-confi rmations as 
tentative non-confi rmations and keep workers on the books, treating them as 
if they were legal workers until workers are given the opportunity to correct 
those errors. That raises the cost of using the system for employers because 
most of the time, those workers end up being non-confi rmed. 
Therefore, to be compliant, employers have to keep workers on their 
payrolls and train them even though they end up getting non-confi rmed.
So, it increases the cost of using the system pretty signifi cantly in those 
cases of non-confi rmation. And even though most U.S. workers, most 
legal workers, are immediately confi rmed, about a quarter of the time that 
people are non-confi rmed, those are mistakes. So, it’s a signifi cant number 
and would be a much more signifi cant number in a universal system. 
 As we think about expanding E-Verify, let me just make a couple of points. 
One is that all of the problems that exist—identity fraud, identity theft, workers 
having adverse consequences—all these problems will not only increase 
absolutely as the system gets bigger but also proportionally, and the reason is 
that, in a mostly voluntary system like we have now, most E-Verify users are 
federal contractors and/or large fi rms. 
Nationwide, about ninety percent of employers are small fi rms with fewer 
than twenty employees; only about thirty percent of E-Verify users have fewer 
than twenty employees. So, almost all of the growth that we have ahead of us is 
among small fi rms who have less internet access [and] smaller [human resource 
(“HR”)] departments. Using E-Verify and using it correctly is a much larger
19.  The Congressional Budget Offi ce (“CBO”) is charged with providing nonpartisan 
analyses to aid in federal budget decision-making and the Congressional budget process. 
See About CBO, CBO, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/.   
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expense for these small fi rms than it is for large fi rms with HR departments 
who still struggle to use it correctly. So it’s quite likely that existing error rates 
and existing noncompliance rates will increase as a different demographic of 
employers are required to use the system. That’s one point. 
A second point I want to make is that the photo-matching tool that USCIS 
uses and the other major innovation that USCIS has implemented in the last 
few years, which is its own sort of electronic auditing of employers to look 
for cases of employer misuse and to look for identity fraud, have limited 
ability to address these weaknesses in the system and misuse by employers 
through electronic monitoring and through existing photo-matching tools. And 
basically, the reason is that most off-the-books employment and most identity 
fraud don’t show up through long-distance electronic auditing. There’s no sort 
of footprint in the electronic record that shows if you’re selectively screening 
your workers. We don’t have that sophisticated of an electronic monitoring 
tool.
It goes very much to the point that [Congressman] Morrison raised of who 
is going to bear the costs of making this system work. Because, anything that 
we do to prevent false confi rmations, to make sure that the system does a better 
job of preventing unauthorized employment, must create additional costs for 
employers, and, especially, must create additional costs for legal workers. And 
the likeliest tool, or one of the tools that we might think about to do that is to 
create a biometric system. A biometric system would be much less vulnerable 
to identity fraud, but the way we would—the steps we’d have to take to create 
a biometric system—include all U.S. citizens and all legal workers would have 
to give their biometrics to the government to create a biometric database that 
could check against and all employers would have to capture biometrics when 
they hire somebody. So, they’d have to have fi ngerprint-scanning technology 
at the worksites or use subcontractors who are going to do that scanning, which 
raises liability issues.
But, in any event, this is a major expansion beyond what E-Verify does now. 
But those are the kinds of who bears the costs of fi xing the system questions 
that we have to raise as we think about, especially if we think about using this 
as an enforcement tool rather than sort of a compliance tool. 
So let me just fi nally mention that having raised this issue of biometrics and 
the costs associated with biometrics, I also want to put in a pitch for a couple 
of pilot programs that USCIS is initiating that I think should be explored as 
alternatives to biometrics and as alternative strategies for strengthening this 
system. And one of them is further expansion of the photo-matching tool to 
include state drivers licenses. To do that likely would require congressional 
action to mandate that states participate, and the debate over the Real ID Act20 
has shown how diffi cult that is. But that would be a powerful tool to help 
20.  REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). 
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employers who want to comply do so successfully. It’s not going to do anything 
against the intentionally noncompliant employers but a powerful potential tool 
for employers who intend to comply. 
And then the other tool that I think is quite important is a self-check tool 
which would allow workers to check their own E-Verify records and to 
confi rm themselves in the system before they go to get employment. This 
is an important tool because it should—for workers who use this—greatly 
reduce false non-confi rmations and employer misuse of the system or the 
consequences of employer misuse of the system. But it’s also potentially a 
powerful anti-fraud tool because, although this is not how USCIS is piloting it
initially, in principle, it creates the opportunity for workers to lock their own 
social security numbers and to prevent people from using their number without 
their knowledge. So I think it’s potentially a way to substantially reduce fraud 
without having to resort to biometrics, which may be desirable both from a 
cost perspective and from privacy and civil liberties perspectives. 
PETER ASAAD: Miss Tulli, your organization has produced several reports 
highlighting many of the concerns raised in our panel discussion today. And 
to prevent reiteration of that same discussion, I wanted to ask more about a 
report that your organization produced, about how errors in E-Verify databases 
impact U.S. citizens and lawfully-present immigrants. There are cases cited 
where authorized workers, lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens, had 
diffi culty clarifying denials of work authorization under E-Verify. Can you 
discuss with us some of these cases you and others have seen at [the National 
Immigration Law Center (“NILC”)]21 and how they were handled? Can you 
walk us through the path to the resolution where they ultimately resolved? 
How long did it take? What was the cost to the employers?
EMILY TULLI: As Peter mentioned, at NILC we have a policy advocacy 
wing but we also provide technical assistance to worker advocates and workers 
who are going through a variety of immigrant and workplace-related issues 
and specifi cally with E-Verify. 
I think it may be useful to ground our discussion today a little bit in a real 
worker’s saga. So, I’m just going to talk a little bit about Jessica. She was 
born and raised in Florida, and she took a job at a major telecommunications 
company in Florida [during the] fall of this year. And as we think through her 
story, I think it’s useful to consider—as the panelists have set up for us—if 
E-Verify was to become mandatory and all workers were input into this system.
So, as we all do, she began employment there; she fi lled out typical I-9 
paperwork, and her employer ran her through E-Verify. She wasn’t aware of 
what she was being run through. They ran her through the system—that’s what 
21.  About Us, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., http://www.nilc.org/nilcinfo/index.
htm (last visited July 28, 2011).
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they told her. And, after a day of work, they came back to her and said, “You’re 
showing up as not authorized to work. You need to go and resolve this.” And 
she was confused—[she was] born and raised in Florida. 
So, as a fi rst step, she went home, and she got some more vital documents, 
identity documents, and brought them back to her employer to try and resolve it. 
Well, that didn’t work so the employer issued her a tentative nonconfi rmation, 
as they’re supposed to under the program rules, and she went to her local 
Social Security offi ce to try and resolve the issue. 
Now, when she went to her local Social Security offi ce—and remember, 
she’s taking unpaid time, at this point, so she’s not working; she’s an hourly, 
low-wage worker. [The Social Security Administration (“SSA”)] is open in her 
area between 9:00 [a.m.] and 4:00 [p.m.], so she had to go during those hours. 
And Social Security inputs her information and says, “You’re fi ne. We can see 
here that you’re work authorized. Go back to your employer. They’ve made a 
mistake.” So she’s now excited. She goes back to her employer, being told by 
the SSA that she’s work authorized, which she knew, and the employer tells 
her, “Nope, you’re still not coming up in our system;” again, not specifying the 
system, not giving her any information.
At this point, she’s beside herself. She’s frantic. She had been unemployed 
before she got this job. So she decides to start Googling and she calls legal 
services organizations in Florida. After talking to an attorney at a legal services 
organization, they sent her to the regional [Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”)] offi ce. So everybody here knows that EEOC is most 
likely not going to have jurisdiction over E-Verify issues in this sense. But she 
very dutifully goes to the EEOC offi ce to try and resolve the complaint and at 
this point she’s been issued that [f that people are talking about. So as she’s 
trying to resolve it, she couldn’t resolve it within the seven days; now she has 
that fi nal nonconfi rmation, she’s been terminated. 
At the EEOC, they listened very patiently and told her, “Well, you don’t 
have a discrimination claim but maybe you should call E-Verify.” This is the 
fi rst time this worker who has been fi red has heard the word E-Verify and 
knows anything about it. It’s from the EEOC, which doesn’t have jurisdiction 
over her claim.
So she went online and she called a USCIS hotline number. Again, she called 
that hotline number between 9:00 [a.m.] and 5:00 [p.m.] because that’s when 
they’re available and, luckily, she speaks English. At this point, the hotline 
is only available in English and Spanish, so if she spoke another language 
it would be diffi cult to get some help. She waits on the line for over an hour 
and then fi nally talks to a representative and what do they tell her? “Well, 
you’re in our system fi ne. You’re work authorized. Go back to your employer, 
who you’ve now been terminated from, and just tell them that you’re work 
authorized. We can see here that you’re work authorized.” 
So she says, “OK, great. This is exciting. USCIS is telling me that they have 
me in their system. This is going to be fi xed. Can you send me a piece of paper 
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indicating that, that I can then take to my employer?” “No, we can’t do that.” 
Though USCIS does offer to call the employer. And USCIS calls her employer 
and tries to work it out. 
Now in this interim, it took about a week of USCIS talking to her employer; 
her following up with the employer and the employer still saying, “We can’t 
fi gure out what the problem is. We know USCIS is calling us. We understand. 
We can’t fi gure out what the problem is.” In the interim of this period, when 
she’s not hearing back, she starts job searching. And I probably didn’t do a 
great job laying out the timeline but she was unemployed from the time she 
received the FNC and was terminated until she found another position, not at 
this employer. She was unemployed for three months. She decides that she’s 
just not going to go back to the employer. Whether they can fi gure it out with 
USCIS or not, she doesn’t want to go back because they use E-Verify and she 
doesn’t want to have to go through that again. So at that point, she’s now taken 
another position. The USCIS and her original employer, the telecommunications 
company, have fi gured out what the problem was and now they’re willing to 
take her on now that she’s gotten another position which, of course, is for 
two dollars less an hour. I think that is a really sort of compelling narrative 
and I think what’s important to underscore is that Jessica, who I’ve talked to 
numerous times, is actually incredibly capable. She’s young, she’s Internet 
savvy, she is culturally competent. She’s not a work-authorized immigrant 
worker; she was born in this country, so she has some understanding of how 
U.S. government works. She has a family who supported her. So for her, three 
months without employment didn’t mean an eviction, utilities off, all those 
other things that come with the reality of working in a low-wage industry; but 
instead, she had a family that could support her, provide her with a space to 
live.
JON FEERE: What was the error?
EMILY TULLI: The error was actually on the employer’s part. [She had] 
a two-part last name and they were putting two spaces instead of one space 
between the name, and that caused the non-confi rmation.
JON FEERE: And that was an employer who tried to do everything right 
and help the worker, and that’s the other thing that doesn’t always work right.
EMILY TULLI: Yes. 
PETER ASAAD: And this is a story about a non-savvy, if you will, 
employee who doesn’t understand the ins and outs of the system. But there’s 
also the story of Traci Hong, who is—who’s been on the House Immigration 
Subcommittee for several years. And when she was fi rst hired, there was a 
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requirement of all federal government employees to go through E-Verify. Well, 
she certainly knows the ins and outs more than just about any of us, but there 
was a mismatch. I’m sure Marc knows a little bit more about this. There was a 
mismatch in her case and it took her quite some time and quite some diffi culty 
to go through that system and fi x the database error.
But I just want to proceed a little bit to Mr. Feere. Your organization, the 
Center for Immigration Studies,22 has produced reports showing the benefi ts 
of E-Verify and it’s really important to understand those arguments. Would 
you provide us some of those conclusions; why your organization has reached 
those conclusions?
JON FEERE: Alright. Well, fi rst off, let me just say I might be the only 
panelist up here who can say that my organization uses E-Verify. I don’t 
know if any of you guys do, but we do. We’re a small nonprofi t and, like all 
nonprofi ts, we’re always pinching pennies to make sure that we can maintain 
our staff. And despite what some opponents of E-Verify say, it hasn’t been 
some sort of fi nancial disaster. We aren’t closing up shop because of E-Verify. 
It’s very straightforward, our manager has no problem with it, and it’s working 
to make sure that anyone who’s in our offi ce is legally employable. 
Couple of things I wanted to mention as far as statistics go. Right now, about 
a thousand businesses sign up for it every week, some willingly, some because 
they’re in a state that requires it. And from the research we can see, it means that 
over one out of every four new hires actually is run through E-Verify. Ninety-
nine percent of eligible workers are confi rmed to work instantaneously; three 
to fi ve seconds you get a response back. Fewer than one percent of eligible 
workers need to update their records to be confi rmed. Certainly there are still 
some errors in the system. As you mentioned before, if you had changed your 
last name or if the employer screwed up, then certainly it has to be corrected. 
But for the most part, things are correct. We just heard the example of the 
staffer; she was able to correct it.
Now we do view this as part of the solution to illegal immigration, as did the 
commissions in the [19]90’s. And if we go back to 1986, when we had the fi rst 
large-scale, comprehensive amnesty bill, the bill was sold as a two-part deal; 
it was legalization for those were here illegally and it was also the promise of 
future enforcement of immigration laws. It also, as we heard, criminalized the 
hiring of illegal immigrants.
22. About CIS, THE CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, http://www.cis.org/About (last 
visited July 28, 2011).  
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Well it wasn’t until a decade or so later that we fi nally were provided some 
opportunity to determine whether or not their employees—or their potential 
employees—were legally authorized to work and that was what eventually 
became the E-Verify system. And what concerns us is that here we are now, 
twenty-fi ve years later—a quarter of a century out from the 1986 amnesty—
and we’re still seeing a lot of effort by those who supported the amnesty to try 
and stop the growth of any type of workplace verifi cation system. 
And I think Americans are concerned about that as well. I think people, by 
and large, distrust the federal government’s willingness to enforce immigration
laws and the idea—I’ve heard it mentioned kind of subtly a couple of times 
here that we need another pathway to citizenship for employees who are here 
legally. But what would that do? What would that solve? We already know that 
if you were to legalize illegal immigrants with promises of future enforcement 
or promises of some new type of verifi cation program, it’s going to be another 
twenty-fi ve years or so before it ever gets enforced and during that time, 
there will be lawsuits to try and prevent it. Some of the groups that have fi led 
lawsuits against using E-Verify are groups that, years ago, supposedly were in 
favor of making sure there was workplace compliance. 
So the idea, for us, is that mass legalization, as the Congressman said, was 
a failure. We tried it in [19]86. If the goal was to reduce illegal immigration, 
clearly it didn’t work. People are suggesting we try it again. It’s not going to 
work without enforcement. The other option that we often hear from advocates 
of mass legalization is that if we don’t do that, the only other option is mass 
deportation. And of course, no one’s calling for mass deportation either. 
And that’s why we think the middle ground is the policy of attrition, where 
you slowly shrink the illegal immigrant population over time by sending the 
message that if you come legally, we’ll help you out. In fact, there should 
be a warmer welcome for those who are admitted legally. But if you are not 
coming here through proper channels, we’re not going to accommodate you 
as easily. You’ll not be able to fi nd a job. And that’s really what we’re talking 
about, is the jobs magnet; that’s what encourages illegal immigration. And the 
way you turn off that magnet is by requiring businesses to use programs like 
E-Verify. Is it 100 percent perfect? Of course not. There aren’t any government 
programs that are 100 percent perfect. Is it ready for prime time? I don’t think 
the government necessarily thinks it is but we’re certainly getting there. And 
as was mentioned, there is the policy of adding photo IDs to E-Verify, which 
would reduce the fraud rates that much more. You should know that about 
ninety-eight percent of illegal immigrants use a social security number—a 
fake ID with their name but a fake number. And E-Verify can catch that very 
easily because they’re going to match the name and the number and realize, 
“Well, there’s no match here,” or the number is not even legitimate. And that’s 
ninety-eight percent of the problem; ninety-eight percent of illegal immigrants 
do that. The remainder, of course, are using black market IDs which are very 
expensive and very diffi cult to come across. And for that, the photo ID process, 
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if it is attached and if there’s support for it, could certainly rule that out. 
But as far as the fallout goes from not doing anything, I mean there’s a very 
high cost to cheap labor that I think people tend to forget. We’re talking about 
exploitation here. We’re talking about child labor; young kids being worked 
many hours at a lot of these meatpacking plants, for example, that were the 
focus of ICE raids that we heard about earlier. You can put an end to this if 
there’s a serious commitment to workplace enforcement. And so far, I just 
don’t think that there is. And I haven’t heard much in the way of solutions 
rather than additional legalization programs. 
Let me give you one quick example here and I’m going to close. There’s 
a company that was the focus of an ICE raid in 2006. It was a meatpacking 
company, Swift & Company. We found—this is well-known—that there were 
1,300 illegal immigrants who were found to have been working at six different 
meat processing plants. I’m not certain if all of them were E-Verify. I know 
there’s some claims that they were. We do know that the business owners were 
instructing the employees on how to get around the system, where to buy fake 
IDs. The business wasn’t trying to uphold the law.
About twenty-three percent of Swift’s production workers were illegal 
immigrants. Now government data—and this is just so troubling to me— 
government data shows that the average wages of meatpackers in 2007 were 
forty-fi ve percent lower than what they were in 1980, and that’s adjusting for 
infl ation.23 That’s a signifi cant problem and it’s the result of not just porous 
borders but a lack of enforcement at the workplace.
Well guess what. After the raid occurred, after the illegal immigrants were 
removed from the jobs, people lined up around the corners to take those jobs. 
And in fact, we found—or our Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who works 
for us found—that wages and bonuses rose, on average, eight percent with the 
departure of illegal immigrants. I think that’s a good thing. I don’t know who 
can say that it’s not a good thing. 
I’ll leave it there.
PETER ASAAD: Thank you so much, Jon Feere, for that perspective as 
well. Now Mr. Hampe, you’re a partner of Baker & McKenzie. You represent 
clients. You’ve also worked on legislative efforts and you understand the 
dynamic of how clients such as the Chamber of Commerce represents many 
clients that are against E-Verify and we were talking a little bit about solutions 
to the whole problem. How do you see E-Verify? Is it a solution, a solution to 
what? Can you put that in your perspective as far as representing clients and 
understanding legislation as well? 
23. Jerry Kammer, The 2006 Swift Raids: Assessing the Impact of Immigration 
Enforcement Actions at Six Facilities (Mar. 2009), http://www.cis.org/2006SwiftRaids.
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CARL HAMPE: Sure. I think the question properly focuses on the point 
Bruce Morrison made at the start, which is if you’re serious about having an 
immigration system with robust legal immigration numbers that the American 
public can support—which there’s sort of mixed support for at the moment—
then you simply do have to address the problem of unauthorized employment. 
It’s just a given. So if one is to conclude, as Congress did in 1986, that employers 
are the entry point and the incentive, that U.S. employment is the incentive
for people to come here without authorization, in most instances, then what 
should employers do; how much should the burden be on employers? And I 
think employers have responded by saying, in most instances, they are willing 
to take reasonable measures, as long as they are effective. And that’s kind of 
the rub.
You will fi nd a diversity of opinion among employers. The Chamber 
has opposed the Arizona statute. I think they wouldn’t oppose it under all 
circumstances. They’re certainly willing, I understand, to discuss a federal 
statute that preempts a patchwork of state statutes and says “Here is the rule,” 
as long as the system in place was effective. And I think when you talk about 
the large companies that I counsel, that’s really the key. Employers want to 
minimize risk in all aspects of what they do so they can go about doing what 
they do, which is providing goods, services, and attempting to make a profi t. 
Immigration is a risk factor to the extent the proposals, such as E-Verify, can 
reduce the risk involved in the hiring and employment process; then they’re 
positive, as long as the requirements are economically rational.
E-Verify is, to some employers, too much, and to some employers, too little 
and it kind of depends on where you sit. Small employers who may rely on, 
shall we say, sketchy pools of labor, would probably be uneasy about having 
E-Verify required of them. Large employers, particularly those with large 
numbers of unskilled workers and especially those that are publicly traded, 
have long ago crossed that threshold. They do E-Verify. That’s not going to 
change. They read the ICE best practices. They do as many of the additional 
best practices that ICE suggests would be undertaken by a compliant employer. 
And they are constantly looking for a way to reduce their immigration risk. 
Obviously, if you’re a meatpacker or a chicken processor, you’re at very high 
risk and so you undertake most, if not all, of the ICE best practices and you 
attempt to do it in a way that is compliant with all laws, including the anti-
discrimination laws. 
So employers are looking for practical solutions. E-Verify is here to stay 
without question and, at the same time, it doesn’t resolve enough of the risks 
that employers see on all sides of the aisle. Employers don’t want to be raided 
by ICE, they don’t want to unfairly deny employment to someone who’s 
authorized, they don’t want to be the subject of anti-discrimination suits; they 
simply want to go about doing their business. And the immigration system, at 
the moment, at the new employment transaction point and thereafter, simply 
isn’t suffi cient. 
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And the debate, the healthy diversity of opinion you’re seeing on this panel 
merely indicates how challenging it is for the politicians and policymakers, 
to come up with the systems that would make the risk that employers face 
in the employment transaction go down. I think employers would like to see 
legislation that worked but, of course, that’s the question: can it happen. 
PETER ASAAD: Appreciate the perspective very much of the employer. 
Now sliding over to Professor Vladeck, you’re a professor who understands 
federal jurisdiction and constitutional law. If you would, what you think will 
happen in the Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting case. Now the District Court 
sided with the Arizona workers; so did the Ninth Circuit. And there have been 
oral arguments and there’ve been some comments based on the oral argument 
questioning from the justices. Where do you see it going and what do you see 
the consequences being? 
PROFESSOR VLADECK: Well, I guess I should preface it by saying 
I hate guessing how the Supreme Court is going to rule because I’m either 
wrong or I’m right for the wrong reasons. No one actually knows.
That being said, I think one can read your argument here, I think somewhat 
reliably, to suggest that the Court’s inclined to affi rm the Ninth Circuit and to 
thereby hold that IRCA does not preempt the Legal Arizona Workers Act, but 
Arizona mandating E-Verify actually is permissible. 
What I think is going to be interesting is not what the result is, but how the 
Court writes that opinion. Because I think there are a couple of different ways 
they can go and how they do it will have, I think, far greater consequences than 
[merely just affi rming].
So let me just sort of briefl y elaborate and then throw it back to some of you. 
The only legal question is what IRCA means when it exempts state laws related 
to licensing or other similar laws from its expressed preemption provision. So 
this is not, for example, like the SB 1070 case24 where the preemption is based 
on a sort of more general, and less textual, confl ict between state and federal 
law. Here you actually have a case of expressed preemption or not, depending 
upon whether the Legal Arizona Workers Act is, or is not, a licensing law. And 
indeed, most of the oral argument was about that very question: is it a licensing 
law. 
And what the Justices really struggled with was the notion that they could 
really tell Arizona that by saying, “We will revoke business licenses if you fail 
to comply with E-Verify,” that that somehow wasn’t a licensing law. It may be
a sort of troubling licensing law, it may be a licensing law that we might not 
have enacted, but it’s about licenses. 
Now the argument that Carter Phillips made on behalf of the Chamber of 
24. S.B. 1070, 49th Legis., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
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Commerce is that licensing law means, more specifi cally, laws that go to the 
conferral on a license and not just the revocation of a license. I don’t think it 
strains credulity to suggest that that’s a thin reed on which to rest this entire 
case, and I think some of the Justices’ questions went in that direction.
So I think one way out is for the Court to just hold narrowly that, because 
the Arizona law specifi cally imputes, as the sanction, that a business license 
is revoked—clearly a licensing law within the meaning of 1324a(h)(2)25—we 
don’t have to decide anything else. 
What’s really interesting, though, is throughout the oral argument, on both 
sides—well, three sides because the federal government argued, too—Justice 
Scalia kept coming back to this notion that the rules might be different when 
you have federal policy that is underenforced by the executive branch. And I 
have to say, I can’t think he means it. And the reason why is because if you 
guys remember [ ], it was Justice Scalia writing for the Supreme Court who 
basically said, “Article II of the Constitution protects the executive’s discretion 
to enforce federal law.” And so, just as Congress cannot command how the 
president exercises his discretion, nor can Congress make an end run around 
that by enlisting the states in requiring the enforcement of certain federal laws.
If that logic makes any sense, then it should also hold for states; that 
states cannot tie the hands of the federal Executive. In other words, under-
enforcement, although problematic as a policy matter, has no actual bearing on 
the constitutional analysis; it has no actual bearing on the preemption analysis. 
I think that has to be right. And so that’s why I think we’re likely to see an 
opinion that sort of ducks the underenforcement question, saves it for SB 1070 
and really just sort of construes the statute as narrowly as possible because 
Arizona did, really, what so few of the states have done, which is—at least in 
this statute’s context—rely specifi cally on the licensing concept. 
If that’s what the Court holds, and I think it is, it’ll be overnight that I think 
we’ll see more and more states moving toward imposing certain kinds of 
sanctions on employers in the guise of licensing practices. And I think the 
question is going to be whether the Supreme Court says the sanction has to 
be in some way related to the ability of the business to function, which I think 
would still get you the Arizona law but which would not get you anything 
about immigration in the guise of business licenses.
So I think that’s where we’ll see how it cashes out. But if I were a betting 
man, I think it’s likely that the Arizona law is going to be upheld.
PETER ASAAD: Thank you so much. So it seems, Congressman Morrison, 
was onto something when he actually said that it was well-crafted and well-
written. And Professor Vladeck, who says, “Let’s look at how it’s written. 
Let’s look at how the whole thing is going to be written, how narrow will it 
be.” But we could end up then, in fact, with a template, if you will, for other 
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (making employment of unauthorized noncitizens 
unlawful).
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states and localities to pass successful legislation. 
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: And indeed, that may in itself provide it 
if it’s just [for Congress to revisit the issue].
CARL HAMPE: Yes. Actually, I was just going to say that. Bruce, maybe 
you’d agree that if the Supreme Court said, “OK, the Arizona statute is fi ne,” 
ten other states rush to present those bills to their legislatures, that might 
bring the Chamber and other groups aligned with them back to the Hill to say, 
“Alright, let’s preempt this once and for all,” and then the question would be, 
“OK, under what standards?” Because that kind of opens up the whole basis 
upon which one has an E-Verify program.
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: That would seem to make sense but I 
spent four years making that argument on behalf of the Society for Human 
Resources Management that this—I mean I said then, and it proved out, that 
the Arizona law was going to be upheld because of the narrow tailoring of the 
language. Nobody wanted to hear it at the time. Now I guess it’s conventional 
wisdom. 
But the fact is that NumbersUSA—to take one organization, for instance 
—actually has built its grassroots base on advocating state laws and they’re 
going to get a big boost out of this case if it goes the way Professor Vladeck 
suggests and they’re going to do a lot of organizing, they’re going to get a lot 
of members off of it. And it’s not entirely clear that the Republican majority 
in the House will want to fi x the problem once the states have the authority 
to “fi x the problem.” Because the state solution seems to be much easier to 
achieve than the federal one and doesn’t come with any legalization baggage, 
for instance. So it might play out quite the other way from what Carl suggests. 
PROFESSOR VLADECK: It doesn’t come with legalization baggage. It 
does come with litigation baggage. Because I think the real issue is the Arizona 
law is about as close to a pure licensing requirement as I think you could get 
without the added piece of actually being necessary to obtain a license versus
revoking a license. The question is going to be, when states start going further 
afi eld . . . 
PETER ASAAD: Alright, thank you so much to our panelists for all their 
time. And thank you.
END TRANSCRIPT
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IMMIGRANT WORKERS’ RIGHTS:  
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF TRADITIONAL 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW
ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT
ELIZABETH KEYES:  This is a wonderful panel of folks representing 
different aspects of very challenging issues; namely, the set of issues facing 
immigrant workers in 2010 . . . . And, I’m just going to throw a few questions 
at them. Knowing them, that will be more than enough to get something lively 
started, but I would like you all to feel free to ask a question as we go. So, I’m 
going to start with Dan and Sebastian, who both work locally on this issue: 
Dan in Virginia [and] Sebastian in Maryland. And, I’d like it if each of you 
. . . could talk a little bit about the people that you’re working with at your 
team organization, the characteristics of the immigrant workers that you are 
representing, and what it is that you do with them. If you could describe, for 
the folks here, the work that you’re doing and services [that accompany your 
work].
DANIEL CHOI: [S]o I work at the Legal Aid Justice Center,1 which 
[provides] . . . non-traditional legal aid [to individuals in Virginia]. Most of 
my clients are people [who are] not citizen[s] or legal permanent residents, 
[but are] undocumented people on various asylum, refugee, or temporary 
protective status.
So, [these are] folks who normally can’t get help. And, the reason that we 
[provide them with assistance] is because we’re the only non-LSC funded
1. LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER, About Us,http://www.justice4all.org/about_us (last 
visited July 26, 2011) (“The Legal Aid Justice Center provides legal representation for low-
income individuals in Virginia. Our mission is to serve those in our communities who have 
the least access to legal resources.  The Legal Aid Justice Center is committed to providing 
a full range of services to our clients, including services our federal and state governments 
choose not to fund.”).
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organization in Northern Virginia that handles civil litigation. [T]he federal 
government has a funding procedure called Legal Services Corporation,2 
[which stipulates that] if you [take] federal money, you will have a nicer 
offi ce, but it also comes with restrictions like you can’t help people with 
certain statuses, you can’t ask for attorney’s fees—although that’s recently 
changed—you can’t do class actions and other restrictions. My organization, 
a while ago, said, ‘screw that!’ And we started representing people of different 
statuses, and that includes mostly, for me, restaurant workers, day laborers, 
people in cleaning services—low-wage working folks. A large percent[age] 
of our clients are mostly Latino and monolingual Spanish speaking, but that’s 
changing as we increase our outreach into different sectors like Asian and 
Middle Eastern, etc. 
SEBASTIAN AMAR: [W]e do a lot of what they do at the Legal Aid Justice 
Center at CASA [de Maryland],3 [but] just for Maryland residents. So, a lot of 
what Dan mentioned [is true for CASA too]. [M]ost of my work focuses on the 
representation of day laborers and domestic workers. As for our day laborers, 
we have maybe twenty percent [that] are in the . . . cleaning industry. A lot 
of hotels have gone up, especially in National Harbor and in Prince George’s 
County [Maryland], so you’ve got a lot of casinos and hotels there looking for 
cleaning staff. But, beyond that, it’s mostly general construction-based labor. 
So, [we’re talking about] folks that go out to do anything from sheetrock and 
drywall to [the] more sophisticated laying of fi ber optic cables for Verizon . . 
. and things like that.
One of the big misconceptions about CASA, in particular, is that folks 
come to us under the impression that we represent folks in immigration cases. 
Obviously, because we work with 100 percent immigrants, [people think] 
we must do asylum and other types of deportation defense. The answer is 
that we do not, and the reason for that is because CASA, twenty-fi ve years 
ago, realized that there are some areas of law that the private bar and other 
non-profi ts have specialized in—asylum and deportation defense being twoof 
those [specializations]. Asylum cases are very sexy for law fi rms to put on 
their annual prospectus and so a lot of their pro bono hours go towards those 
types of cases. The not so sexy case is that of the undocumented worker who
2. About LSC, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/lsc.php (last visited 
July 16, 2011).
3. About, CASA DE MARYLAND, http://www.casademaryland.org/about-
mainmenu-26 (last visited July 16, 2011) (“CASA’s primary mission is to work with the 
community to improve the quality of life and fi ght for equal treatment and full access to 
resources and opportunities for low-income Latinos and their families. CASA also works 
with other low-income immigrant communities and organizations, makes its programs and 
activities available to them, and advocates for social, political, and economic justice for all 
low-income communities.”).
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is owed $150.00. It’s not a huge amount and doesn’t really mean a lot to a 
lot of people, but it means a great deal to the person who needs [it] to make 
rent. So, that’s why we focus on the employment side, on issues that are just 
tangentially related to immigration issues that these folks may face.
ELIZABETH KEYES: Joseph, could you take us now to the national level, 
and talk about how Change to Win4 is working?
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: Sure. Just by way of a little bit of history: I 
think people probably [have] heard about the [American Federation of Labor 
and the Congress of International Organizations (“AFL-CIO”)],5 which is 
a coalition of unions that was . . . formed in the 1920’s and [19]30’s at the 
moment [when] the industrial revolution really kicked into gear [and] our 
economy moved into [a] factory-based economy. [W]hen you think about steel 
workers and auto workers, you think about high-paid workers. [At least] that’s 
what you hear [about] in the news. At the turn of the century and into the 
[19]20’s and [19]30’s, those were pretty desperate jobs. Those would be akin 
to Wal-Mart jobs today. And a lot of those jobs were fi lled by Eastern European 
immigrants, and what happened was workers rose up and organized—to make 
sure that they had a fair share of the profi ts they were generating for the steel 
barons and the auto barons, like Henry Ford.
Change to Win unions are actually . . . a set of service employee unions—
[Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”)],6 [United] Farm Workers,7 
United Food and Commercial Workers,8 [and the] [International Brotherhood 
of] Teamsters9—who broke off from the AFL about fi ve years ago10 . . . because
4. About Us, CHANGE TO WIN, http://www.changetowin.org/about (last visited July 
16, 2011).
5. About Us, AFL-CIO, http://www.afl cio.org/aboutus/ (last visited July 16, 2011).
6. About SEIU, SEIU, http://www.seiu.org/our-union/ (last visited July 16, 2011) 
(“We are the Service Employees International Union, an organization of 2.1 million 
members united by the belief in the dignity and worth of workers and the services they 
provide and dedicated to improving the lives of workers and their families and creating a 
more just and humane society.”).
7. About Us, UNITED FARM WORKERS, http://www.ufw.org/_page.
php?menu=about&inc=about_vision.html (last visited July 16, 2011) (“Founded in 1962 
by Cesar Chavez, the United Farm Workers of America is the nation’s fi rst successful and 
largest farm workers union currently active in 10 states.”)
8. About UFCW, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS, http://www.ufcw.
org/about_ufcw/ (last visited July 16, 2011).
9. About Us, INT’L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, http://www.teamster.org/content 
(last visited July 16, 2011).
10. See Thomas E. Edsall, Two Top Unions Split from AFL-CIO, WASHINGTON POST 
(July 25, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/25/
AR2005072500251.html (reporting on the resignation of the Service Employees 
International Union and International Brotherhood of the Teamsters from the AFL-CIO on 
July 25, 2005). 
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we’re now in a service economy. [W]here the factory workers of seventy or 
eighty years ago are the hotel workers, the restaurant workers, the janitors, 
and the security guards [of today]. By and large, a lot of those workers are 
immigrants, and these are workers who are struggling to make it into the 
middle class. And right now, because large groups of these workers are all 
unorganized, there isn’t a path for these folks. And what our unions are trying 
to do is create a pathway, [to] give these workers, whether it’s farm workers or 
truck drivers, a right to have a voice in the workplace, so they can bargain over 
their working conditions.
And that’s really . . . the primary goal of [Change to Win]. And, in a larger 
context, [the reason] why . . . it’s signifi cant right now is [because] . . . the labor 
movement has been in decline for about thirty to forty years . . . [and] [a] smaller 
and smaller percentage of workers are organized. Why is that important? 
It’s important for . . . one fundamental reason, which is we’re in danger of 
not having a middle class. We’re in danger of [losing] the American dream.
[W]e’re in the moment of [one of the] greatest economic inequality[ies] [in] 
our nation’s history—[where the] greatest concentration of wealth is squeezed 
from the top and there’s less for everybody else . . . and that has wide-ranging 
consequences. It has consequences right now for education, for crime, for 
healthcare outcomes, [and] for kids making it to college. And, fundamentally, 
that’s what we’re trying to fi gure out: how do we organize workers, the least of 
these, the poorest of the poor in this new economic moment?
ELIZABETH KEYES: Dan, I’m wondering if you could give us a picture 
of a typical case that you [get]. A restaurant worker comes to you, what [harm] 
has been done? Give us a picture of . . . [what has] been done and what you’re 
able to do about it.
DAN CHOI: Oh, Sebastian and I probably have the same answer to this. 
We work on the same thing. But what usually happens is [that] it comes to 
us [at the] second stage— [where a] worker [hasn’t been] paid. It could be a 
restaurant worker [or] someone in construction, but they don’t get paid, and 
they’ll try [futilely] for maybe weeks, sometimes even months, trying to get 
their wages. Basically, calling their employer, visiting their worksite, doing 
everything [they can] to get a couple hundred or a couple thousand dollars 
back. When they come to us [their efforts didn’t] work out, and they somehow 
were fortunate enough to learn that there could be additional things that could 
be done.  [W]e actually don’t take most of the cases that come to our offi ce, 
because . . . [the] need for unpaid wage services is actually much greater than 
the number of lawyers that are available. Just to put it into perspective . . . after 
our other attorney left, I could safely say that if you want free legal help after 
you didn’t get paid, I’m the only lawyer in northern Virginia who will take 
your case . . . for free.
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ELIZABETH KEYES: [Sebastian,] I was thinking about how both you 
and Mr. Choi said you represent a lot of people that work in the restaurant 
industry and then construction. In these industries, many people are . . . being 
paid in cash. How is there a way that you can verify how much cash they’re 
actually owed?
SEBASTIAN AMAR: Sure, so this is one of my favorite types of cases 
for the reason that it’s the employer’s responsibility under the law to keep 
records of all the workers and how many hours they’ve worked. And so, in 
cases—especially with big construction [companies], and a restaurant that has 
more than one employee—you’ve got witnesses that can attest to the fact that 
somebody has come to work, and he’s worked “x” number of days and weeks 
and months, and if you paid this guy under the table, your defense in court 
is, ‘Your Honor, I’m in violation of my responsibilities under the law as an 
employer because I’m not reporting this guy on my taxes. I’m not withholding 
anything, but I don’t have any receipts for that, either, but I promise that I 
paid.’
DAN CHOI: [W]hat it actually comes down to is [that] places like Virginia 
don’t really have good labor laws. But the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA],11 
which is a federal law that deals with wage[s] and hour[s], [has] a recordkeeping 
requirement—so if you actually bring a lawsuit and if it survives . . . [in] the 
initial stages the burden shifts, so that the employer actually has to show that 
[it] kept records . . . so it’s not as diffi cult [of a case]. 
ELIZABETH KEYES: You both have talked about the need [for 
representation] far outstripping the supply. So, Sebastian, could you talk a little 
bit about something that makes CASA fairly special, which is the organizing 
component. [Can you speak about some] of the wage and hour work and how 
that amplifi es what you individually do?
SEBASTIAN AMAR: [S]o, I think one of the good things about working at 
CASA is that every CASA attorney is outnumbered now . . . [approximately] 
forty to one by organizers. And so, you’ve got this army of people whose 
entire job it is to go out into the community, to educate folks about what their 
rights are, to get a feel for what the cost to the community is, what the issues 
that they’re facing are, and then bring them back to us, and say, ‘Hey, listen, 
this is a problem, what can we do from a legal perspective, as far as trying to 
address it and provide some relief?’ And I think that that helps us, because 
we are outnumbered greatly, as far as the need—it gives you an added tool—
another weapon as an attorney. [This is] because the reality is [that] if you are 
an employer and you care about your license to work, if you care about the 
11. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
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reputation of your company—which, in a lot of these industries your reputation 
is everything—what you don’t want is for me to call a bunch of organizers, 
and say, ‘Hey, listen, we need to rally the troops. Get 500 people over to your 
headquarters. I’ll call every news ally that I have and we’ll have cameras and 
500 people in front of your offi ce talking about how you’re cheating workers 
out of their wages.’ 
[S]o, in certain instances, that’s prove[n] to be infi nitely more useful 
than any litigation that we could have undertaken in those cases, especially 
for folks who don’t have the luxury of waiting six, eight, ten months, two 
years, three years on appeal for something to go through. And then the 
collections process. And so . . . the ability to lean on organizers is what 
makes the job as fulfi lling as it is, because—without the organizer component 
to it—[we] would just be running into a brick wall over and over again. 
 ELIZABETH KEYES: [This segues] nicely to Joseph. I wonder if you 
could talk about . . . how [organzing] has helped, in particular, industries where 
immigrants are dominant and what some of the challenges have been [in] 
organizing those groups?
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: Well, to talk specifi cally about the farm 
work . . . United Farm Workers is a union in California. Some of you may 
be familiar with Cesar Chavez, who marched in the fi elds in the [19]60’s, 
organized tens of thousands of farm workers,12 [and] gave them a path to self-
organize. The fundamental challenge, for example, with this group of workers, 
is that they are excluded from federal labor law, and what that means is, you’ve 
got an entire group that’s excluded from having the right to organize under 
federal law. [S]o, in 1935, when Congress passed the Wagner Act, or the 
National Labor Relations Act,13 it excluded domestic workers, farm workers, 
[and] a few other categories. Does anyone want to venture a guess why? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Because everybody is an immigrant in those 
industries.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: Okay, immigrant. Other guesses? Who were 
the work[ers] . . . what was the work force in 1935?
12. See Mara Elena Durazo, Making Movement: Communities of Color and New 
Models of Organizing Labor, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 235, 242 (2006) (discussing 
the role that Cesar Chavez, among others, has played in the labor movement).
13. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) 
(codifi ed at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-53, 157, 159–61, 163, 165-67 (2006)).
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, they didn’t want to apply federal laws to 
family farms. 
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: So, when Congress considered the law, there 
was incredible opposition, but when President Roosevelt moved it through 
Congress, in order to get the southern senators to vote for the law, he had to 
remove all of the protections for farm workers, or domestics, who were largely 
African-Americans.14 And so, they wrote them out of the law, and for seventy 
years we’ve been laboring under that set of restrictions. And so what we’re 
trying to fi gure out is . . . how do you lift [up] this group of workers? Stephen 
Colbert testifi ed in front of Congress15 a month ago, some of you may have 
seen the testimony. He was there with Arty Rodriguez, the President of the 
United Farm Workers, and Colbert, he said it better than anyone else. [Colbert 
was asked] ‘Why are you interested in this group of workers? Why are you 
interested in not only the immigration issue, but the organizing issue? Why 
are you sitting here with Arty Rodriguez?’ And Colbert said, ‘Well, it’s about 
power. This is a group of people who are the least of these, they come here and 
do our work, and they have no rights whatsoever.’
So, the challenge we’ve got in this moment is . . . what do you do if federal 
law doesn’t give folks the right to organize? [W]hat do you do?  So, seventy 
years ago . . . Congress said, ‘Farm workers are not protected under federal 
law to organize.’ And you’re an activist, you’ve got a law degree, you’re an 
organizer, [y]ou’re going to get creative. Come hell or high water, you’re 
going to fi gure out how to lift farm workers out of poverty. What do you do? 
Think big.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Organize anyway.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: You organize anyway. Absolutely. What else?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You lobby to change the law.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: Okay, you do. And at which level?
14. See Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should “Agricultural Laborers” 
Continue to Be Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 EMORY L.J. 489, 506 
(1999) (explaining that the exclusion of domestic workers and farmworkers was the result 
of harsh criticisms of the original drafting of the bill, which broadly covered all private-
sector employees).
15. See Protecting America’s Harvest: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law, of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 32 (2010) (statement of Stephen Colbert, Host, The Colbert Report, Comedy Central 
Studios), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
house_hearings&docid=f:58410.pdf (text); Stephen Colbert Testifi es in Front of Congress 
(NECN broadcast Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.necn.com/09/24/10/Stephen-Colbert-
testifi es-in-front-of-co/landing_arts.html?BlockID=317523&feedID=4214 (video). 
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: At the state level.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: [S]o . . . there’s a couple of different things . . 
.  that have been out there. [F]or the last seventy years, farm worker advocates 
[and] civil rights advocates have been trying to get Congress to write farm 
workers [into the NLRA and] it hasn’t worked.16
And then there’s been a concerted effort in several states, and really, after 
seventy years, it’s really California, that one state, [that has] enshrined the 
right to organize. Let me tell you a little bit about what we’re doing just very 
briefl y. So, recognizing the diffi culty of moving legislation either at the federal 
level or the state level—before the election of Barack Obama, we decided 
what are the things that President Obama can do to help this group of workers. 
[W]e realized [that] the federal government purchases over a billion dollars 
worth of fruits and vegetables . . . that feed our troops [and] that are on school 
lunch plates. And the federal government, specifi cally the President—had the 
procurement authority right to say,  ‘Well, the federal government is going 
to only do business with those vendors who say no to child labor, say no 
to slavery, provide overtime, provide rest breaks, provide minimum wage 
protections, and the right to organize.’ 
Actually, the same day that Stephen Colbert testifi ed [before] Congress and 
really elevated the issue of migrant farm workers, Arty and I met with the 
Secretary of Agriculture, and told him that ‘We think you should use your 
federal procurement power to extend the law, to give workers the rights they’ve 
been denied for almost seventy years.’ We fundamentally believe there’s no 
better way to organize or no better thing that you can do for workers than to 
give them a path to self-organize, to self-police their own workplaces. And so, 
that’s some of the creative type stuff that we’re trying to fi gure out how to do.
ELIZABETH KEYES: It’s creative. Can you talk about the special 
challenges of organizing immigrant women? What industries they’re found 
in and how they make their . . . what kinds of cases make their way to your 
attention.
SEBASTIAN AMAR: Sure, like I mentioned before, we do a signifi cant 
amount of representation of domestic workers, so that can mean pretty much 
anything, but, most specifi cally, it means folks hired to do cleaning of homes, 
preparing dinners, child care, elder care, and things like that. And actually, I’d 
say that our women’s group at CASA is, without a doubt, the best organized 
and most effective of all the groups of workers that we organize. I’m not
exactly sure why that is except that they seem to be the most upset. They do a
16. See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong. 
(1969) (statement of Cesar E. Chavez) (lobbying for the removal of the agricultural labor 
exclusion from § 2(3) of the NLRA). 
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tremendous job of not only supporting each other, but a lot of the work on the 
ground to get people out of really dangerous situations. A lot of the domestic 
workers that we are present[ed with] . . . because of our proximity to the 
District, come over to us through diplomats. Somebody brings them through 
some country in Africa, they don’t speak the language, they don’t have family, 
they have no phone, no Internet. They have no idea what to do once [their 
situation] turns sour, and somehow, they get word out to CASA and we’ll . . . 
send folks out to the site to confront the employer and to extract the worker. 
And so the women organize . . . for whatever period of time is necessary, to 
provide housing and help the worker(s) get back on their feet, contact family 
or friends back home and do whatever we can do to recover wages. And so, the 
majority of the women that we organize are domestic workers. I’m not sure, 
beyond our proximity to the District, why that is.
But I’d say the other side of that coin is that we have a signifi cant number 
of women who work in the cleaning industry. [I believe] that the reason that 
they organize so well is because when there’s a violation, there seems to be a 
wholesale violation of everybody that’s working on that particular site—and 
when you and all of your colleagues that are similarly [situated and] suffer the 
same harm, it’s a lot easier to fi nd your voice—it’s not just you. It’s not just 
you having to convince an attorney at CASA de Maryland, or an organizer 
who[m] you’ve never met. You’re coming with, literally, ten, fi fteen, twenty 
people who have suffered the same harm, to seek help. And so, I think that 
that’s empowering. And I think that they’re just very much outspoken. They’re 
a very effective group before the media. They’re not afraid to tell their story, 
which is a common problem that we fi nd among immigrant workers, [who 
usually say] “It’s fi ne if you want to fi le my case, but I don’t want to talk to the 
press, I don’t want my picture in the newspaper, I don’t want anybody to know 
who I am.” These ladies are the exact opposite. You almost have to fi ght off 
their demands that we go to the press immediately every time there’s an issue. 
It’s great to have to tell someone, “Listen, just take a second, step back for a 
minute,” and, “we’ll call you as soon as we have a plan of action.” But they’re 
always there and they’re always ready. That’s been a very effective tool for 
us, particularly with the folks who work for diplomats because of the issue of 
diplomatic immunity that, in many cases, keeps us out of court, and so you got 
to fi nd another way. And I’ll tell you, they really don’t like people showing up 
[at an embassy] to [tell them] that [they are] violating human rights.
DAN CHOI: We actually also organize, but we don’t have a women’s 
group, so I’ll talk about the challenge side of things. [First,] I think immigrant 
women still fulfi ll traditional roles. So, I mean, if you think of traditional roles, 
men go to work, and women stay at home. When they come to the United 
States, man goes to work, woman goes to work, but she still takes care of the 
children, so a lot of times after work, women are taking care of children, which 
puts less time for them to actually come out and be organized. Second[,] is that 
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they tend to work in a lot of sectors that are much more hidden, like domestic 
work. If you are at a house serving a family or if you’re in a dry cleaners . . 
. it’s harder for someone to go out there and do outreach as opposed to, at [a 
construction site where] there are 500 guys [at] any time. So that’s been our 
challenge—working with immigrant women, or organizing them.
ELIZABETH KEYES: Dan, can you talk about how Virginia has its [own] 
special challenges? [Y]ou mentioned the absence of a good labor law, but 
politically  it’s an even trickier environment than most to work with immigrant 
clients. [C]an you talk about how you connect to advocacy or coalition work to 
try to handle some of the state problems that are making your job of litigating 
diffi cult?
DAN CHOI: So, northern Virginia is a separate creature from the rest of 
Virginia. The rest of Virginia is still very conservative, and when you think 
Tea Party, you think [of] Virginia. [It was the] capitol of the Confedera[cy], 
and a lot of things that go on are not very pro-immigrant, so we are always 
on a defensive posture. Our General Assembly is usually in January and 
February, and [two years ago] we had 150 or so . . . what we would consider 
anti-immigrant measures presented. It went down slightly last year when they 
found out the economy was bad and all that immigrant stuff [wasn’t] going 
to work. [B]ut we expect it to rise again because of all the successes [in other 
states]—and I use that term success in a cynical manner. For example, [in] 
Arizona, where politicians have now found out that you can profi t by making 
life harder for immigrants. 
Some of the things that have recently gone on [in the] General Assembly 
are simply that you can’t have anything [except] in English. You can’t have 
any government literature [except] in English. Imagine if you’re a tourist from 
Finland or Argentina, coming through Virginia, and trying to look at a tourist 
brochure, and you can’t print that in some of the other language, because it’s 
required that it will only be in English.
You have things like arrest[ing] folks . . . the big thing is [that] you can’t get 
your driver’s license or renew your driver’s license using your employment 
card. So basically, a lot of people in the D.C. metro area, especially Salvadorans, 
came here on what was previously mentioned, temporary protected status. 
That means that you’re here legally, but you don’t have a green card. To get a 
driver’s license in Virginia, you practically need a green card or a U.S. passport. 
This immigration—employment verifi cation card—the IEP, you can’t use it to 
do [it].
Basically . . . you’re here legally, and the federal government said, “You 
can work here legally, but you can’t drive to get to your work or pick up 
your children.” So that’s the situation that we have right now and that was 
spurred on by one immigrant—one immigrant on that kind of status—who got 
drunk and killed a nun somewhere else. So the government made this a big 
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deal, and even though the monastery said, “We don’t want this to become a 
political issue,” it became a political issue and now you have literally hundreds 
of people [in this situation]. We’ve been getting hundreds of phone calls of 
people saying, “I’ve been here for years. I haven’t committed any crime. I 
just want to get to my work, but they won’t let me renew my driver’s license.”
 ELIZABETH KEYES: Our time is winding down . . . but I’d like to leave 
time for questions. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: With the acknowledgement that there tens of 
millions of immigrant workers in this country, why do you think the laws are 
so slow to change, to be modernized. You talk about the issue being like this 
for seventy years. So, what’s the hold-up, basically? 
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: I think, in my experience, at least the last 
two years, working at the federal [level]—even with the Administration, even 
when you have a President of goodwill, who in his heart of hearts wants to do 
the right thing—there’s an incredible amount of inertia and opposition. And, 
just as an example, when we met with the Secretary of Agriculture, and we 
said, “Well, farm workers should have a bill of rights. They’ve been excluded 
from legal protections for seventy years.” I can’t think of a more sympathetic 
group of workers to be a champion for. We had done polling that said, “This 
will make you look good with Latino voters, etc.” He’s open to it, but he said, 
“Well, I’m concerned about, Republican opposition. I am concerned that the 
existing bureaucracy in the Department of Agriculture isn’t going to adapt 
quickly enough.” So, it’s frustrating for folks like us who want change to come 
very quickly.
[O]ther examples over the last two years . . . we’re working on a campaign in the 
Inland Empire in California, where [ ] the goods come in on ships. They get out 
at the Port of Long Beach, near Los Angeles, California—this is stuff that goes 
on the shelves of Wal-Mart or Home Depot. They’re then trucked from the coast, 
about 100 miles [to] the Inland Empire, which is just a sea of warehouses. It’s a 
third world country, [in] Riverside County. Walking around, there’s no running 
water. Streets are unpaved. And, [there] are low-wage Latino workers or temp 
workers. We’ve done multiple meetings with the Department of Labor to say, 
“Look, you should do concentrated enforcement. You actually have power of
 the FLSA to invoke hot cargo.”17 Which means, that if Wal-Mart is violating
17 See, e.g., DEP’T OF LABOR, Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic 
Enforcement: A Report to the Wage and Hour Division 29–30 (David Weil ed., May 2010), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf (explaining that 
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has the power, under section 15(a) 
of the FLSA, to embargo goods that have been manufactured in violation of any provision 
of the FLSA—including non-payment of wages).
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the law the Department of Labor could say, “alright, we are going to hold these 
goods, Wal-Mart. We’re not going to let you put them on the shelves, until you 
clean up your act, until the hundreds of thousands of workers in your supply 
chain get the rights they deserve.”
But again, it’s two years into it. We’re still negotiating with the Administration, 
so there’s inertia. And I think people have to rise up and get a little bit angrier 
for more radical change to happen.
DAN CHOI: It’s defi nitely politics. It’s polarized. They say the country is 
getting very polarized, and whenever you make any move ahead, it kind of 
means working together and when you say “comprehensive immigration,” it 
encompasses all. And so, for example, pass legalization as well as strengthening 
the borders. Unfortunately, whenever those words come up, there’s a large 
faction on both sides [of people] who will not work together. Hearing, pass 
legalization, you call it “amnesty,” and people don’t want to [allow amnesty] . 
. . and the same thing on our side, too. But I mean, the reason it doesn’t happen 
is it’s a very political issue and people really aren’t willing to work together. 
And it’s just politics. It’s not common sense. It’s just politics, and that’s what 
we’ve seen over and over.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How do you feel about strikes and 
walkouts, specifi cally, restaurants having walkouts on a Friday 
night? Do you think those modes of organizing are outdated? 
 DAN CHOI: Oh, it works. It still works. So, I’m actually on the Advisory 
Board for the Restaurant Opportunities [Center]18 . . . I’m on the board, but 
[on the] D.C. side. [T]hey’ve been around the country and what they’ve done 
is, whenever there are problems, they’ve organized . . . [they’ve] had people 
strike, and they brought attention to the fact that workers at these—even [at] 
the fanciest, and we’re talking about the $100.00 [a] plate places, are still 
getting exploited in so many ways. So it still works. It’s not the only answer, 
but it defi nitely works.
ELIZABETH KEYES: I agree on that. More questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So, the threats, when someone threatens that 
they’re going to report someone to Immigration . . . is that [an empty threat]?
 
18. See generally REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED, What We Do,  http://www.
rocunited.org/what-we-do (last visited July 16, 2011) (explaining that the Restaurant 
Opportunities Center model builds power for restaurant workers by organizing the 
workers to “demonstrate public consquences for employers who take the ‘low-road’ to 
profi tablity.”).
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 DAN CHOI: Yes and no. I mean, they could call Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement [ICE]19 and, potentially, I don’t know what ICE would do with 
that information. So, they might actually go after somebody. That said, a lot of 
times, ICE has better things to do than go after workers who didn’t get paid and 
[who are] trying to get their rights. Also, depending on their jurisdiction, there 
[are] protections. Unfortunately, the circuit courts are somewhat conservative, 
so it’s actually after you fi le a lawsuit, but it might be considered retaliation, 
and illegal, if you make any threats after a lawsuit is fi led.
ELIZABETH KEYES: Going on that . . . will there often be sanctions for 
the employer, so it’s kind of like if they make that threat, it’s more of an empty 
threat because they could get in trouble? Couldn’t they get in trouble, too, if 
they’re hiring undocumented [immigrants]?
DAN CHOI: Yes, and I remind them that every time they call and say, 
“That guy is illegal, right?” And then I ask them, “Well, if he is, you hired 
him.” That usually shuts it up.
SEBASTIAN AMAR: [A]nd I’ll just add onto that, [that] the Department 
of Labor is  . . . making a push now to revamp their wage theft, wage recovery, 
and bad employer . . . practices. And so, we’ve had some meetings with them 
where they stress, to a very high degree, that “Listen, whoever you send to us, 
we’re absolutely not entering into any memorandum of understanding with 
ICE or anything like that to pass them over, [or] to give any type of information 
to folks.” And, I think that probably part of your question was spurred because 
of my comment, saying “I can’t really guarantee to anybody that I represent 
that if we go to court that that’s not going to come up,” and we can object to it 
all we want, but if there’s somebody in the courtroom that we didn’t anticipate 
being there, and you get on the stand and you’ve said it anyway . . .
The reason that I say that, although I haven’t seen that, personally, [is that] 
I have heard, particularly in the District of Columbia, folks who have objected 
[un]til their face turned blue, and the judge still allowed that information—
which you can appeal—but throughout that process, folks that have actually 
caught the attention of [ICE]. So, a lot of those instances haven’t been resolved 
yet, and I’m sure that there [are] signifi cant constitutional and other arguments 
that folks should be able to make to get that quashed. But it’s nonetheless a 
concern. So, I don’t think that we can ever say it’s a totally empty threat. Just 
like Dan said—also—we never know who’s going to answer the phone at ICE. 
And, if it’s somebody that just didn’t have a lot to do that day, or felt like going 
to [a] favorite Chinese restaurant, maybe they’ll show up. But it is a very
19. ICE Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATIONS AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.
ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited July 26, 2011).
344           THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM       [Vol. 1:3
useful response to say, ‘Well, that’s fi ne—if you call ICE, you’re calling ICE 
on yourself, too, basically because somebody is going to have to investigate 
that you’re hiring all these undocumented workers.” So, at the end of the day, 
that’s the big problem. There’s just not enough accountability for employers.
ELIZABETH KEYES: I’m going to take moderator’s privilege for the last 
question. I think it’s striking that all three speakers have talked about lawyering 
far beyond litigation. There’s nobody up here who said that this case, those 
cases are in the context, the context and we’ve heard about local advocacy, 
state advocacy, federal advocacy, legislation, agency work, [and] organization 
in general. And any of you are welcome to talk about this. I’m going to ask 
Joseph if he could talk about it. Joseph was an organizer before law school and 
then obviously, has continued with his motivation to be very heavily involved 
in organization. Can you talk about what the law adds to organizing . . . ?
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: [T]he truth is the law as it is, isn’t [how] the 
law as it should be. And . . . we organize in a context where there are perimeters 
set down and I think the worst thing you can do is go through law school and 
then operate within those perimeters. I went to law school. I was an organizer 
with the Steelworker’s Union in the South, and a defi ning experience [was 
when] I had organized a small steel fi nishing plant in rural Tennessee, and I 
was young—I was excited—I was a young organizer, [and I had] one of my 
fi rst wins. [A]nd after you organize, you then give it to a union negotiator to 
work on the fi rst contract. I called up the negotiator a month later and I said, 
‘How’s the bargaining going?’ 
And he said, ‘Well, they’ve shut down the place and moved it.’ [A]nd all 
those men and women that stood up and decided to act in concert . . . it just 
kind of hit me in the gut, and at that moment, I realized, well, I do need to 
organize, but I also need to know what the law is more effective[ly], [in order] 
to try to move both in a more effective direction. So, a lot of the work that 
I’ve done, especially at Change to Win, has been trying to fi gure out what is 
the intersection of existing law and how can you kind of operate in the gray 
spaces. How can you bring creativity, to try to do things that have never been 
done, or that get stalled in Congress? But, I think there’s a mixture of both. 
Being a good lawyer, by itself, isn’t enough. I think you got to be a strategic 
organizer, if you want to really facilitate social change. And, I passed out . . . 
the latest issue of The American Prospect Magazine.20 This is actually . . . an
20 See generally About The American Prospect, AM. PROSPECT, http://www.prospect.
org/cs/about_tap/our_mission (“The magazine’s founding purpose was to demonstrate that 
progressive ideas could animate a majority politics; to restore to intellectual and political 
respectability the case for social investment; to energize civic democracy and give voice to 
the disenfranchised; and to counteract the growing infl uence of conservative media.”) (last 
visited July 16, 2011). 
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example of the intersection of law and advocacy. So, there’s a lot of projects 
here where workers are organizing in California, in the fi elds, in warehouses, 
and, at the same time, we’re trying to use creative [tactics], like to get the 
biggest bang for the buck at the federal level, whether it’s DOL, Agriculture, 
or the White House.
ELIZABETH KEYES: Great . . . Big round of applause for our panel.
END TRANSCRIPT
*  *  *
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1998, National Basketball Association (“NBA”) commissioner David 
Stern grew a “lockout beard” for nearly half a year, declaring that it would 
remain intact until the league and union came to an agreement and resumed 
the basketball season.1 Currently, the threat of yet another beard, in addition to 
another truncated or cancelled season, looms over the NBA and up until very 
recently, lingered over the National Football League (“NFL”).2 
Within the last several months, the NBA and NFL’s collective bargaining 
agreements (“CBA”) have expired, leaving both leagues with serious doubt 
regarding the cancellation or delay of their 2011 seasons due to disagreements 
about several mandatory subjects of collective bargaining between their front 
offi ces and unions.3 
As of the date of this article, the NBA has instituted a lockout of its players, 
and the NFL ratifi ed a new ten-year CBA with the National Football League 
Players Association (“NFLPA”) on July 25, 2011 following a fi ve-month long 
lockout.4  
Decertifi cation, or dissolution, of a labor union, is one option available 
to labor organizations—including players’ associations—during collective 
bargaining negotiations.5 With the owners seemingly holding so much power 
and with the longstanding history of lockouts present in both leagues, the 
possibility of decertifying the union with the National Labor Relations Board 
1. See Steve Aschburner, Lockout Revisited, 10 Years Later, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(July 8, 2008), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/steve_aschburner/07/08/
lockout.revisited/ (“But the way most people remember it, the league’s angry and newly 
vulnerable chief executive let his retro whiskers grow symbolically from bitter start to 
exhausting fi nish . . . .”).
  2.     See Laura Clawson, NFL Lockout Ends, DAILY KOS (July 25, 2011, 11:36  A.M.), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/07/25/998457/-NFL-lockout-ends (allowing for 
current players to remain in the NFL’s medical plan for life a provision which was hotly 
debated in prior negotiations).  
3.  See Larry Coon, Lockout Looms Over 2010-11 Season, ESPN.COM 
(Sept. 22, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=coon_
larry&page=lockout-100922 (explaining that if a new CBA is not agreed upon by the NBA 
and players’ union prior to the expiration of the current CBA a league-imposed lockout will 
likely ensue, threatening cancellation of 2011–12 season); Union Head Says Owners Set for 
Lockout, ESPN.COM (Oct. 5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl /news/story?id=5652700 
(explaining that a stumbling block for negotiation of a new CBA is that the NFL, although 
claiming fi nancial diffi culties, will not share its books with the union).
4  See generally, CBA Expires, NBA Locks Out Its Players, ESPN.COM (July 1, 
2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=6723645 (detailing both sides of 
the labor dispute which erupted on Friday, July 1, 2011, when its CBA expired); Judy 
Battista, As the Lockout Ends, the Scrambling Begins,  N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011), at 
B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/sports/football/NFL-Union-Labor-
Deal.html?pagewanted=all (“After nearly fi ve months of inactivity by all but a handful of 
negotiators, the NFL sprang to life again Monday when [thirty-two] player representatives 
voted unanimously to recommend approval of a [ten]-year labor deal that owners largely 
approved last Thursday.”).
5. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 528–29 (4th ed. 2010) 
(explaining that if a union votes to decertify, players would no longer have any “affi liation 
with the union and no collective bargaining agreement would be in place”). 
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(“NLRB” or “Board”) may appear to be the best option for players.6 Based 
on the likelihood of the owners instituting a lockout following the expiration 
of the CBA, a decertifi cation of the NBA Players Association (“NBPA”) is 
arguably the only tool left to ensure a 2011 season.7 Recent decertifi cation 
efforts in both leagues reveal, however, that such a move can result in a negative 
economic impact on players’ salaries and free agency status.8 Thus, the legal 
options available to a players’ union via the NLRB and provide a more stable 
and successful alternative in dealing with the current labor situations in the 
NBA and the NFL.
This Article will examine, analyze, and propose a solution for the NBPA 
by considering the interplay between the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA” or “Act”), the NLRB, and the history of labor disputes in the NBA 
and the recently revived NFL. Part II will provide a background on collective 
bargaining under the Act, the jurisdiction of the NLRB, and how it applies to 
the unique circumstances of the sports industry.9 Part III will outline the labor 
histories of the NBPA and the NFLPA, including important legal challenges to 
collective bargaining and antitrust restraint claims, and will discuss the current 
situation facing the NBA and NBPA.10 Part IV will analyze the likely negative 
results of decertifi cation in comparison to the strength of a certifi ed players’ 
association, as well as illustrate the disadvantaged position that a union inhabits 
in today’s economy after decertifi cation.11 
II.  BACKGROUND
To safeguard both employers and employees, and to “promote[ ] the fl ow of 
commerce,” the NLRA regulates collective bargaining relationships between 
employers and designated employee unions.12 The history of labor
6. See generally Eric R. McDonough, Escaping Antitrust Immunity—Decertifi cation 
of the National Basketball Players Association, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821 (1997) 
(proposing, in the context of the late 1990s dispute between the NBA and NBPA, that 
decertifi cation of the NBPA, following the expiration of the then-current CBA, would 
allow players to compete in a more free market and receive fair market value wages).
7. Cf. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(explaining that decertifi cation allows players to pursue new strategies, such as challenging 
league practices through a strikes or through antitrust claims).
8. See Decertifi cation: The NFLPA and NBPA’s Nuclear Option, LAW360 
(January 18, 2011), www.constantinecannon.com/pdf_etc/complaw360art011811.pdf 
(explaining that decertifi cation would eliminate guaranteed salaries and pensions 
for the players and the ability to negotiate and control their marketing and licensing 
rights). 
9. See infra Part II (discussing the application of the NLRA to professional sports 
labor disputes). 
10. See infra Part III (analyzing the effects of the most recent NFL decertifi cation and 
the future of the NBA lockout).
11. See infra Part IV (providing an accounting of the labor history and current labor 
relations disputes present in the NBA and the NFL).
12. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006) 
(attempting to rectify the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees 
through provision for collective bargaining).  
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law, stemming from the Wagner Act,13 is based around the policy of bringing 
employers and employees together to encourage negotiation and agreement.14 
A.  Collective Bargaining and the NLRA
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA to protect the rights of employees and 
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain labor 
and management practices deemed harmful to the workforce and economy of 
the United States.15 In order to carry-out this process, Congress charged the 
NLRB with administering the provisions of the Act.16 The Board has two main 
functions: (1) to determine, through elections, whether a group of employees 
wish to be represented by a union in dealing with their employers and if so, 
by which union; and (2) to prevent “unfair labor practices by private sector 
employers and unions.”17 
The Board’s authority includes oversight of union representative elections 
by employees,18 as well as the governing of elections when employees seek to 
dissolve their labor organization as their exclusive bargaining representative.19 
The Board is also empowered to regulate unfair labor practices by conducting 
investigations, issuing complaints, and petitioning courts for relief.20 One of 
the key aspects of labor practices between labor organizations and employers 
is the mandatory obligation to bargain collectively when a labor unit has 
elected an exclusive bargaining agent.21 This obligation exists “with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” and requires 
that both sides negotiate in “good faith.”22
The process of collective bargaining begins with the selection of an 
13. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codifi ed as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)).
14.  See 1 PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 26–27 (4th ed. 
2001) (providing Senator Wagner’s belief that, in an industrial era dominated by large 
corporations, employees needed the ability to bargain together in order to assure their 
rights, with regard to the need for the passage of the Wagner Act).
15. See id. (explaining that the “cornerstone” of the Wagner Act was Section 7, which 
gave employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
concerted activities for . . . mutual aid and protection”).
16. See § 153 (creating the NLRB to adjudicate, investigate, and enforce the NLRA 
to remedy historically lax enforcement that plagued previous labor laws).
17. What We Do, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2011).
18. § 159(c).
19. See § 159(e) (requiring that thirty percent of eligible employees must petition the 
Board, no sooner than one year after a union had previously been certifi ed, for an election 
to decertify a previously-certifi ed bargaining representative).
20. See § 160(e) (permitting the NLRB to seek relief in federal district court to enjoin 
ongoing unfair labor practices).
21. See § 158(d) (specifying that the duty to bargain in good faith is aimed at the 
consummation of a written collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the 
bargaining representative).
22. See id. (explaining, however, that such an “obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession”).
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appropriate unit for the purpose of bargaining with the employer.23 The unit 
representative is selected by a majority of all employees within an appropriate 
unit at the employer’s facility or plant; after the representative collectively 
bargains with an employer over several mandated conditions of employment.24 
The Board’s statutorily-mandated determination of an “appropriate unit for 
collective bargaining” is adjudicated before, and decided by the Board, and 
cannot be overruled or interfered with by a court, unless the Board’s decision 
is arbitrary or capricious.25 Additionally, the Board has the authority to decline 
to exercise jurisdiction over an employment organization if the labor dispute 
does not have a suffi ciently substantial impact on interstate commerce.26 
Once the selection of an exclusive bargaining unit is complete, the 
collective bargaining process ensues. There is a duty for both the employer 
and the unit representative to bargain in good faith, failure to do so is an unfair 
labor practice.27 The language in the Act creates two subject matter categories 
for collective bargaining—mandatory and permissive subjects.28 To be a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, a term must “settle an aspect of 
the relationship between the employer and employees.”29 
23.  For instance, when an employer has two plants that manufacture different 
product lines, the employer may ask the Board to segregate the two into two different 
bargaining units. If the employer is successful, each plant would then have to separately 
select a certifi ed exclusive bargaining representative (union) and each representative would 
have to bargain with the employer separately. See § 159(a)–(b); Ethan Lock, The Scope of 
the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 382 (1989) (“When a 
majority of employees designate a union to represent them, an employer must . . . bargain 
in good faith with the employees’ representatives  . . . .”).
24.  See § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such 
a unit” regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining, including “rates of pay, wages, hours 
of employment, or other conditions of employment.”).
25.  See NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F.2d 243, 247–50 (9th Cir. 1944) (upholding 
the Board’s determination that sloper and trimmer employees were also qualifi ed cutters 
and that all three could join in an appropriate bargaining unit together). A federal court 
usually defers to an “administrative agency [like the NLRB] because of its own lack of 
experience with issues or the need to protect the authority of the agency.” HARDIN ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 2282.
26.  See § 164(c)(1); see also Sec. Guards & Watchmen Local No. 803 (Yonkers 
Raceway, Inc.), 196 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1972) (declining jurisdiction over the horse racing 
industry, even though racing had “some effect” on interstate commerce).
27.  See § 158(a)(5) (prohibiting an employer from refusing to bargain collectively 
with his employees’ chose representative); § 158(d) (“[T]o bargain collectively is the 
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith . . . .”).
28.  See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348–49 
(1958) (holding that an employer cannot insist on acceptance of non-mandatory terms 
as a precondition to reaching an agreement, even when the employer otherwise agrees to 
bargain over mandatory terms).
29.  See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) (explaining that there is no penalty or repercussion if 
parties refuse to negotiate with regard to permissive subjects).
352          THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM       [Vol. 1:3
An unfair labor charge can be brought when one party refuses to bargain in 
good faith over a mandatory subject.30 The good faith requirement to bargain 
collectively, however, does not indicate a necessity for parties to reach an 
agreement.31 The “good faith” requirement in collective bargaining is focused 
on the standards of behavior in the bargaining process, not on results.32  
A theory of judicial non-intervention supports the purpose of the NLRB 
refereeing the collective bargaining process.33 While the Act establishes the 
right of employees to join labor organizations and engage in collective action, 
it also guarantees the right of employees to abstain from forming or joining a 
labor union.34 Additionally, the Act provides a strict procedure for decertifying 
a labor organization by a vote of the union’s members.35 Following a petition to 
the NLRB for decertifi cation signed by at least thirty percent of the employees, 
the Board takes a secret ballot poll of the entire bargaining unit to determine 
whether or not to decertify the unit.36 If the majority of employees vote against 
the continuation of the union as the exclusive representative of the bargaining 
unit, the Board then decertifi es the union.37 
 B. The Labor Exemption
Because the union-employer relationship can often lead to accusations of 
antitrust violations, courts have recognized a “non-statutory labor exemption” 
from antitrust law in certain agreements reached in the course of collective 
30.  See § 158(a)(5) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse 
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees [over mandatory subjects 
of bargaining].”).
31.  See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (“While Congress did 
not compel agreement between employers and bargaining representatives, it did require 
collective bargaining in the hope that agreements would result.”); H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 
311 U.S. 514, 525 (1941) (“It is true that the National Labor Relations Act, while requiring 
the employer to bargain collectively, does not compel him to enter into an agreement.”). 
32.  Cf. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1967) (stressing that the 
employer has an obligation to supply all relevant information necessary for the employees’ 
bargaining representative to perform its duties); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) 
(holding that the duty “may be violated without a general failure of subjective good faith”). 
33.  See generally Lock, supra note 23, at 381–83 (explaining the theory behind 
restraint in judicial intervention during the bargaining process as being consistent with 
congressional intent manifested in the text of the Act).
34.  See § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to 
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor 
organization as a condition of employment . . . .”).
35.  See § 159(c)(1) (requiring an initial petition by employees); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 
102.83–102.84 (2010) (regulating the form, content, and procedure for presentation to the 
NLRB of  decertifi cation petitions).
36.  § 159(e)(1).
37.  Id. 
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bargaining under the NLRA.38 The primary purpose of the labor exemption 
is to protect labor organizations and their bargaining activities.39 Typically, 
antitrust actions are brought under the Sherman Act, which condemns “[e]
very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce.”40 The Supreme Court has held, however, 
that parties engaged in labor agreements can be immune from antitrust laws.41 
The Court cited a “strong labor policy” favoring labor agreements, even in the 
face of antitrust restraints.42 The labor exemption and antitrust immunity apply 
when agreements at issue relate to mandatory subjects of bargaining such as 
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.43  
C. The NLRA and Collective Bargaining as Applied to the Sports Industry
In 1969 the Board established its jurisdiction over professional sports leagues, 
holding in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs44 that Congress 
38.  See Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfi tters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 
622 (1975) (recognizing “the nonstatutory exemption” to federal antitrust law protects the 
unions ability to “eliminate competition over wages and working competitions” and to 
inevitably “affect price competition among employers”); Local No. 189, Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965) 
(“[T]he national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond 
the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, 
employees must work.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (“The labor of a human being 
is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall 
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural 
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or 
conducted for profi t, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations 
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, 
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies 
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (preventing 
federal courts from enjoining activity that would otherwise be considered “an unlawful 
combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of [certain] acts” in the context 
of a labor dispute).
39.  See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229–33 (1941) (holding 
that labor actions directed at an employer but due to “internecine” confl ict between two 
competing labor organizations did not violate the antitrust law); but cf. Allen Bradley Co. 
v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 807–11 (1945) (noting, 
however, that the exemption does not permit unions to combine with non-labor groups in 
order “to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services”). 
40.  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
41.  See 312 U.S. at 229–33 (explaining that “whether trade union conduct constitutes 
a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman Law and 
[Section] 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of 
outlawry of labor conduct”). 
42.  See 421 U.S. at 622 (“[T]he goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if 
this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws.”). 
43.  See id. (“The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy 
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working 
conditions.”).
44.  Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs & Ass’n of Nat’l Baseball League Umpires, 
180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
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intended for the Act to apply to Major League Baseball.45 And   reasoned 
that, based on its policy of encouraging collective bargaining, it should assert 
its jurisdiction and subject any professional team sports labor dispute to the 
Act.46 For the fi rst time, the Board accepted the idea that professional baseball 
affects interstate commerce, and thus ruled that professional baseball is subject 
to the Act.47 The Supreme Court applied the Board’s holding in Radovich v. 
Nat’l Football League to determine that both football48 and basketball49 affect 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and are, by extension, subject 
to the NLRA. 
 Then, in 1980 the Fifth Circuit established that when facing a joint 
employer relationship, such as a professional sports league, a league-wide, 
multi-employer bargaining unit was appropriate because the unit had “common 
labor problems and a high degree of centralized control over labor relations.”50 
And rationalized that only a bargaining unit comprised of every league player 
can wield enough bargaining power to challenge professional sports leagues.51 
 For multi–employer certifi cation, the NLRB requires either such a joint 
agreement between the parties or a controlling history of bargaining on a 
45.  See id. at 192 (“We can fi nd, neither in the statute nor in its legislative history, any 
expression of a Congressional intent that disputes between employers and employees in 
[the] industry [of professional sports] should be removed from the scheme of the National 
Labor Relations Act.”).
46.  See JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORT § 6.03, at 788 
(1979) (explaining that the Act is broad enough to permit the Board to exercise jurisdiction 
over “all the employees” in professional team sports, “from bat boys to maintenance men”). 
47.  See id. at 190–91 (“Congressional deliberations regarding the relationship 
of baseball and other professional team sports to the antitrust laws likewise refl ect a 
Congressional assumption that such sports are subject to regulation under the commerce 
clause . . . [and] legal scholars have agreed . . . that professional sports are in or affect 
interstate commerce, and as such are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  See generally NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (establishing that that 
the Board had authority under the NLRA to exert jurisdiction over an employer even when 
a manufacturer was not directly involved in interstate commerce but instead, received and 
shipped a small volume of manufactured goods through interstate commerce). 
48. Cf. Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (“[T]he volume 
of interstate business involved in organized professional football places it within the 
provisions of the [Sherman] Act.”).
49. Cf. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 
1971) (“The business of professional basketball as conducted by NBA and the NBA teams 
on a multi-state basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise and broadcast the games for 
interstate transmission, is trade or commerce among the several States within the meaning 
of the Sherman Act.”), stay granted, 1971 WL3015 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1971), reinstated sub 
nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204.
50. 613 F.2d 1379, 1383  (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that once a player is hired by 
a team, his working conditions are controlled not only by that team, but by the league as 
well). 
51. Cf.  PAUL C. WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 302–03 (3d ed. 
2004) (explaining that multi-employer bargaining is now a common feature, because “[b]
oth employers and unions in these industries fi nd they have a complimentary long-term 
interest in putting their relationship on that broader footing”); WEISTART & LOWELL, supra 
note 46, at 794 (“Multi-employer bargaining is presently used in professional sports . . . 
.”); see also WONG, supra note 5, at 530 (describing that today “players associations have 
become a powerful tool” in collective bargaining).  
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multi-employer basis.52 In the sports industry, the inclusion of all teams within 
a league, along with the league commissioner’s offi ce, constitutes a multi-
employer unit for collective bargaining.53
In the context of a multi–employer unit, challenges often arise over the 
issues of individual bargaining and the union’s right to fair representation.54 
Professional sports contracts have historically been made between a player and 
a single team or organization. Meanwhile, the relevant collective bargaining 
agreement does not set salaries for contracts, but rather contains constraints 
concerning wages and conditions of employment within which players and 
teams are free to negotiate.55 Each league sets forth in its CBA the limitations 
or parameters in which a player and team can negotiate a salary, but no matter 
the system, any employer that individually bargains with a player outside of 
those parameters is committing an unfair labor practice.56
The Supreme Court’s standard for such action comes from J.I. Case Co. 
v. NLRB,57 when the Court conceded that in some situations, allowing for 
individual employees to bargain may be benefi cial for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.58 The Southern District of New York’s decision in Morio v. North 
American Soccer League59 best illustrates the issue of individual bargaining 
in sports.60 The Morio court granted a temporary injunction on all individual 
contracts due to a violation of the employers’ duty to bargain exclusively with 
the bargaining representatives of the players.61 Thus, in sports there is more 
individual freedom of contract for employees under typical league collective 
bargaining agreements, so long as the employees and the individual teams act 
52.  Id.
53.  See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(explaining that there is a joint employer relationship between the North American Soccer 
League and the various clubs that have a “proportionate role in League management”). 
54.  See generally NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 499, 353 U.S. 87, 94–97 (1957) 
(establishing the constitutionality of multi-employer bargaining).
55.  See WONG, supra note 5 at 529–30 (explaining the difference between typical 
sports contracts and those of other unions such as butchers, teachers, or grocery workers 
who will negotiate specifi c salaries in collective bargaining). 
56.  Compare WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 305 (quoting Morio v. N. Am. 
Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633, 638–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 
1980) (explaining that any individual bargaining outside of a CBA can be a violation under 
the Act, because a union is entitled to conduct all bargaining with an employer), with 
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 808 (describing how it has “been common for 
collective bargaining agreements in professional sports to cover only the minimum terms . 
. . and to specifi cally provide that individual athletes may negotiate individually for better 
terms” (emphasis added)). 
57.  321 U.S. 332 (1944).
58.  See id. at 338 (noting that it may be wise for a CBA to set basic terms but to allow 
further individualized bargaining, particularly when individual employees face different 
work or personal circumstances).
59.  501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
60.  See id. at 635, 637 (fi nding that the soccer league’s clubs continued to negotiate 
with individual players after the NLRB named the league as a multi-employer unit).
61.  See id. at 638–39, 640 (“The duty to bargain carries with it the obligation on the 
part of the employer not to undercut the Union by entering into individual contracts with 
the employees.”).
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in good faith and within the parameters of the CBA.62
The duty to bargain in good faith is best seen through the behaviors and 
actions of parties involved in collective bargaining.63 In sports, bad faith 
bargaining accusations are usually the result of one party refusing to start or 
continue negotiations with the other party.64 Both players associations and 
leagues have been found guilty of unfair labor practices for a bad faith refusal 
to negotiate over mandatory subjects of bargaining.65   
While the Act vaguely mandates that all negotiations must be in good faith 
“with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,”66 
several cases have explicitly held certain types of restraints and parameters 
within collective bargaining to be mandatory subjects of bargaining in good 
faith.67 Some of the most important bargaining issues are included in mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining, such as free agency,68
62.  See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 307 (discussing the free market 
orientation of CBAs in sports and how such an orientation is different “than what one fi nds 
in most unionized sectors.”).
63.  See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text. 
64.  See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 (explaining that bad faith has 
een found when there was a refusal to negotiate or an attempt to bypass the other party with 
a unilateral change in a mandatory subject matter of collective bargaining). 
65.  Compare Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th 
Cir. 1974) (“[B]y unilaterally promulgating and implementing a rule providing for an 
automatic fi ne to be levied against any player who leaves the bench area while a fi ght or 
an altercation is in progress on the football fi eld, [employers] have engaged in unfair labor 
practices.”), with WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 & n.217.1 (explaining that 
in 1976 the NBPA was found to have bargained in bad faith when it refused to bargain over 
player restraint mechanisms that were mandatory subjects of bargaining, but which the 
NBPA contended were violations of antitrust law). 
66.  29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
67.  Accord Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Powell 
v. Nat’l Football League (“Powell II”), 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Wood v. Nat’l 
Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player 
Relations Comm., Inc. (“Silverman II”), 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 
1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
68.  See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (holding that the “Rozelle Rule,” which provides 
guidelines on free agency for NFL players, constitutes a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining). 
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player mobility restraints69 (including compensation systems),70 salary caps, 
player drafts,71 and salary arbitration.72  
Challenges to mandatory subjects of bargaining in sports have often been 
presented as antitrust claims under Sherman Act.73 These challenges are 
typically defended by the non-statutory labor exemption that allows for a 
league to engage in behavior that would otherwise be an antitrust violation, 
so long as the action or restriction relates to mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining.74 Mackey v. National Football League provides the accepted 
requirements with which a subject of collective bargaining in sports may be 
exempt from trade restraints claims.75 The Eighth Circuit designated a three-
part test to determine whether the restraint receives the labor exemption.76 For 
the labor exemption to apply, (1) the restraint on trade must primarily affect 
only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the agreement must 
concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and (3) the agreement 
must be the product of bona fi de arm’s-length bargaining.77  
69.  See id. (noting that the Rozelle Rule “operates to restrict a player’s ability to 
move from one team to another and depresses player salaries”).
70.  See Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303 (“The First Refusal/Compensation system, a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, was twice set forth in collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated in good faith . . . .”). 
71.  See, e.g., Wood, 809 F.2d at 961–62 (holding that the salary cap, entry draft, 
minimum individual salaries, fringe benefi ts, minimum aggregate team salaries, guaranteed 
revenue sharing, and fi rst refusal provisions, “are mandatory subjects of bargaining . . . 
[because] [e]ach of them clearly is intimately related to ‘wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment’”).
72.  See, e.g., Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 
880 F. Supp. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995) (fi nding that the 
“salary arbitration for reserve players is also a mandatory part of the collective bargaining 
process between the Players and the Owners.”).
73.  See Mackey, 543 F.2d 606, 609, 610 (challenging an NFL rule that allowed the 
league commissioner to force a club receiving a free agent to compensate the player’s former 
club); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (reciting contentions by 
a national basketball player that “[a] ‘salary cap,’ college draft, and prohibition of player 
corporations violated Sherman Act”).
74.  See supra Part II.B; see also Local Union No. 189 v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 
Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965) (holding 
that a marketing-hours restriction was related to wages and hours, and obtained through 
collective bargaining, and thus fell within the “protection of the national labor policy and 
[was] therefore exempt from the Sherman Act”). 
75.  Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
76.  Id.
77.  Id.
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III.  HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS IN THE  NFL AND THE NBA
Both the NBA and the NFL have exclusive bargaining agents that were fi rst 
recognized in the 1960’s—the NFLPA and the NBPA.78 During their tenure, 
both labor organizations have negotiated numerous collective bargaining 
agreements with their respective leagues, yet both the NFL and the NBA 
have had their share of strikes, work stoppages and even cancelled seasons.79 
Currently after a four-and-half month lockout, the 2011 NFL season is back 
on track, after a new ten-year CBA was executed on July 21, 2011. 80 But, the 
NBA’s 2011 season appears to be in jeopardy after the league and the NBPA’s 
negotiations failed on July 1, 2011 the NBA fi led an unfair labor practice 
complaint with the NLRB and a suit against the NBPA in Federal District 
Court of New York.81 
A. Labor History of the National Football League
The NFLPA was formed in 1956 and became the exclusive bargaining unit 
to NFL players in 1968.82 While there were small work stoppages in 1968, 
1970, and 197483 the NFLPA encountered its fi rst serious issue in the case of 
Mackey v. National Football League.84
In Mackey, a group of present and former players sued the NFL, arguing that 
the “Rozelle Rule,” was an unfair restraint on trade under the Sherman Act.85 
This rule provided that, upon the expiration of a player’s original team contract, 
if a player switched teams and the two teams could not reach a satisfactory
78. Compare About the NBPA, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.
nbpa.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (explaining that the National Basketball 
Players Association was founded in 1954), and WONG, supra note 5, at 531 (stating that 
the National Football League Players Association was founded in 1956), with Mackey 
v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976) (pointing out that the NLRB 
recognized the NFLPA in 1968 as the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL 
players), and Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams (“Williams II”), 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 
1995) (referencing how the NBA and NBPA entered into their fi rst collective bargaining 
agreement in 1967).
79.  See April Weiner, NFL and the CBA: Ranking the Worst Work Stoppages in 
Pro Sports’ History, BLEACHER REPORT (March 10, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/631338-nfl -and-the-cba-ranking-the-worst-work-stoppages-in-pro-sports-history 
(noting that the NFL has had fi ve work stoppages since its inception—four strikes and one 
lockout—and the NBA has had three work stoppages, all of which were lockouts).
80.  See DeMaurice Smith, Interview with Michel Martin host of NPR’s Tell Me 
More (July 27, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/2011/07/27/138738431/
nfl s-longest-work-stoppage-ends).
81.  See Nathan Koppel, NBA Takes Players Association to Court, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL LAW BLOG (August 2, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/02/
nba-takes-players-association-to-court/?mod=WSJBlog; Nat’l Basketball League, NBA 
Files Unfair Labor Practice Charge, Lawsuit Against NBPA (August 2, 2011 10:38 AM), 
http://www.nba.com/2011/news/08/02/nba-labor-lawsuit/. 
82.  Kapp v. Nat’l Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 83 (N.D. Cal. 1974), vacated in 
part, No. 72-537, 1975 WL 959 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1975), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 
1978).
83.  WONG, supra note 5, at 544 tbl.11.3.
84.  543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
85.  Id. at 609. 
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arrangement on compensation, the league commissioner could transfer 
substitute players from the player’s new team to the old team.86 League players 
complained that the rule limited their free agency and argued that they could not 
freely contract out their services.87  The NFL argued that it was shielded from 
antitrust liability under the nonstatutory labor exemption within the Sherman 
Act, due to its participation in a CBA.88  The District Court of Minnesota held 
that “[the NFL’s] enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted a concerted 
refusal to deal . . . and therefore was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”89
The Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court’s ruling that because the Rozelle 
Rule was not the product of “bona-fi de arms length bargaining,” the labor 
exemption did not apply and the Rozelle Rule was subject to antitrust scrutiny 
under the Sherman Act.90 In a victory for the players, the court held that the 
Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law because it was an unreasonable 
restraint on trade, but the court also encouraged the two sides to resolve the 
issue of player mobility restraints through a collective bargaining agreement.91 
The two sides came to an agreement in March of 1977 that contained league 
concessions on “union security” and the league’s pension plans, in return for 
new and different restrictions on free agency.92
Then, in 1982 following the expiration of the CBA, the NFL players went 
on strike; this strike lasted fi fty-seven days and ended with a new agreement.93 
Later, in 1987, the NFL experienced its most signifi cant labor dispute after 
the expiration of the 1982 CBA when the NFL owners found replacements for 
the striking players and the NBPA was forced to call off the strike after many 
players were close to crossing the picket line to receive a paycheck.94 After 
twenty–four days the strike ended, and the players returned to work under 
similar pre-strike conditions.95
86.  Id. at 610–11.  
87.  Id. at 609.
88. Id at 620–21.
89.  Id. at 609 (citing Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 
.1975)).
90.  See id. at 616 (observing that the clubs had unilaterally imposed the rule since 
1963).  See generally John Croke, An Examination of the Antitrust Issues Surrounding the 
NBA Decertifi cation Crisis, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 163, 177-79 (1998) (discussing the “per se” 
and “rule of reason” antitrust analyses in the decertifi cation context). 
91.  See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (“The parties are far better situated to agreeably 
resolve what rules governing player transfers are best suited for their mutual interests than 
are the courts.”). 
92. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 231 (observing that the new rules 
“proved even more restrictive than the old Rozelle Rule” and that only one player “actually 
changed teams for compensation” from 1977 to 1987). 
93.  See WONG, supra note 5, at 531 (noting that the union conceded on the issue of 
player mobility in return for better player salaries and benefi ts).
94.  See generally Paul D. Staudohar, The Football Strike of 1987: The Question of 
Free Agency, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (1988) (explaining the disputes over free agency 
and player mobility in the 1987 strike). See id. at 29 (describing how two-thirds of the 
league teams found replacement players, while the striking players, on the other hand, had 
limited fi nancial reserves and the union had no “strike fund” prepared).
95.  See id. at 30 (stating that the strike ended October 15th).
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The fi ght was not over, and a group of players brought suit against the NFL 
in the District Court of Minnesota for several restrictions contained in the 
CBA and in the standard player contract—claiming that they were violations 
of the Sherman Act.96 The court refused to order a preliminary injunction on 
the issues and held that the labor exemption protected the NFL—as the parties 
had not come yet to an impasse.97  
The players appealed the district court’s decision that there was not yet 
an impasse, but the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and 
held that the labor exemption applies for “as long as there is a possibility that 
proceedings may be commenced before the Board, or until fi nal resolution of 
Board proceedings and appeals.”98 Noting, in the decision, that antitrust claims 
were not appropriate because labor policy favors “negotiated settlements 
rather than intervention by courts.”99   
Following this ruling, and having played two seasons without a CBA in 
place, the NFLPA elected to decertify itself as the exclusive bargaining unit 
through a league-wide player vote.100 Following decertifi cation, another lawsuit 
was fi led against the NFL in Powell v. National Football League & McNeil 
v. National Football League (Powell III).101 The District Court of Minnesota 
held that because of the decertifi cation of the NFLPA, the labor exemption no 
longer protected the NFL and the player restraints challenged in the suit were
96.  See Powell v. Nat’l Football League (“Powell I”), 678 F. Supp. 777, 778–79 (D. 
Minn. 1988) (stating that plaintiffs “[sought] to enjoin defendants from implementing or 
continuing a system of alleged player restraints [set up to restrict player mobility]”), rev’d, 
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
97.  See id. at 788 (“[P]roper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires 
that a labor exemption relating to a mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration 
of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to that issue; 
thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from scrutiny . . . .”) The NLRB 
has ruled an “impasse” to be a “matter of judgment” in which the Board considers: 
[the] bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the 
negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to to [sic] which there is disagreement, 
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations . . . . See   
Taft Broad. Co. & Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists, 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967); 
see also Wong, supra note 5, at 544 (listing seven factors to consider).
98.  See Powell v. Nat’l Football League (Powell II), 930 F.2d 1293, 1303–04 (8th Cir. 
1989) (“[T]he nonstatutory labor exemption protects agreements conceived in an ongoing 
collective bargaining relationship . . . beyond impasse. . . . ”)
99.  Id. at 1303.
100.  See WONG, supra note 6, at 531. Without a CBA, the league was able to institute 
unilateral changes so long as the bargaining relationship existed, and these changes could 
not be challenged as unfair labor practices through NLRB jurisdiction. 
101.  764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
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now vulnerable to antitrust violation claims.102 This time, a jury found that the 
NFL’s compensation rule was a violation of the Sherman Act.103  
Another suit was fi led less than two weeks after Powell: White v. National 
Football League.104 In White a group of players brought a class action suit 
seeking total or modifi ed free agency.105 White eventually settled out of court, 
and the NFL paid $195 million to the class of players and granted greater free 
agency to the NFL players.106 Not long after the Powell verdict, the players 
once again elected the NFLPA as their exclusive bargaining representative and 
the NFLPA successfully executed a new CBA in 1993.107
The most recent CBA, signed in 2006, included a provision allowing 
owners to opt out of the agreement in March, 2011—instead of its expiration 
in 2012.108 Months before the CBA actually expired, NFLPA executive director 
DeMaurice Smith expressed concerns about the NFL making plans for a 
lockout,109 and stated that every team had taken individual votes to determine 
whether the NFLPA should once again decertify as the exclusive bargaining 
unit.110
On March 11, 2011, the owners opted out of the agreement and the league
locked out its players.111 The same day, the NFLPA offi cially 
decertifi ed and a group of individual players fi led a lawsuit in
102.  See id. at 1358–59 (reasoning that, without a certifi ed collective bargaining 
representative, no further remedy or action before the Board remained, and thus there was 
no longer the “ongoing collective bargaining relationship”).
103.  See McDonough, supra note 6, at 840 (describing how the jury found that Plan 
B had “a substantially harmful effect on competition” and caused economic injury to the 
players (quoting Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 229 n.2 (D. Minn. 
1992))).
104.  White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993), motion 
for fi nal approval of settlement granted, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d 
402 (8th Cir. 1994).
105.  Id. at 1394–95.
106.  McDonough, supra note 6, at 842 (“But of greater importance is that the White 
settlement, gained only after decertifi cation of the players own union and subsequent court 
victories, provided the most signifi cant amount of free agency in the history of the NFL.”).
107.  WONG, supra note 5, at 531.
108.  See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006–2012 (Mar. 8, 2006) (unpublished 
contract) (on fi le with author); see also WONG, supra note 5, at 546 (explaining that the “[o]
wners unanimously vote[d] to opt out of [the] collective bargaining agreement” on May 
20, 2008, an act that resulted in the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement 
moving to May 1, 2011).
109.  See Associated Press, Union Head Says Owners Set for Lockout, ESPN (Oct. 
5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl /news/story?id=5652700 (explaining that Smith has 
pointed to the NFL’s recently asking banks to extend loan periods for league teams in the 
event of a lockout).
110.  See Doug Farrar, Players, NFL Dig In For Pending Labor Fight, YAHOO! SPORTS 
(Nov. 18, 2010) http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl /news?slug=ys-nfl labor111810/ (describing the 
actions of the league and the NFLPA in preparing for a possible lockout at the end of the 
current season).
111.  See Nate Davis, NFLPA Decertifi es, Pursues Lockout Injunction Against NFL, 
USA TODAY, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2011/03/report-nfl -
players-association-applies-for-decertifi cation/1 (Mar. 12, 2011).
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U.S. District Court, alleging antitrust violations and seeking an 
injunction regarding the lockout.112 In the months since then, the 
NFLPA has engaged in a series of court hearings, court-mandated mediation and 
numerous negotiation meetings.113 Then, on July 25, 2011 NFL Commissioners 
Roger Goodell and DeMaurice Smith announced that the league and the 
NFLPA had reached a new ten-year CBA which would end the lockout and 
that “[f]ootball [was] back.”114
B. Labor History of the National Basketball Association
The exclusive bargaining unit of the NBA is the NBPA, which was founded 
in 1954.115 The NBA entered into its fi rst CBA in 1967.116 Following the 1971 
decision in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,117 which provided 
that the NBA participated in interstate commerce,118 and thus, by extension, 
would fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.119 
Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n120 provided a major victory for the league in 
the labor relationship. Leon Wood, a college basketball player drafted in the 
fi rst round of the NBA draft, brought suit against the league and argued that 
the draft and salary cap were illegal restraints of trade.121 Despite fi nding that 
the draft and salary cap actually injured Wood and others in the position of 
drafted players, the Wood court held that all trade restraints were the product of 
collective bargaining and thus could not be challenged on antitrust grounds.122
112.  See id. 
113. See generally Sal Paolantonio, Players, Owners Facing Tight Squeeze, ESPN.
COM (July 11, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl /columns/story?columnist=paolantonio_
sal&id=6756795 (describing the federal judge-mandated negotiations between the league 
and NFL player representatives). 
114. See Players Vote to Approve New Labor Deal, Put End to Extended Lockout, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 25, 2011 9:40 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
football/nfl /07/25/nfl -labor-deal.ap/index.html.
115.  See About the NBPA, supra note 78 (discussing how the NBA recognized the 
NBPA as the exclusive union representative of all NBA players when the players threatened 
not to play in the fi rst televised All-Stars game).
116.  Id.
117.  325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay granted, 1971 WL 3015 (9th Cir. Feb. 
16, 1971), reinstated sub nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
118.  See id. at 1062 (noting that the NBA operates in seventeen metropolitan areas, 
schedules games in numerous states, and receives revenue from nationwide broadcasts).
119.  See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
120.  809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
121.  Id. at 956–57.
122.  Id. at 959, 960 (rebuffi ng a basketball player’s argument that his superior skills 
vis-à-vis other players should permit him to insist on individual bargaining, because 
“collective agreements routinely set standard wages for employees with differing 
responsibilities, skills, and levels of effi ciency”); see McDonough supra note 6, at 833–34 
(highlighting the fact that Wood still lost the suit even though at the time he was not yet a 
part of the bargaining unit but an in-coming college athlete, and explaining that the court 
relied on the defi nition of “employee” in the NLRA in holding against Wood). 
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Besides the Wood decision, the fi rst major labor issue in the NBA arose 
in 1995.123 Facing the imminent expiration of the CBA in 1994, the league
and players managed to reach a no-strike, no-lockout agreement to protect 
the 1994–95 season; the players played under the regulations of the previous 
agreement in hopes of striking a new deal during the season.124 However, 
following the expiration of the CBA on June 23, 1994 the NBA and its teams 
brought suit against the class of present and future NBA players seeking a 
judgment stipulating:
(i) that the continued imposition of the disputed provisions of the CBA 
[the college draft, the salary cap, and the right of fi rst refusal for free 
agents] would not violate the antitrust laws because that imposition is 
“governed solely by the labor laws and is exempt from antitrust liability 
under the nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws”; and (ii) that 
the disputed provisions are lawful even if the antitrust laws apply.125 
The Second Circuit ruled for the league and cited the labor exemption as 
providing the league with immunity from possible antitrust challenges so long 
as there was a collective bargaining relationship between the parties.126
After the 1995 season, the loss in Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams 
(“Williams I”), and the failure to negotiate a new CBA, a group of NBA 
players who were unhappy with the current league provisions signed a petition 
to decertify the players association as their exclusive bargaining agent.127 The 
association’s biggest stars, led by Michael Jordan and Patrick Ewing, also 
brought an antitrust suit in District Court.128 Eventually, the NLRB conducted
123.  See WONG, supra note 5, at 549 tbl.11.3 (noting that in 1995, the NBPA threatened 
to decertify during an owners’ lockout).
124.  Robert Bradley,  Labor Pains Nothing New to NBA, ASS’N FOR PROF’L 
BASKETBALL RES., http://www.apbr.org/labor.html (last visited May 30, 2010).
125.  See Williams II, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (fi nding that the players had 
refused to negotiate with the NBA until the 1988 CBA had expired); see also McDonough, 
supra note 6, at 835 (indicating that the same restrictions had been challenged eight years 
prior in Wood).
126.  See 45 F.3d at 691, 693 (holding that even after the expiration of a collective 
bargaining agreement, where there is a collective bargaining relationship employers can 
still bargain with a union, implement joint proposals, and use economic pressure to secure 
agreement on proposals). 
127.  See 1 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND 
BUSINESS 95 (1997) (describing the 1995 negotiations and the resulting attempt to get rid 
of the union leadership).
128.  See id. (stating that the lawsuit alleged that any joint action by the NBA owners, 
whether a lockout, the return of the old salary cap system, or a new system, “would violate 
the antitrust laws in the absence of a union”).
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an election that would determine whether the players association would 
be decertifi ed.129 By a vote of 226–134 the union remained the exclusive 
bargaining agent.130 Still without a CBA, the NBPA and the league continued to 
negotiate and eventually created a new agreement in July 1996, all without any 
signifi cant work stoppages—either by a player strike or an owner lockout.131 
The new six–year CBA, however, contained a provision allowing owners to 
re–open negotiations after three years if player salaries rose too high relative 
to league income, and in 1998, the NBA faced a work stoppage.132 During the 
season, on March 23, 1998, the owners voted to reopen negotiations, and, after 
nine negotiation sessions that produced little progress, the league announced 
a lockout beginning July 1, 1998.133 The lockout lasted six months, and right 
before the 1998–1999 season was set to be cancelled, the sides settled on a 
new CBA and agreed to play a shortened season beginning in February.134 Both 
sides made concessions in the settlement, with the players suffering a new cap 
on individual salaries, while the owners lost in their efforts to institute a hard 
team salary cap.135
The most recent CBA came into existence on July 1, 2005 and expired on 
June 30, 2011.136 The owners made the decision to refuse an option to continue 
the CBA until 2012, and the struggles in negotiation over the past six months 
have resulted in both sides questioning whether there will be an NBA season 
in 2011.137 Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the NBPA fi led an unfair labor 
charge against the league with the Board for unfair bargaining practices,
129.  Id.; see Murray Chass, N.B.A. Taking a Timeout for Decertifi cation Results, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at B12 (“If the union wins, the players will continue to have a labor 
relationship with the N.B.A., short-circuiting an antitrust suit . . . [if] the NLRB certifi es 
the results, Judge David Doty of United States District Court in Minneapolis will consider 
the players’ request to issue a preliminary injunction ending the league’s lockout of the 
players.”).
130.  David Steele, NBA Players Vote for Union Decertifi cation Fails; Lockout Could 
End Friday, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 13, 1995, at B1. 
131.  See WISE & MEYER, supra note 127, at 95–96 (describing the tumultuous 
relationship between the owners and union following the decertifi cation election).
132. Paul D. Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball: The Lockout of 1998-99, 122 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter, Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball].
133.  Id. at 4–5 (explaining that the league claimed nearly half of its 29 teams were 
losing money, and that players were receiving 57 percent of total revenue in salaries, a 
number much greater than the threshold 51.8% that allowed owners to reopen negotiations). 
134.  Id. at 8.
135.  Id.
136.  2005 [NBA] Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XXXIX (unpublished 
contract) (on fi le with author), available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005.
137.  See Coon, supra note 3 (“If the league and players’ union don’t come to terms 
on a new agreement by then, the league will impose a lockout, a work stoppage that will 
disrupt business and could possibly lead to the cancellation of the entire 2011-12 season.”); 
see also Chris Mannix, As Two Sides Stand Firm, Lockout Seems Inevitable For NBA, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 12, 2010), http:// sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/chris_ 
mannix/07/12/stern.las.vegas/ (noting that the league’s current proposal and the players’ 
current proposal are “miles apart”).
2011]                                STRENGTH IN NUMBERS                             365 
complaining the NBA’s goal was to avoid meaningful negotiation until a 
lockout was in place.138 Following the expiration of the CBA, the owners 
initiated a lockout,139 and the biggest issue the two sides are in disagreement 
about is revenue sharing between owners and players.140 NBA commissioner 
David Stern and NBPA executive director Billy Hunter have met for several 
negotiations, but since expiration, progress has stalled and both sides appear 
unafraid to discuss the possibility of a lengthy work stoppage.141  
IV.  ANALYSIS OF NLRB DECERTIFICATION AND ITS NEGATIVE EFFECTS
While the NFL players have decertifi ed their union once before, both the 
NFLPA and NBPA considered the option of Board–regulated decertifi cation in 
light of the threat of a lockout in 2011.142 However, decertifi cation of a union 
provides instability and it is unlikely to result in any large benefi ts—in contrast 
to the advantages of continued negotiation through an exclusive bargaining 
agent certifi ed by the Board.
A. Legal Options of a Decertifi ed Players’ Association to 
Challenge Trade Restraints 
The Eighth Circuit established that any trade restraint is a mandatory 
subject of collective bargaining. Yet, today almost all salary caps, free agency 
restrictions, and rookie drafts fall under the labor exemption—so long as a 
collective bargaining relationship exists.143 Thus, a players’ association who 
desires to pursue an antitrust claim against a league is presented with a many 
number of options under the Sherman Act.
In Powell II, the court lists several choices for labor organizations faced 
with possible restraints on trade, including exerting economic pressure and 
presenting claims to the Board.144 Additionally, in Williams I, Judge Duffy 
opined that the players union could decertify under Board regulations and 
subsequently bring antitrust claims against the NBA, but did not advise the 
players to pursue this course of action.145  As the Eighth Circuit explained:
138. See ESPN.COM, supra note 4. 
139.  See id. 
140.  See Coon, supra note 3 (“The players are guaranteed fi fty-seven percent of the 
league’s revenues  . . . before expenses come out.”).
141.  See Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Lockout Threatens Entire Season, YAHOO SPORTS, 
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_lockout_players_063011 
(June 30, 2011) (“[T]here’s a real chance the NBA is gone for a full year now. This has the 
makings of the NHL’s labor war of 2004-05, where the cost of instituting a hard salary cap 
cost the sport a complete season.”).
142.  See generally Coon, supra note 3 (noting that “fewer than ten percent of the 
players who experienced the lockout in 1998-99 are still in the league”).
143.  See Powell II, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the labor exemption 
protects “agreements conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship . . .” from 
antitrust liability). See also supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“impasse” and “bargaining relationship” tests).
144.  See id. 
145.  See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams (Williams I), 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
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[W]e are not compelled to look into the future and pick a 
termination point for the labor exemption. The parties are now faced 
with several choices. They may bargain further . . . [t]hey may resort 
to economic force. And fi nally, if appropriate issues arise, they may 
present claims to the [Board]. We are satisfi ed that as long as there is 
a possibility that proceedings may be commenced before the Board, 
or until fi nal resolution of Board proceedings and appeals therefrom, 
the labor relationship continues and the labor exemption applies.146
A decertifi ed labor organization holds almost no actual power; instead, the 
power to bring legal action lies in the hands of individual employees.147 Not 
only will the players have to provide their own legal representation— instead of 
relying on the union to bring suit or an unfair labor practices complaint against 
the league—but the chances of winning such lawsuits are not a certainty for 
the players.148  
This theory is exemplifi ed by Caldwell—where a player in the American 
Basketball Association brought suit against the league and his team for a 
suspension.149 The court ruled, however, that because the American Basketball 
Association Players Association had received Board certifi cation as the 
exclusive bargaining unit, Caldwell’s proper pursuit of a claim was through 
the NLRB by alleging unfair labor practices, rather than an antitrust suit.150 
More recently a group of NBA players lost their antitrust counterclaims in 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams.151 In dicta, the  court reasoned that there was 
no per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and therefore considered 
the reasonableness of the challenged restraints.152 Applying a “rule of reason” 
analysis, the Williams court reasoned that the salary cap, the restrictions on 
free agency, and the college draft were not anti–competitive.153
146. Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303.
147.  See Croke, supra note 90 at 177 (warning that decertifi cation would leave the 
individual players to “fend for themselves”).
148.  Compare Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(holding that the Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law), with Williams I, 857 F. 
Supp. 1069, 1078–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (deciding on exemption grounds but positing in 
dicta that the challenged trade restraints were not violations of antitrust law), aff’d, 45 F.3d 
684 (2d Cir. 1995).
149.  See id. at 526 (explaining that Caldwell alleged that the team and league conspired 
to “blacklist” him to ensure that he could never play in the league again).
150. See id. at 530 (“[I]f Caldwell is allowed to proceed with the present action, 
employees in similar circumstances will either never resort to the NLRB or will 
institute parallel administrative and antitrust proceedings with the risk of inconsistent 
adjudications.”).
151.  See Williams I, 857 F. Supp. at 1071, 1078, 1079 (characterizing professional 
athletic associations as joint ventures, not as “competitors in any economic sense” 
(quoting Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (emphasis in 
original))).
152.  Id. at 1078–79.
153.  See id. at 1079 (“The pro-competitive effects of these practices, in particular the 
maintenance of competitive balance, may outweigh their restrictive consequences.”). 
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Most recently, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Brady v. NFL154 may be 
interpreted by other circuits as holding that lockouts are legal, even in the 
face of decertifi ed unions.155 This decision could greatly impact the strongest 
weapon of decertifi ed unions, the assurance that decertifi ed unions can bring 
antitrust claims against a league instituting a lockout. Even if such reading of 
the June 8, 2011 decision is a stretch of the imagination, the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion solidifi es the notion that lockouts cannot be enjoined, and as such, 
any lockout would remain in place until the merits of the case are heard.156 For 
example, the Brady case would not have been heard by a U.S. District Court 
until 2012, thus ensuring that without a negotiated deal, the NFL could have 
cancelled the upcoming season, despite whether or not the NFLPA elected to 
decertify. 
Thus, continuing the union as the certifi ed exclusive bargaining unit under the 
oversight of the NLRB is a more stable option in furthering the players’ efforts 
to affect change in league provisions, as union lawsuits and unfair labor practice 
claims are less expensive and will be possibly more successful than individual 
antitrust lawsuits brought by players outside of the union.   
 Finally, there exists the possibility of NBA or NFL owners bringing a bad 
faith bargaining charge against their respective players’ association concerning 
the decision to decertify.157 Looking at the current status of the NFL, with every 
team voting—most unanimously—for decertifi cation more than four months 
before the current CBA expires,158 the league could argue that the players had 
no desire to reach an agreement.159 By decertifying immediately following the 
CBA expiration, the NFL and the NBA players would be placing themselves in 
a different situation from the 1989 NFLPA, which only decertifi ed following a 
failed court challenge and two seasons of play without an agreement in place.160 
154.  Brady v. Nat’l Football League, Docket No. 11-1898 (8th Cir. 2011).
155 See Michael McCann, Burning Questions From Eighth Circuit Ruling To Extend 
NFL Lockout, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 16, 2011) http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
writers/michael_mccann/05/16/nfl .lockout/index.html. 
156 See Brady (“[W]e conclude that § 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives a 
federal court of power to issue an injunction prohibiting a party to a labor dispute from 
implementing a lockout of its employees.”). 
157.  Cf. HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 803 (explaining that the Board can fi nd bad 
faith even if a party is willing to meet, so long as the Bard fi nds that the party “is merely 
going through the motions of bargaining”).
158.  See supra note 110.
159.  See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) 
(holding that the duty of good faith is an obligation “to participate actively . . . as to indicate 
a present intention to fi nd a basis for agreement . . . ‘[with] an open mind and sincere desire 
to reach an agreement’” (quoting NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st 
Cir. 1941)).
160.  See generally WONG, supra note 5 at 544–45 & tbl.11.3 (describing the history of 
the 1989 NFLPA decertifi cation struggle).
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B. NLRB-Provided Oversight for Players Associations as Certifi ed Exclusive 
Bargaining Agents 
Unlike the uncertainty of antitrust lawsuits, any certifi ed bargaining 
agent has the ability to use NLRB regulations to challenge their employer.161 
Congress adopted the NLRA and its amendments in order to provide “a[n] 
array of rules and remedies” for employee unions to challenge their employers 
outside the scope of antitrust law.162 The original Wagner Act, passed in 1935,
sought to signifi cantly change labor law through providing additional rights 
to employees and additional outlets for employee-management disputes.163 
Congress recognized that the only way to successfully implement the new labor 
rights was to establish “the type of administrative agency that had become a 
hallmark for much of the New Deal legislation.”164 With strict procedures and 
clear jurisdiction, the NLRB-regulated claims of unfair labor practices and bad 
faith negotiations provide labor unions with the stability necessary to challenge 
groups as powerful as sports leagues and team owners.165 Finally, the presence 
of a collective bargaining unit and subsequent bargaining relationship do not 
exclude a union from bringing a successful antitrust suit against its employer, 
while the decertifi cation of such union does preclude any unfair labor practice 
challenge under the Act.166
The presence of an exclusive bargaining agent and a collective bargaining 
relationship allow for parties to use economic sanctions. The players have the 
ability to strike, as set forth in the Act.167 However, even during a strike, a union 
161.  See  HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 27 (observing that the NLRA Act conferred 
a triad of essential rights: “(1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain collectively; and 
(3) the right to engage in strikes [and other concerted activities]”).
162.  Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Williams II, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995)) (“Every employee who is locked out by 
a multiemployer group, every striker who is not reinstated, and every employee who is 
discharged could bring an antitrust action . . . Clearly, Congress had no such intention. As 
noted, the NLRA offers ‘a[n] array of rules and remedies . . . and . . . application of antitrust 
principles to a collective bargaining relationship would disrupt collective bargaining as we 
know it.’”).
163.  See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 26-27 (“Caught in the labyrinth of modern 
industrialism . . . the employee can attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation 
with other employees.” (quoting 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert 
Wagner)).
164.  See id. at 28 (creating the Board).
165.  See generally WONG, supra note 5, at 520 (outlining the procedural process of 
fi ling an unfair labor charge with the Board).
166.  See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (“[A]n agreement among 
employers could be suffi ciently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-
bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not signifi cantly 
interfere with that process.”). The Brown decision also noted that investigation into the 
requirements of insulation from antitrust law should come from the Board “to whose 
‘specialized judgment’ Congress ‘intended to leave’ many of the ‘inevitable questions 
concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to arise in the future’.” See id. (quoting 
NLRB v. Truck Divers Local 499, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)).
167.  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection . . . .”).
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is still bound to bargain in good faith.168 Employers, on the other hand, have 
the ability to “lockout” their employees as a negotiation tactic in collective 
bargaining.169 A likely provision in any CBA is a “no strike, no lockout” clause 
during the term of the CBA, which ensures that these economic sanctions will 
only be used if the agreement expires before a new one is signed.170 If there
is no exclusive bargaining unit, and thus no bargaining relationship, players 
would not have the statutory authority to strike,171 yet it remains unclear 
whether owners could lock out their employees.172 
From 1987–1989, the NFL played for two seasons without a collective 
bargaining agreement, with only a minor three-week strike in 1987.173 However, 
when the NFLPA decertifi ed in 1989, the owners lost their ability to lock out 
the players, but the players were also unable to bargain for any sort of benefi ts 
and were forced to play under the league’s unilateral provisions concerning 
free agency and salary caps.174 Thus, while a Board decertifi cation may ensure 
that the NBA will play the 2011 season, if the season occurs, the league and 
owners could attempt to unilaterally decide upon the provisions surrounding 
every season played where the players do not have an exclusive bargaining 
unit.175
168.  See § 158(b)(3) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice . . . to refuse to bargain 
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to 
the provisions of section 159(a) . . . .”).
169.  See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (holding “an employer 
violates neither § 8(a) (1) nor § 8(a)(3) [of the Act] when, after a bargaining impasse 
has been reached, he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the 
sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining 
position.”).
170.  See generally WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 823–29 (discussing the 
economic uses of strikes and lockouts by bargaining parties).
171.  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (granting employees the right to engage in concerted 
activities “for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”).
172.  Compare WISE & MEYER, supra note 127, at 95 (“[M]ultiple employers cannot 
conduct a lockout if there is no union”), with WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 827 
(stating that economic sanctions can only be used “so long as bargaining is pursued in good 
faith and the lockout is utilized only after the bargaining process has reached stalemate or 
impasse.”).
173.  See id. at 545–46 (charting the NFL collective bargaining history from 1968 to 
2008, and including the 1987 player strike and the 1993 CBA signing).
174.  See generally Thomas George, N.F.L.’s 7-Year Plan Was Really 5 Years of 
Cheating History, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at B15 (arguing that, prior to the 1993 NFL 
CBA, the league had instituted “a heavy-handed, one-sided free agency system” that 
produced only two free agent moves over fi ve years).
175.  See Coon, supra note 3 (noting that players not represented by a collective 
bargaining unit lose key protections and benefi ts).
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Collective bargaining relationships in sports often produce benefi ts to the 
players in return for sacrifi cing much of their “free market” abilities through 
restraints like the draft or salary cap.176 Both the NFL and NBA’s current 
agreements contain explicit sections concerning health care, as well as 
retirement and pension plans, which are all benefi ts the union has accrued 
in negotiations with their respective leagues.177 There will be little, if any 
incentive for the NBA to continue providing these benefi ts to the players in the 
event of union decertifi cation.178 As professional basketball can lead to long–
sustaining and career–ending injuries, the presence of a retirement and pension
plan is something of great value to all current, past, and future players in either 
league. Without a CBA—indeed—without a bargaining agent in general, it is 
unclear whether a pension plan would be as strong as the current plans are or 
if they the plans would exist at all.
Concerning player retirement, the short nature of professional athletic 
careers plays a role in pursuing actions against a league, as well as negotiations 
with leagues and owners. Between the lack of job security and the short length 
of a players’ career (as well as his earnings peak), the possibility of playing 
under unilateral salary restraints for any amount of time can jeopardize the 
earning capacity of NBA athletes.179 While the NFL players were ultimately 
successful in their lawsuits against the league in Powell–McNeil and White, 
the process from the 1987 strike to the 1993 court decisions lasted longer than 
an average NFL player’s career.180 Clearly, the success of these lawsuits comes 
at a price, while the ability to consistently play under mutually agreed-upon 
CBAs provides a more stable economic scheme for professional athletes. 
Therefore, the abilities of a decertifi ed union and its members to exact any 
change or to succeed in obtaining any benefi cial economic provisions pales 
in comparison to both the powers of a certifi ed union, as well as the limited 
capabilities of leagues who are obligated to negotiate with such unions under 
the NLRA.
176.  See Croke, supra note 90, at 176 (noting that collective bargaining negotiations 
produce benefi ts such as minimum team salaries, which would most likely be eliminated 
if a union decertifi ed); Union: NFL Will Cut Off Health Benefi ts in Event of a Lockout, 
SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/142994 
(explaining that the NFL league offi ce stated that if the two sides do not agree on a new 
CBA, the NFL would stop providing health care to NFL players and their families).
177.  See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, supra note 178, at 
arts. XLVI, XLVII (explaining the responsibilities of the team owners to provide health 
coverage and retirement benefi ts); 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 108, 
at arts. III, IV (same). 
178.  See, e.g., Union: NFL Will Cut Off Health Benefi ts in Event of a Lockout, supra 
note 192 (illustrating that without a CBA, leagues will cut the costs of providing benefi ts 
for their players). 
179.  See Lock, supra note 23, at 385 (arguing that because of a lack of job scurity and 
a short average career length, NFL players are unlikely to reach their earning potential if 
they strike or play without a CBA).
180.  See generally How Long is the Average NFL Career?, LIVESTRONG, http://www.
livestrong.com/article/15527-long-average-career-nfl -player/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) 
(explaining that an average career in the NFL is 3.3 years).
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C. Economic Realities of Salary Negotiations and the Failure of the Free 
Market Argument in Today’s Economy
One of the statutorily imposed mandatory subjects of collective bargaining 
is wages,181 and the collective bargaining unit makes a signifi cant difference 
in players’ wages today. In professional sports, there is a large disparity in the 
salaries of top players and the players who receive the minimum contract.182 
While it is possible to argue that the decertifi cation of a union and removal of 
a collective bargaining relationship would allow all players to receive their 
“free market worth,”183 this thought process is severely shortsighted.184 When 
the NBA attempted to decertify in 1995, it was led by superstars Michael 
Jordan and Patrick Ewing, who fought hard against the institution of a hard 
salary cap and received record-breaking salaries.185 Thus, the benefi t felt from 
the presence of a free market, or even the ability to circumvent certain salary 
restrictions, rises to the top.  
This, in contrast to the anticompetitive nature of unions under the Board, 
seeks uniformity within the ranks of the union.186 While the superstars of the 
NBA would probably see their contracts rise in a free market, there would be 
little, if any benefi cial effect for the majority of the league.187 Additionally, while 
players like Michael Jordan argued that there is a competitive disadvantage 
for “highly skilled” employees, much of the trade provisions in sports extend 
beyond specifi c salaries.188 While opponents of certifi cation may argue that 
the players associations would be committing unfair employee representation 
practices, such a claim is short sighted in light of Steele v. Louisville & 
181.  See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (specifying that collective bargaining units are the 
exclusive employee representatives allowed to collectively bargain for employees’ wages).
182.  See Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 6 (explaining 
that, while the mean salary is $2.6 million, half of players make less than $1.4 million).
183.  See McDonough supra note 6, at 859 (noting that the “non-statutory” labor 
exemption protects salary caps from antitrust claims).
184.  But cf. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 813 (conceding how diffi cult it 
would be for “star” players to complain of a CBA that would benefi t the majority of players 
to the star players’ detriment). 
185.  See Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 4, 5, 6 
(explaining that when the 1996 CBA retained the salary cap, it also had a “Larry Bird” 
exception, under which Jordan was able to sign a one-year, $30 million contract). In Major 
League Baseball, when there was no salary cap, but only a “luxury tax,” the top salary was 
over $20 million more than the league minimum. See WEILER & ROBERTS , supra note 51, 
at 307 (explaining that in 2003, Alex Rodriguez of the New York Yankees received $22 
million salary in comparison to the league minimum of $300,00).
186.  See Robert A. McCormick, Interference on Both Sides: The Case Against the 
NFL-NFLPA Contract, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397, 406-07 (1996) (explaining that the 
union’s goal of reducing competition among employees regarding wages and conditions is 
accomplished when employers agree to establish uniform terms of employment).
187.  See generally Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 6–7 
(discussing how, even with salary caps, bottom players tend to have little in the way of 
payouts compared to stars).
188.  See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, supra note 108, 
at arts. VII, X, XXVIII (regulating issues such discrimination, personal appearance, and 
injury grievances); 2005 [NBA] Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 136, at arts. 
VI, XXVIII (incorporating attendance rules and telecom rights). 
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Nashville Railroad, which allows a union to make provisions for differing 
treatment among its members based on “competence and skill.”189
Uncertainty of decertifi cation extends additionally to the protections that a 
collective bargaining relationship provides to the union group as a whole in 
terms of wages, and that protection is vital in the economic realities of 2011.190 
The NBA’s current salary situation illustrates the problematic possibilities of 
employees working without the protections of Board-regulated negotiations.191 
With teams acting more conservative economically, either the disparity in 
salary will skyrocket between the best players and the rest of the league, or the 
lack of salary cap could result in a decrease in salaries in general.192 
Finally, the players may have a viable claim of bad faith bargaining against 
the owners due to the owners’ refusal to turn over fi nancial documents.193 The 
NBPA has questioned the league’s claims that teams are losing money in recent 
years, and the leagues and teams in general have not suffi ciently opened their 
189.  323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944); see, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-
2012, supra note 108, at art. XXIV, § 1(c) (listing several instances in which compensation 
can differ amongst players with different competency levels); 2005 [NBA] Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, supra note 136, at art. VII, § 4 (same).
190.  But see Liz Mullen, Hunter: Talk of $400M NBA Loss ‘Baloney’, SPORTS BUS. 
J. (May 31, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2010/05/20100531/
This-Weeks-News/Hunter-Talk-Of-$400M-NBA-Loss-Baloney.aspx (expressing the view 
that while NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter does not believe that the NBA is losing 
$400 million, the NBA has already provided the union with boxes of fi nancial records in 
support of that claim). 
191.  Compare 2010 NBA Free Agents and Signings, BACKSEAT FAN, http://
backseatfan.com/2010/07/2010-nba-free-agents-and-signings/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) 
(charting how, in the summer of 2010, 9 NBA players signed a maximum or near-maximum 
allowable contract despite owners’ claims of fi nancial hardship), with WONG, supra note 
5, at 532 (noting that the removal of the salary fl oor would result in “tremendous cost 
savings at the players’ expense”).  See generally Michael J. Redding, Third and Long: 
The Issues Facing the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effect 
of an Uncapped Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 102 (2009) (“Operating without a 
minimum salary requirement would allow the owners to set the market for free agents and 
rookies without any artifi cial salary fl oors.”).
192.  See Redding, supra note 109, at 102 (noting how the NFL owners believe that 
“the current fi nancial model is harming them by providing the players with too large of a 
revenue share”).
193.  Compare NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 755–56 (1956) (“Good faith 
bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest 
claims . . . [if] . . . an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of 
bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy.”), with 
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 (stating that furnishing information to a union 
has been found to be an element of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith, but that 
fi rst a union must make a “good faith request for the information to be furnished” and that 
such information has to be relevant).
2011]                                STRENGTH IN NUMBERS                             373 
books to the players’ association.194 While the law only requires an employer 
to disclose fi nancial documents when there is a stated “inability to pay,” the 
economic claims of the league may warrant an order to disclose fi nancial 
information.195 Even if a bad faith bargaining claim would be unsuccessful, 
forcing the NBA to claim that it could pay wages, but simply desires to lower 
them, would be a valuable bargaining chip in collective bargaining negotiations.
 The NBPA should remain certifi ed as the exclusive bargaining agent under 
the Board. Based on the stable options available to Board–certifi ed unions in 
collective bargaining and the benefi ts of administrative oversight, as well as 
the recent legal challenges in the NFL labor dispute, decertifying either union 
and attempting to individually bargain for contracts without a CBA in place 
will ultimately hurt the players as a group. 
194.  See Union Head Smith: NFL Owners Gearing Up for Lockout in 2011, NAT’L 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl .com/news/story/09000d5d81b1858f/article/union-
head-smith-nfl -owners-gearing-up-for-lockout-in-2011 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) 
(describing the union representative’s complaints about the league’s willingness to turn 
over fi nancial documents).  Billy Hunter has repeatedly questioned David Stern’s claims 
of fi nancial loss and has requested additional documents. See Mullen, supra note 190 
(explaining that Hunter has requested “the sales prospectuses NBA teams have shown 
to buyers and would-be buyers of franchises in the last few years” to illustrate that teams 
are advertising themselves as profi table to potential buyers, while claiming losses to the 
union).
195. See Nielsen Lithographing Co. & Graphic Comms. Int’l Union, 305 N.L.R.B. 
697, 701 (1991) (holding that an employer also need not disclose its “projection of its future 
ability to compete” but that such estimation of its ability to compete is not “equate[d]” with 
its ability to pay).
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